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PREFACE 
There is a tension that exists in higher education today and it involves the way 
people communicate with each other. Of all places, college and university campuses --
frequently the locus of significant discovery and the development of profound insight as 
a result of dialogue -- should be settings which are open and free for expression and 
inquiry wherever it may lead. 
One might also expect, however, that a collegial environment would produce and 
display the most rational discourse and highest levels of civility, due to what arguably 
could be the common objective universally shared by all so engaged; namely, to arrive 
at the "truth," or at least somewhere closer to it than before the dialogue began. 
Such is often not the case these days. Indeed, there are many issues the 
discussions about which are conspicuously avoided in many academic communities. 
"Political correctness," while well-intended in its early days, has created a chilling effect 
on many campuses. Sensitivity to the feelings of all individuals and groups who have 
endured years of insensitivity should most certainly be increased, but it should not be 
at the expense of genuine and legitimate intellectual pursuits. 
The matter may even be a bit more complex at church-related institutions. 
Though still committed to the pursuit of truth, some working in these environments 
begin with the presumption that certain truths have already been apprehended and there 
is nothing more to say in those areas. Consequently, tolerance for expression about 
certain topics may be considerably lower when that is the case. That is their right, of 
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course, and it may be perfectly consistent with the mission and the values upon which 
the institution was established and its curriculum is based. 
It is also imµollant to recognize, however, that freedom and propriety may be 
able to he balanced in such a way so as not to do irreparable damage to either in the 
process of gaining a better understanding of the world and the human condition nor in 
transmitting what is discovered to succeeding generations of students. The key, it might 
be suggested, is in remembering that, when one engages in the exercise of his or her 
freedom with the spirit that it is done on behalf of or in the service of others, tensions 
can be eased and the cooperation that is such an essential part of collegial collaboration 
can be maximized. 
While a synthesis of freedom and service may appear to be contradictory, those 
who view each in relation to the other might find that, when practiced in the context of 
a Christian college, both can be enhanced. This study was motivated by an interest in 
the degree to which the colleges and universities of the Lutheran tradition have 
embraced this principle, one which served as a central tenet in the theology of Martin 
Luther himself. 
It is hoped that in providing a portrait of how these institutions approach both 
their relation to the Church and the freedom of expression on their campuses, the 
importance of these two crucial components of Lutheran higher education can be 
recognized and deliberate measures taken to make them consistent with the missions and 
objectives of each of these Christian academic communities. 
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A Christian is a perfectly free lord of all, subject to none. 
A Christian is a perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all. 
Martin Luther, The Freedom of a Christian, 1520. 
CHAPTER l 
INTRODUCTION 
Context and Justification for the Study 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees, in part, that 
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances." Supreme Court decisions have extended the applicability of this language 
to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which 
provides, "No state shalJ deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law." While most recognize that "no law" has not been interpreted to grant 
absolute freedom of expression of any kind, few deny that the First Amendment contains 
some of the most important rights members of a democratic society could possess. 
Indeed, freedom of expression is often viewed as holding the status of a "preferred 
freedom" vis-a-vis other constitutional rights with which it may find itself in conflict. 
In colleges and universities, freedom of expression is important because 
communication about and discussion of ideas arguably is one of the primary purposes 
of higher education. If there is anything that ought to prevail in an institution which 
desires and deserves the designation "higher education," it is open and uninhibited 
communication. Therefore, the nature and limits of free expression on a college or 
university campus could very well represent one of the more important issues facing 
higher education today, if only because without the ability to inquire, explore, discuss, 
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debate, and disagree, something surely must be lacking from the collegiate experience. 
This extends beyond mere academic freedom, although that constitutes a significant part 
of it. It goes to the very heart of how the educational process in a "collegial" setting 
occurs. It is true that individuals can educate themselves by independent inquiry, 
exploration, and study. The purpose of a "college," however, which is literally "an 
association of individuals ... engaged in some common pursuit" (Webster's New World 
Dictionary, 1976), is predicated on the notion that communication is central to the 
endeavor. If the process cannot include free and open dialogue where participants have 
the right to be wrong, disagreeable, and even offensive in the process, the educational 
experience and quality of the learning environment is diminished. 
In public colleges and universities which are, by definition, government agencies, 
the First Amendment applies and the freedom of expression can be taken to its 
constitutional limit. In the private sector, which includes church-related colleges and 
universities, institutions of higher education are not directly bound to the First 
Amendment, since the Bill of Rights is only applicable to action by the federal 
government and the states (which would include all public colleges and universities), to 
the extent that its provisions have been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. But even on private campuses, freedom of expression is 
crucial to the educational mission. Many private institutions affirm the principle of free 
speech and extend the liberty to the level allowed in the public sector. For example, a 
given church-related college may elect to adopt and publish in its official handbooks a 
policy which, for all intents and purposes, extends the same rights to its community, 
thereby binding itself contractually to the same standards or level of tolerance which the 
Constitution automatically imposes upon its public counterparts. 
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While free expression has always been a significant issue in higher education, 
since the late 1980s questions concerning the appropriate nature and limits of expression 
have been challenging the intellectual community, not merely as theoretical constructs, 
but in terms of pnictical policy questions revolving around hate speech, political 
correctness, and academic freedom. A cursory examination of a few recent issues of T'he 
Chronicle of Hi~her Education, for example, would produce a list of articles on the 
following topics: community response to racist graffiti written on the walls of an office 
at the University of Colorado (May 12, 1993, p. A4); offensive messages transmitted on 
an electronic bulletin board which raise questions about whether this form of expression 
should be restricted (May 19, 1993, p. 28); the freedom of one student to refer to a group 
of other students as "water buffalos" (May 19, I 993, p. A32); a concern over the content 
of commencement speeches which might be controversial (May 19, 1993, p. A33); 
students debating whether a panel should be established to restrict offensive art after 
some object to the display of a sculpture depicting "fatness" (May 5, 1993, p. AS); the 
implications for free expression when 4,000 copies of a right-wing campus newspaper 
often critical of feminism are stolen at Penn State (July 28, 1993, p. A30); the theft of 
14,000 copies of the student daily at the University of Pennsylvania by African American 
students who acted in protest of the paper's coverage of racial issues (September 22, 
1993, p. A35). The list could be extended, but the point is that such incidents continue 
to occur, each one raising issues of both freedom and propriety and necessitating the 
determination by someone where the limit on certain kinds of expression will be 
established. Those which end up as court cases, of course, have the limits set by judges. 
Speaking at the May, 1993, commencement of George Mason University, Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist acknowledged the timeliness of the issue of free expression 
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in higher education by addressing the tension that exists between the need, on one hand, 
to explore ideas which may cause offense to some and the obligation, on the other hand, 
to challenge those "ideas or viewpoints which seem obnoxious to us" (The Chronicle of 
l11gher Education, June 2, 1993, p. Al8). 
It is not uncommon for personal interests or individual rights to collide in 
constitutional litigation as these incidents illustrate. On one hand, individuals utter all 
manner of things in the name of free expression, some of these quite offensive. In 
response, others claim a right to be free from that which has the result of bringing harm 
to them through certain remarks or behavior. When rights seem to be in conflict, one 
doctrine of constitutional interpretation assigns a "preferred" status to the First 
Amendment freedoms, for it is claimed that they represent the foundation upon which 
all other freedoms in the society rest. While it was not necessarily declared as such, this 
conflict really becomes the underlying issue in most, if not all, controversies involving 
offensive speech and free expression. 
Private institutions, technically free from First Amendment constraints, may be 
as restrictive as they want in terms of what kind of expression is prohibited on campus. 
Many, however, do set:m to want to operate as a free marketplace of ideas where the 
quality of one's expression determines the degree to which it is given value. Indeed, 
some of the most open academic environments are found on private campuses which 
pride themselves in having a progressive approach to free expression. Elite institutions 
such as Stanford and Yale, for example, see their missions as including the advancement 
of knowledge through research in every area. Their private status seemingly imposes no 
restrictions on that which they may seek to explore. Yale University produced an 
extensive "Report" on free expression which clearly implies that the search for truth is 
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to take priority over an individual's moral responsibility to remain civil (Pavela, 1989, 
p. 5). Such a position reinforces the notion that if the right of free expression is to mean 
anything, people are going to have to be able to tolerate hearing things on occasion that 
they would prefer not to hear. In other words, it could be argued that a college or 
university campus is the very place where expression should be the most free. 
Others, however, take a different perspective and assert that precisely because it 
is an institution of higher education, higher standards of conduct and expression can be 
expected and even demanded and, as a result, administrators can be that much more 
scrutinizing about what is said. While private -- and especially church-related --
institutions may take advantage of their status and establish strict codes which proscribe 
offensive remarks, they must recognize that when they do this they may be 
compromising their equally important status as a place where some offense may have to 
be endured in order to get closer to the truth for which many claim to be searching. 
Young and Gehring, editors of the newsletter The College Student and the 
Courts, have commented in a recent issue (June, 1993) that "[t]he regulation of hate 
crimes is one of the most difficult issues facing the colleges and universities of our 
nation" (p. 1031). Attempts at such regulation by both public and private institutions 
have borne out the controversial nature of this approach of dealing with offensive 
expression. Two state universities, the University of Michigan and the University of 
Wisconsin, have had speech codes struck down by federal courts because they were 
found to be in violation of the First Amendment. 
One of the luxuries for those at church-related institutions is that there need be 
no reluctance to provide plenty of value-laden responses to those whose messages divert 
from the moral or religious standards of the sponsoring body. It is important to 
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remember that there is nothing in the First Amendment to stop either a private or a 
public institution from condemning in the strongest possible language incidents which, 
though perhaps constitutionally protected, are reprehensible to decent indivi<luals. 
Since the problems connected with offensive speech which have been experienced 
on a number of college campuses raise questions of propriety and, ultimately, whether 
it is right to allow certain things to be written or said, one wonders whether those who 
operate within the context of church-related academic communities would be more 
inclined to support or oppose restrictions on such expression. In other words, is doing 
what is believed to be right, as defined by certain religious values, just as important, or 
perhaps even more important, than tolerating what one may have a right to do? Since 
many of the private institutions in the United States are church-related and look to their 
missions, values, and the beliefs of their respective denominations to help them 
determine how certain practices and policies will be carried out, it will be helpful to 
examine how this segment reconciles the challenges of open and free expression in their 
academic communities with the values they may espouse regarding how individuals on 
their campuses should act toward and treat one another. It may also be instructive to 
see if their institution's values are actually reflected in the attitudes of their presidents. 
Finally, there is additional interest in knowing, in the context of the church-related 
institution, how the rights of specific constituencies such as individual students, student 
groups, and guest speakers are viewed in such settings as classrooms, residence halls, 
open forums, outside lectures, and on the campus generally. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to determine the attitudes of the presidents of 
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Lutheran colleges and universities about the nature and limits of free expression on a 
church-related campus. More specifically, the study sought to determine: 1) the degree 
of church-relatedness for a sample of Lutheran colleges and universities; 2) the level of 
support or tolerance that exists for freedom of expression on each campus according to 
its president; 3) the possible relationship between an institution's degree of church-
relatedness and its level of tolerance for free expression; and 4) how the different 
Lutheran church bodies which sponsor these institutions compare to each other in terms 
of these relationships and attitudes. 
Statement of the Problem 
While academic communities are places where open and free express10n 1s 
essential to accomplish their objectives, church-related colleges and universities may be 
confronted with a potential conflict if certain types of expression occurring on their 
campuses are considered by some to be inconsistent with institutional mission and 
values. As the individual ultimately responsible for the climate that exists on the 
campus, the president of a church-related institution, therefore, must weigh the nature 
of this expression and consider imposing or recommending limits if it violates the 
standards established by the institution's religious character. Specifically, the problem 
can be stated as follows: Does the degree of an institution's church-relatedness influence 
its president's attitudes toward the nature and limits of free expression on the campus? 
Theoretical Rationale 
The presidents of these institutions were selected to serve as the sample for the 
study because presidents are often seen as the single most important individuals in an 
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academic community and the ones who either actually have the power to -- or are 
perceived to be able to -- set the tone for the kind of environment that should be 
established for the communication and free exchange of ideas. Presidents not only 
determine lhe direction for but also embody their institutions. lt is assumed, as well, 
that they are somewhat familiar and conversant with the general topic, given the amount 
that has been written and said about it in recent months and their own need to remain 
knowledgeable about such issues. 
Presidents from Lutheran colleges and universities were chosen for a number of 
reasons. First, the forty-five institutions in the United States affiliated with some 
Lutheran body constitute an identifiable and distinct -- if not distinctive -- segment of 
the private sector. The first Lutheran college was founded in 1832 and ever since then 
thousands of students and professors have engaged in teaching and learning in the 
context of values, both educational and theological, which have their roots in the 
Reformation tradition. 
The importance of free inquiry and expression was important to Martin Luther 
himself, who, for the sake of the truth as he understood it, risked his own positions in 
both the Church and the university for persisting in that truth. It was believed that 
presidents of Lutheran institutions would appreciate the significance of the tension that 
exists between the need for free expression and the problems that can arise when the 
freedom is abused. Some were also willing to identify the problem as one with 
theological overtones, something that was of interest to the researcher. 
It was also believed, however, that because of the various denominational 
differences that exist as a result of American Lutheranism's historical divisions, the 
members of the sample would display a moderately wide range of views on the relative 
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importance of freedom and restraint in their responses to both closed-ended statements 
and open-ended interview questions. 
Also facilitating the use of these individuals is the existence of a relatively 
moderate degree of cooperation among the presidents themselves, many of whom 
participate regularly in annual meetings and other activities sponsored by the Lutheran 
Educational Conference of North America (LECNA), which provides support for and 
is open to all Lutheran colleges and universities regardless of one's particular synodical 
or denominational affiliation among the five Lutheran bodies which sponsor institutions 
of higher education. 
Given this setting, and the expectation that the sample would produce results 
suggesting that a wide range exists among these institutions and their presidents on scales 
of both church-relatedness and support or tolerance for free expression, the theory 
posited is that Lutheran colleges and universities exhibit characteristics which allow them 
to be placed into one of four categories corresponding to the four quadrants produced 
when a scale of church-relatedness and a scale of support for free expression are made 
to intersect. The first scale ranges from "secular" to "religious" and the second from 
"freedom" to "restraint." Pairing an institution's scores from the two scales and plotting 
the coordinates on a graph produces a scattergram which demonstrates not only the 
relationship between church-relatedness and support for freedom of expression, but also 
the degree to which individual church bodies arrange themselves into clusters in the 
respective regions of the graph. These are designated as either Secular-Freedom, 
Secular-Restraint, Religious-Freedom, or Religious-Restraint. 
The theory, therefore, suggests that the presidents of more secular ( or less 
church-related) institutions are more supportive of free expression in higher education 
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in general, and Lutheran higher education in particular, than those from institutions 
which are more religious (or church-related), and consequently less supportive, or more 
likely to favor restraint, when it comes to offensive expression. This theory gives rise to 
another as well; namely, that the institutions tend to cluster together with the others 
from their own church bodies. 
Finally, the study also provides an opportunity to examine the extent to which 
the principle of freedom of expression can be viewed as either a legal, moral, or 
theological issue; or at least one having legal, moral, and theological dimensions. These 
three categories represent an ascending degree of intolerance as applied to offensive or 
controversial expression in a church-related campus setting, and those who see free 
expression merely as a legal issue with no moral or theological dimension are more 
likely to oppose limits on expression. Those who see it primarily as a theological issue 
recognize it as having a moral and legal dimension as well, but seem to respond on the 
basis of their theological perspective or their institution's religious values. These are 
more likely to support limits on offensive expression. 
Definition of Terms 
Expression refers to any written, spoken, or symbolic communication from one 
person to another person or group. Close physical proximity, especially in the case of 
written expression, is not a requirement. 
Offensive expression is that which causes an average person of his or her social 
group to become hurt or offended because a connection can be seen between the 
expression and the characteristics of the individual victim. A racial slur is an example 
of one form of offensive expression. Offensive expression does not refer, for example, 
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to vulgar language which is uttered in the presence of someone, regardless of whether 
it offends or not, if it could not reasonably be construed as an insult specifically directed 
to the offended person and connected to his or her group status. 
A group is "an aggregation of people identified by a common race, religion, 
national origin, ethnicity, gender, or sexual preference" (Laramee, 1991, p. 57); and 
group defamation refers to "[olral, written, or symbolic speech that debases or degrades 
members of a group on the basis of a characteristic that is allegedly common to the 
group, or that by its very utterance inflicts injury on a member of a group, or that 
promotes animosity against a group" (Laramee, p. 57). 
Hate speech is basically the same as group defamation but could be directed to 
an individual as well. An epithet, often the vehicle used in the commission of hate 
speech and group defamation, is any disparaging word, phrase, or "slur" directed to an 
individual or group. Epithets are often referred to as something which one might "hurl" 
at another, such as one would do with a rock or other weapon intended to cause harm. 
Racist speech is hate speech or group defamation based on one particular characteristic 
of the victim. Often racist speech is accomplished through the use of epithets. The 
presumption is that little or no substantive content, and consequently a minimal amount 
of value is present with this kind of expression. (See Alexander ( 1989) for a discussion 
of "low value speech.") 
Values attempts to convey the notion of some qualitative, and admittedly 
subjective, set of "principles, goals, or standards held or accepted by an individual, class, 
society" (Webster's New World Dictionary, 1976), or some other group which carry for 
the group a sense of intrinsic worth. Religious values, therefore, are those principles 
which have as their source a belief in the tenets of the particular church or 
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denomination of the people who hold them, with Christian values, in turn, being those 
which have been founded on the specific teachings of Jesus Christ. While "Christian" 
and "religious" clearly should not be viewed as being synonymous, both derive their 
sense of value from a particular understanding of a God whose relationship with the 
believers helps define the values. An example of a common Christian value is that all 
people are considered to be precious in the sight of God and, because they have been 
redeemed by the work of Christ, therefore, have inherent dignity and worth. 
Consequently, some Christians would consider the right to unrestricted freedom of 
expression to be in conflict with and subordinate to certain Christian values. 
Toleration in the context of this study refers to the willingness to endure or 
absorb, for the sake of the constitutional principle, expression which is offensive or 
undesirable. Freedom of expression is the collective right provided in the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and covers spoken, written, and symbolic 
speech, as well as demonstrations. Symbolic speech is expression which conveys a 
message in a non-verbal manner. Wearing a black arm-band and burning the flag are 
well known examples. 
Church-relatedness is the characteristic of each Lutheran college which has been 
used to analyze the attitudes of the institutional presidents. Very generally, it represents 
how certain factors, such as the college or university's mission statement, course 
requirements, policies, traditions, worship practices, denominational affiliation of faculty 
and students, and requirements for a president to be a member of the clergy, contribute 
to a portrait of each institution as an agency more or less of its sponsoring church. 
It has been stated that this is a study of presidential attitudes. According to Shaw 
& Wright ( 1967), 
attitude is best viewed as a set of affective reactions toward the attitude 
object, derived from the concepts or beliefs that the individual has 
concerning the object and predisposing the individual to behave in a 
certain manner toward the attitude object. Although intimately related 
to attitude, neither the propositions that the individual accepts about the 
object (beliefs) nor the action tendencies are a part of the attitude itself 
(p. 13). 
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Belief, in turn, is "any expectancy, set, or proposition which the individual 
accepts as true of the object or event." One's "belief becomes an attitude when it is 
accompanied by an affective component which reflects the evaluation of the preferability 
of the characteristics or existence of the object. The attitude would be the sum of such 
beliefs about the object" (Shaw & Wright, 1967, p. 13). In comparison with an 
"opinion," which has been considered more of a verbalized response, "attitudes" are 
"unconscious ... response predispositions" (p. 5). 
General Hypothesis 
The general hypothesis for this study was that the attitudes of the presidents of 
Lutheran colleges and universities concerning the nature and limits of free expression 
on their campuses would be influenced to some extent by the degree of church-
relatedness of their respective institutions. More specifically, it was expected that the 
Lutheran colleges and universities which display a higher degree of church-relatedness 
would have less tolerance for offensive or questionable expression. Likewise, the 
attitudes of the presidents of those institutions which are less church-related would be 
less supportive of formal codes, policies, or practices which would place limits on 
expression determined to be controversial or offensive. In short, it was believed that 
support for expression would be linked to how "secular" or "religious" an institution is. 
1-1-
Sample and Data Gathering Procedures 
Each one of the presidents of the forty-five Lutheran colleges and universities in 
the United States was contacted with an invitation to become a participant in this study. 
Forty of them elected to be included. 
The collection of data took place in three phases. The first phase consisted of 
mailing a researcher-designed survey instrument to each of the forty-five members of the 
population. It solicited information not only about the presidents themselves but also 
about certain characteristics of their respective institutions. 
The second phase consisted of the distribution of another researcher-designed 
survey instrument. Copies of this were administered to some of the presidents in person 
at a LECNA meeting many of them attended. Those who were not at the meeting or 
those who did not complete it on that occasion were then mailed a copy along with a 
request to complete and return it. It consisted of 48 items to which the presidents could 
respond in one of the following ways: strongly agree, mildly agree, neither agree nor 
disagree, mildly disagree, or strongly disagree. Forty individuals ultimately responded 
to this instrument. Since all of them had also completed the first phase, these presidents 
constituted the sample. The three who had completed the first survey but refused to 
respond to the second were dropped from the sample, although their responses to the 
items on the first survey are included in the presentation of the results for those items 
in Appendix 13. 
The third phase of the study, which was more supplemental than integral to the 
first two, consisted of phone interviews with those who indicated at the end of the 
second survey instrument a willingness to participate in this way. Although twenty-one 
of the forty originally said they would be interviewed, seventeen ultimately provided oral 
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responses to nine researcher-designed questions they had received in advance. 
Assumptions 
The assumptions underlying the study can be grouped into five main categories. 
The first is "Free Expression" and includes the following points: the right to freedom 
of expression is not absolute but, at the same time, it is also one of the most important 
rights for a democratic society. On the other hand, some expression, even that which 
traditionally has been considered to be within the scope of constitutional protection, is 
so harmful to certain individuals that proscribing it may be warranted. 
The second category is "Free Expression and Higher Education." Here it is 
assumed that open and free expression is an essential commodity for students in an 
academic community; that offensive speech by and among students is a current and 
significant issue for higher education; and that differences of opinion and the discussion 
of those differences make an educational community vital and dynamic. Therefore, 
some conflict and tension is inevitable and often good insofar as it serves to stimulate 
intellectual debate. 
Third, with regard to "College and University Presidents," it is asserted that 
individuals holding this position understand the tension that exists between the value of 
free expression in an academic community on the one hand, and the importance of 
maintaining a climate free of communication which does not contribute to the 
educational experience, or achieve any social good, on the other hand. Moreover, these 
not only are the best individuals to represent the institutional viewpoint on the issue of 
expression in higher education, but also are likely to be relatively well informed about 
the topic. Finally, it is assumed that college and university presidents will be answering 
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not as private individuals but as spokespersons for their institutions. 
The fourth category of assumptions deals with "Lutheran Colleges and 
Universities." About them it is assumed that they will vary widely in terms of the degree 
of church-relatedness they exhibit. 
Finally, under the category of "Legal and Moral Rights," it is assumed that legal 
or constitutional rights do not create moral rights. That is, having a legal right to say 
something does not automatically mean that it is morally right to say. 
Limitations 
The following limitations, concerns, and precautions have been identified in the 
preparation of this study. First, while the sample is numerically small, it does represent 
89 percent of the entire population, so generalizations can be made based on the 
findings. However, they may not be generalizable beyond this particular population and 
sample. 
Second, the population is very homogeneous; all but one of the presidents are 
white males and almost all of them are Lutherans of northern European ancestry. To 
the extent that the personal characteristics of the members of the sample int1uence their 
responses, this may have resulted in relatively insignificant findings, especially in terms 
of any value outside the population's constituency itself. Since one of the objects of the 
study is to discern the subtle differences that exist among the institutions, however, their 
similarities relative to other groups may not be relevant. In other words, the focus 
becomes the more subtle differences that do exist within this specific sample of Lutheran 
college and university presidents. 
Third, arriving at a determination of what constitutes church-relatedness is 
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something about which few researchers have been able to agree. The literature review 
in the next chapter presents some examples of how the issue has been addressed. 
Fourth, presidents were asked to respond as representatives or spokespersons for 
their institutions. A respondent may hold an attitude as an individual different from his 
official response given as a president speaking for the institution. If a president 
responded on the basis of a personal attitude which differed from the official position 
of the corporate entity, the findings could be misleading. 
Finally, because of the somewhat sensitive nature of the study, some members of 
the sample may have been inclined to give answers which reflected neither their true 
attitudes nor the practice of the institution but rather what was thought to be the answer 
most acceptable to whomever may see the responses. Dillman (1978) acknowledges the 
"tendency to offer socially desirable answers" or "to answer questions in a way that 
conforms to dominant belief patterns among groups to which the respondent feels some 
identification or allegiance" (p. 62). He suggests that it is most likely to occur in 
interviews and least likely in mail surveys (pp. 62-63). Perhaps because the first phase 
of this study was done exclusively by mail, and the second with the researcher present, 
but in a non-interactive way, a sense of trust may have been established so that, by the 
time the interviews were conducted, the inclination to respond candidly and honestly 
were present to a greater degree for those who participated in that phase of the study. 
Significance of the Study 
Given that the attitudes of the presidents of any sector of higher education, let 
alone Lutheran higher education, have not been studied on the matter, this study 
provides a starting point for further exploration on most aspects of this topic. It also 
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contributes to the general literature on church-related higher education and, to a lesser 
extent, on presidential leadership in those kinds of institutions. 
In short, the study was designed to reveal the attitudes of a particular group of 
college presidents on an important and current topic in higher education. It 
demonstrates the differences that exist among Lutheran colleges and universities with 
regard to the varying degrees of church-relatedness they display. It also reveals some 
interesting tendencies with regard to the individual church bodies themselves. Finally, 
it provides some indication of the degree to which church-relatedness affects how 
Lutheran college and university presidents view the nature and limits of free expression 
on their campuses. 
The theoretical significance of the study is represented by the convergence of the 
scales of church-relatedness and tolerance for expression which were devised specifically 
to examine this problem. When all the paired scores are plotted on intersecting axes, 
the position of each member of the sample can be viewed in relation to every other 
member enabling one to determine the degree to which each institution exhibits the 
characteristics of one which is either "secular and free," "secular and restrained," 
"religious and free," or "religious and restrained." By then identifying the specific 
denominational affiliation of each institution, one can also determine the degree to 
which the different church bodies represented within the sample display any distinctive 
characteristics, both as individual groups and in relation to each other. Particularly, this 
will allow a determination of the degree to which denominational affiliation may be 
related to how a president views the issue of free expression in society, in higher 
education generally, on a church-related campus, and at his own particular institution. 
From a practical perspective, this study is not only helpful in clarifying the role 
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that religious mission and values play in the life and practice of Lutheran colleges and 
universities; it also reveals the degree to which each institution has developed its position 
with regard to offensive expression on the campus. This provides an opportunity for 
institutions to reevaluate existing policies and, if seen as appropriate, to establish new 
ones which address the issues identified in the study. Finally, the study also presents a 
relatively clear portrait of Lutheran higher education, generally, insofar as it reveals the 
differences which exist among institutions calling themselves "Lutheran," as well as 
differences among the various church bodies with which they are affiliated. 
Oq:anization of the Study 
In this chapter the context for the study was established by explaining the 
pertinent constitutional principles involved as well as the timeliness and relevance of the 
topic. An attempt was also made to justify the relevance of the study for church-related 
higher education today by citing a number of recent examples of the kinds of problems 
that have emerged in this sector. The specific purpose of the study was then stated and 
the research problem identified. After providing a rationale for the study's theoretical 
framework, including an explanation as to why it was facilitated by using Lutheran 
college and university presidents as the sample, significant terms used in the study were 
defined. The general hypothesis was then posited, information about the sample and 
data gathering procedures were outlined, and the assumptions, limitations and 
significance of the study were stated. The chapters that follow include a review of the 
literature which deals with both free expression in higher education generally, as well 
as how it is addressed in church-related higher education; an explanation of the 
methodology employed to conduct the study; an analysis of the results of both survey 
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and interview phases of the study; and a summary and discussion of the findings, 
including the implications that exist for current practice and future research. 
CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
After reviewing briefly the purpose of this study, as well as the rationale for 
undertaking it, the main focus of this chapter will be to summarize the literature relevant 
to the study itself. It will be presented in two major sections. The first is an examination 
of "Free Expression in Higher Education Institutions" and will include accounts of some 
recent incidents, court decisions, and critical commentary on the topic. The second 
section will address "Free Expression in Church-Related Higher Education Institutions" 
and will discuss, in turn, criteria for defining church-related higher education in America 
and the relationship between truth and freedom at church-related institutions. A 
conclusion will summarize the main points made in the chapter which are most pertinent 
to the chapters that follow. 
Review of and Rationale for the Study 
This study represented an attempt to discover how the presidents of Lutheran 
colleges and universities felt about the importance of freedom of expression in their 
church-related academic communities. In the abstract, one would assume that this 
sample of well-educated, relatively successful administrators would recognize the 
intrinsic value of freedom of expression. They are, after all, educators and, as such, 
supposedly interested in a better understanding of the various subjects that can be 
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taught, learned and explored. Because the normal vehicle used in teaching, learning, 
and reporting one's research findings involves expression, to support its suppression 
seems contrary to the educational task. In short, Lutheran college and university 
presidents, along with most others in academe, would seem naturally to be among those 
for whom freedom should tend to prevail over restraint. 
It is important to recognize, however, that as Lutheran college and university 
presidents, these individuals may also feel a commitment to other values as well; namely, 
those arising out of the church-related nature of their institutions. It is possible and 
even likely for some that the imposition of limits upon or lack of support for certain 
forms of expression could be justified because they violate values inherent in their 
mission as an arm of their church. 
An undertaking to discover how this particular segment of higher education 
administrators approaches the topic should help those who might wish to understand 
better not only church-relatedness in Lutheran higher education but also the challenges 
that confront all college and university presidents who may be forced to determine an 
appropriate balance between freedom and restraint. 
Summary of Relevant Literature 
Free Expression in Higher Education Institutions 
Introduction. This section of the review consists of an examination of a small 
number of court decisions and critical commentary directed to them; the views of several 
scholars on the issue of free expression in general and campus-based expression in 
particular, especially as it may address both legal and moral dimensions of the topic; and 
information regarding what little research has been done in the area of institutional 
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positions on the nature and limits of free expression in church-related higher education. 
Due to the nature of the topic, the case references which appear throughout are 
not necessarily discussed in chronological order. Indeed, the review begins with one of 
the most recent Supreme Court decisions to address the issue of free expression 
generally. 
The summaries of the articles which display varying perspectives on the propriety 
of restrictions for offensive expression attempt to identify the degree to which the 
scholars cited view the matter as a legal or a moral issue. No literature was found which 
approaches it from a theological or spiritual perspective. 
The current state of the law: The St. Paul case. Those who are concerned about 
the nature and limits of free expression on college and university campuses have watched 
with more than passing interest the developments in, the announcement of, and the 
various responses to the recent United States Supreme Court decision in the case of 
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 120 L Ed 2d 305 (1992). The case itself is not situated in or directly 
related to any particular institution of higher education, but, rather, a municipality. The 
implications for colleges and universities, both public and private, are significant, 
nonetheless, and could have a substantial impact on how the nature and limits of free 
expression on campuses across this country are viewed for some time to come. The case 
is quite complex, not only because of the perplexing issues and arguments which are 
raised on both sides, but also because of the split among the Justices as to the rationale 
for their respective opinions. While the decision itself was unanimous, the majority 
opinion was joined by only five persons. The three separate opinions in the case, while 
concurring in the result, represent a rather adamant disagreement with the majority over 
the direction current First Amendment doctrine should take. 
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The incident which gave rise to this decision involved the burning of a cross on 
the lawn of an African-American family in the city of St. Paul, Minnesota. The 
individual accused of committing this act was charged under St. Paul's Bias-Motivated 
Crime Ordinance, one of several laws which could have been invoked to respond to this 
matter. It provided: 
"Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, 
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a 
burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable 
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the 
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct 
and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor" (R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 120 L Ed 2d, 
at 315). 
The trial court ruled that this "ordinance was substantially overbroad and impermissibly 
content-based and therefore facially invalid under the First Amendment" (p. 315). On 
appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, however, this ruling was reversed. The state 
Supreme Court was of the opinion that the ordinance was drafted narrowly enough to 
avoid impermissible restrictions on the content of expression and, therefore, provided 
the state with a valid "' means toward accomplishing the compelling interest in 
protecting the community against bias-motivated threats to public safety and order'" (p. 
316). 
The United States Supreme Court first acknowledged its obligation to accept the 
Minnesota Supreme Court's narrow reading of the ordinance as one which "reaches only 
those expressions that constitute 'fighting words' within the meaning of Chaplinsky" (p. 
316). In spite of this and the Petitioner's request to "modify the scope of the Chaplinsky 
formulation, thereby invalidating the ordinance as 'substantially overbroad,"' the Court 
then immediately went on to rule that it would not be necessary to consider the 
overbreadth issue. The majority stated that even if "all of the expression reached by the 
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ordinance is proscribable under the 'fighting words' doctrine, the ordinance itself is 
unconstitutional on its face because "it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on 
the basis of the subjects the speech addresses" (p. 316). 
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, an<l Justices 
Kennedy, Souter and Thomas. Justices White, Blackmun and Stevens, on the other 
hand, felt strongly enough about what the focus in the case should have been that they 
each wrote separate opinions to demonstrate their division with those in the majority; 
if not with the outcome, then at least with the logic they employed. 
Justice Scalia was careful to make clear the fact that he finds it "reprehensible" 
that any family would have a cross burned in its front yard (p. 326). Because St. Paul 
had "sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without adding the First 
Amendment to the fire," however, he determined that the "content discrimination" in 
this ordinance was not "reasonably necessary to achieve St. Paul's compelling interests" 
(p. 326). In other words, a city can punish such destructive behavior without connecting 
it to a restriction on expression which a particular governmental body may find 
undesirable, for the First Amendment exists precisely to prevent Congress, any state or 
a unit thereof from proscribing expression with which it may disagree, even if such a 
restriction is eminently popular with, or viewed as wise by, most of the people. This 
particular law, which was found to have gone "even beyond mere content discrimination 
to actual viewpoint discrimination," could not, under the First Amendment, "impose 
special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects" (p. 
323). 
Justice White, whose opinion was joined by Justices O'Connor and Blackmun 
and, in part, by Justice Stevens, sounded very much like a dissenter in the case. The 
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senior justice concurred, nevertheless, in the ultimate judgment that the St. Paul 
ordinance was unconstitutional. His opinion made three points: ( 1) any ordinance which 
prohibits "expressive conduct that causes only hurt feelings, offense, or resentment," had 
the effect of criminalizing expression protected by the First Amendment and th us was 
overbroad;" (2) there are "certain categories of speech, including 'fighting words,' 
[which] are not protected by the First Amendment;" and (3) this ordinance "would have 
been a valid regulation of unprotected speech for purposes of the Constitution's 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause" if it had not been overbroad (p. 306). 
Justice Blackmun also stated in his brief concurrence that the ordinance 
restricted expression protected by the First Amendment and was therefore invalid. In 
addition, he feared that the majority's approach would have the effect of either relaxing 
"the level of strict scrutiny applicable to content-based laws," or be interpreted as an 
attempt by the Court to manipulate First Amendment doctrine to strike down an 
ordinance the majority could not support as a matter of policy (p. 306). Finally, he 
pointed out, somewhat cynically, that the majority's new approach to the nature and 
limits of expression either will or will not become precedent which, in either case, is very 
discouraging (p. 339). 
In addition to agreeing that it was fatally overbroad, Justice Stevens, who was 
joined in part by Justices White and Blackmun, also pointed out that "the majority, in 
ruling that proscribable speech cannot be regulated based on subject matter, wrongly 
gave fighting words and obscenity the same sort of protection afforded core political 
speech." Moreover, he went on to provide a thorough analysis of the issue and 
concluded that "not all content-based distinctions are equally infirm and presumptively 
invalid" and, therefore, fighting words may, on occasion, depending on both the content 
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of the expression and the context in which it occurs, be protected by the First 
Amendment (p. 306). He did not believe that the ordinance was "an unconstitutional 
content-based regulation of speech," and would have voted to uphold it had it not been 
overbroad (p. 352). One of the things he particularly liked about the ordinance was its 
evenhandedness. He stated: 
In a battle between advocates of tolerance and advocates of intolerance, 
the ordinance does not prevent either side from hurling fighting words at 
the other on the basis of their conflicting ideas, but it does bar both sides 
from hurling such words on the basis of the target's "race, color, creed, 
religion or gender. . . . It does not, therefore, favor one side of any 
debate" (p. 352). 
Justice White charged that "by characterizing fighting words as a form of 
'debate,' ... the majority legitimates hate speech as a form of public discussion" (p. 
330). "By placing fighting words, which the Court has long held to be valueless, on at 
least equal constitutional footing with political discourse and other forms of speech that 
we have deemed to have the greatest social value, the majority devalues the latter 
category" (p. 331). 
Justice Blackmun expressed the concern that this case may have been used by the 
Court to manipulate "doctrine to strike down an ordinance whose premise it opposed, 
namely, that racial threats and verbal assaults are of greater harm than other fighting 
words ... [and] that the Court has been distracted from its proper mission by the 
temptation to decide the issue over 'politically correct speech' and 'cultural diversity,' 
neither of which is presented here" (p. 339). 
Justice Stevens pointed out that one cannot judge speech without judging its 
content. Therefore, it is not only possible, but necessary to conclude on appropriate 
occasions that some content is indeed not entitled to First Amendment protection (pp. 
342-343). He insisted, in disagreement with Justice White over the latter's categorical 
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approach to the f'irst Amendment, that "[t]he meaning of any expression and the 
legitimacy of its regulations can only be determined in context" (p. 346). In each 
analysis, one must consider both "the content and context of regulated speech, and the 
nature and scope of the restrictions on speech" (p. 34 7). To protect fighting words based 
on subject matter, such as race, for example, is to give it greater protection than 
commercial speech and even some core political speech, according to established case 
law, for there are examples of restrictions even on certain kinds of commercial and 
political speech (p. 344). 
For a case from which there was no dissent, it appears that much is still left to 
be done to settle the law in this area. Judges and commentators alike struggle with the 
need for freedom on the one hand and propriety on the other. Finding the proper 
balance and determining the appropriate limit are complex matters to resolve. When 
similar incidents occur on a college campus, it is often the president who is charged with 
finding and then justifying that balance. 
A response to the St. Paul decision. Within the scholarly community, criticism 
of the official ruling was equally intense. Young ( 1992), writing in Black Issues in 
Higher Education, suggests that with a decision like this the Court could very well be 
"Making America Safe for Bigotry" (p. 52). He believes that the hidden agenda in the 
decision is an attack on what he calls "the newest right-wing nemesis -- 'politically 
correct speech"' (p. 52), an idea also expressed by Justice Blackmun in his concurring 
opinion in the case (120 L Ed 2d, at 339). 
In response to Justice Scalia's presumed position that even "fighting words" can 
no longer be regulated because they -- by prohibiting the expression of views on certain 
"disfavored subjects" -- would result in "content discrimination," Young calls it a 
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"curious flight of fantasy 11 to elevate cross-burning on a person's lawn to 11 debate 11 
protected by the First Amendment (p. 52). The decision, in effect, affords to fighting 
words and obscenity, which prior cases clearly indicated did not fall within the scope of 
protected expression, the same protection as political speech. 
Young also makes the point that the mentality of the majority block disregards 
the "barbaric history of racial intimidation, harassment and assault that has been heaped 
upon citizens of color, 11 by issuing the decision outside of a context which does not 
recognize the absurdity of equating terms like "whitey" and "nigger 11 (p. 52). It also 
ignores the fact, borne out by history as well, that "racial threats and verbal assaults" --
admittedly only speech -- very often represent what is really the first step in the 
commission of violent hate crimes "directed against unfavored persons or groups" (p. 
52). 
As one of a growing number who argues that a qualitative difference exists when 
certain things are said or done to certain individuals or groups, as opposed to others, 
Young denounces the message which this decision sends not only to the children of the 
family upon whose lawn the cross was burned, but to all who need only little 
encouragement to participate in acts of bigotry. This could include immature and 
inexperienced college students who may find themselves for the first time in a setting 
which includes people who appear different to them and yet about whom they are 
ignorant. "There are some words and symbols whose use in this society have the power 
and impact of deadly force," Young asserts (p. 52); and the victims, like the family in 
this case, will never be the same. But beyond what has happened to those individuals, 
it has also "bequeathed to the country a continuing legacy of tolerance for bigotry ... 
and made it clear to those citizens who have been historically and systematically 
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subordinated, that protection from acts of bigotry may be a long time coming from the 
land of the free" (p. 52). The fact that Justice Scalia finds acts like this "reprehensible" 
falls short of what Young feels is needed now to address the kinds of problems this case 
represents. 
The link to higher education. Robert O'Neil (1992), director of the Thomas 
Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression, and former President of the 
University of Virginia, has also commented on this case. He looks at it particularly from 
the perspective of one interested in what it may mean for campus speech codes or 
policies which prohibit the expressive harassment of various kinds of individuals and 
groups. 
He recognizes that this case goes beyond the banning of certain kinds of 
expression which might take place in a campus setting. He also is well aware of the 
interest and concern of those, including institutional presidents, who seek guidance for 
responding to incidents like this which are becoming increasingly frequent at colleges 
and universities. Furthermore, he knows that many view speech codes as an easy way 
to communicate an institution's standards to its community, and that many would have 
expected an ordinance like St. Paul's to be an effective way of controlling the acts 
proscribed. Yet he also understands how the Court -- if it has determined that "fighting 
words, including racist, sexist, homophobic, and ethnically demeaning epithets, are not 
devoid of ideas or messages," but are, in the words of Justice Scalia, "' quite expressive 
indeed"' -- could find it logical to conclude that "[w]hen it is the particular message or 
viewpoint that triggers penalties -- even within a category of speech such as 'fighting 
words' that normally would not be protected by the First Amendment -- that singling out 
of particular expression may violate the Constitution's guarantee of free speech" (p. 
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A40). It is natural, then, that "sensitive communities," including many academic 
communities, will "seek ways of limiting such abusive and venomous language" because 
they recognize that "liJt is the hateful thought behind the epithet or slur that makes it 
so offensive" (p. A40). 
O'Neil observes that, in light of this decision and the view of the First 
Amendment it presents, some speech codes and rules may have more difficulty being 
sustained than others. For some time, however, he has felt that they have been of 
questionable value (See O'Neil, 1989; Pavela, 1989), and seems to welcome this 
opportunity the Court has provided to reassess all such policies (p. A40). Rules which 
restrict "fighting words" or language deemed offensive to the hearers because of their 
"race, religion, gender, and sexual preference," he believes, are those most likely to fail 
under the holding in St. Paul (p. A40). 
O'Neil comments on the fact that policies at both the University of Michigan and 
the University of Wisconsin, designed to prohibit racial harassment and discrimination, 
were struck down by federal district courts because they were determined to be 
unconstitutionally vague. (See Doe v. University of Michiian, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. 
Mich. 1989); and UW-M Post v. Board of Reients, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991)). 
He also notes that attempts by the Wisconsin Legislature to improve their code has been 
frustrated by divisions cut along the lines that divide the general population. Further, 
Congress has considered a bill that would forbid all public and private colleges and 
universities which receive federal funds "from disciplining students on the basis of 
protected speech," although O'Neil is not optimistic of its chances for passage (p. A40). 
Finally, O'Neil notes that the American Association of University Professors has issued 
a strong statement calling unjustifiable all codes which 11 'ban or punish speech based 
32 
upon its content"' (p. A40). 
O'Neil believes that in spite of how one may feel personally about the decision 
in St. Paul, those who serve in academic communities should not miss the opportunity 
to reevaluate what their own response will be. He recognizes that some private 
institutions may be tempted to disregard it completely because the First Amendment 
does not apply to them. He also anticipates that some public institutions may take the 
position that the ruling will have a limited and narrow application which may not extend 
to campus policies (p. A40). His point, however, is that this case should prompt all to 
consider the nature and limits of campus speech in general and particularly the 
educational opportunities afforded in the midst of crisis. The latter point was made by 
several members of the sample in the present study as well. 
Just as speech codes are not needed to prohibit and punish much of the offensive 
behavior that occurs on campus, neither was a Supreme Court decision necessary to 
require a better job of discerning the important distinction between expression with no 
value and that which contributes to the educational process. Nor should the opportunity 
be missed to enhance what is done to educate about why it is wrong to engage in 
offensive behavior -- even if it is technically legal. O'Neil advocates vigorous 
"condemnation of racist and sexist epithets and slurs" as both appropriate and essential 
(p. A40). But he also recommends the establishment of rules that focus on conduct as 
opposed to speech. Such presumably may have saved the St. Paul ordinance. Such 
would also, in his mind, protect the expression of all ideas and their respective 
contributions to the mission of each academic community. This should inspire only the 
highest levels of discourse. That which degrades has no place in an educational 
institution. On the other hand, to proscribe the expression of even the most hateful 
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person always risks drawing the line too far on the side of what should be tolerated for 
the sake of the greater principle of free expression. The ultimate irony is that while 
offensive expression is, perhaps, least tolerable in an academic community, this may also 
be where the greatest toleration for the expression of any idea should be found (p. A40). 
Members of the sample had an opportunity to express themselves on how they resolved 
this dilemma. 
A case from higher education and reactions to it from different perspectives. A 
case which preceded the St. Paul decision, and seems to have anticipated its outcome, 
did take place on a university campus. And while some might hold that there is a 
substantial qualitative difference between burning a cross on a particular African-
American family's lawn and a fraternity skit featuring a white male wearing an afro wig 
and blackface with pillows stuffed "in his bosom and backside" while competing in an 
"ugly woman" contest (Wiley, 1991, p. 1), others would find both equally violent in 
terms of the impact of each incident upon its respective victims. 
The Sigma Chi chapter at George Mason University is the group that chose to 
exercise its right to free expression in this manner. When the university suspended the 
fraternity, suit was brought to declare the penalty an infringement of the group's First 
Amendment rights. A United States District Court judge agreed and ordered that 
sanctions imposed by the university be lifted. He stated that even though "' the 
university disagreed with the message"' it could "' not discipline the students by 
infringing on their First Amendment rights based on the perceived offensive content of 
the activity"' (Wiley, p. 1). (See Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi v. George Mason 
University. 773 F. Supp. 792, E.D. Va. 1991.) 
Typically, there were two reactions to the decision. One side expressed the 
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concern that this would not only open the way for "those who might conduct racist or 
sexist activities in the future," but it would also inhibit "administrators from curtailing 
racial hostility on campus" (Wiley, p. 20). The minority affairs director at the university 
regrets the message sent by the decision, as well as the message that is not sent; namely, 
the pain felt by the students throughout the ordeal. He also sees it as "a bad precedent 
for those trying to discipline students who commit acts of insensitivity -- knowingly or 
unknowingly. This case will clearly dictate how universities take action around the 
country" (p. 20). It is pointed out that the so-called "hostility factor" on predominantly 
white campuses has been found "to be largely responsible for the gradual decline in 
enrollment of African American Students at predominantly white institutions" (p. 20). 
If colleges and universities are going to have to comply with court decisions such 
as this one, it has been suggested that they should at least establish something like 
"' community value codes'" which can then be reinforced "' with workshops and 
programs on sensitivity to ensure their effectiveness"' (p. 20). It is no secret that "' an 
environment where discrimination is tolerated ... is not conducive to learning,"' 
especially for the victims (p. 20). Supporters of the decision, if not the conduct, contend 
that a different outcome "would have been constitutionally unjustifiable, and that in a 
democracy, objectionable expression" while often unpleasant, is the price to be paid for 
freedom (p. 20). 
Victor Glasberg, the ACLU lawyer who represented the fraternity, referred to the 
matter as "a hard-line civil libertarian case, predicated on the theory that merely 
offensive speech and conduct cannot be punished at all, whatever its content" (Glasberg, 
1991, p. 21). He also expressed the hope that the decision would free the university" 'to 
focus on the real issues of the ugly women contest -- sensitivity to racial diversity and 
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women's concerns -- which have received short shrift to date'" (Wiley, 1991, p. 20). 
Wiley (1991) reports that George Mason history professor Roger Wilkins, an 
African American and self-proclaimed absolutist on First Amendment issues, considers 
this a close case in terms of whether the skit could be considered protected expression. 
He is more certain, however, about the very kinds of expression the First Amendment 
was designed to protect; namely, that which runs the risk of being offensive or 
controversial. He also points out that those who are sometimes the victims of offensive 
language are also significant beneficiaries of strict rules in support of unpopular 
messages. He even goes so far as to say that being hit with a racial slur is the price one 
must pay to be able to press his or her own agenda (p. 20). Others, whose views will be 
examined shortly, believe that the price is too high. 
Wilkins also makes the important distinction between that which may be 
"acceptable" expression under the Constitution and what is appropriate in an academic 
community. He states that even though it may be "' legally wrong"' for the university 
to punish the fraternity, "' it is educationally correct for the university to make it clear 
that that speech has no place in a civilized society. It has an educational obligation to 
teach appropriate behavior"' (Wiley, 1991, p. 20). This is a relatively balanced approach 
for a First Amendment absolutist to make and represents, through its emphasis on 
educating for normative behavior, an approach which could be classified as having a 
moral perspective. 
Glasberg (1991), on the other hand, focuses less on the moral or educational 
obligations and more on the importance of protecting offensive expression as a matter 
of legal principle, the principle being that "content does not matter and suppression of 
offensive free expression is unconstitutional" (p. 21). He admits that while "the law has 
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not adequately protected minority groups," the answer to this unfortunate development 
is not "more repression of diversity and dissent, more prescribed orthodoxies, more 
uniform standards of behavior" (p. 21). Rather, it is "making sure that the system stays 
as open as possible" (p. 21). In Glasberg's opinion, minorities have the most to lose if 
the government begins to restrict the legal limits of speech (p. 21 ). 
Speech codes in higher education. One who most likely has applauded the ruling 
in both the George Mason and St. Paul cases since they have been handed down is 
Miller ( 1992), who has issued a commentary on many of the recent attempts around the 
country to restrict offensive expression. Noting some of the more ambitious attempts to 
demonstrate sensitivity to certain historically victimized groups at the expense of 
expression, he seems not to appreciate the sincere motives behind the need to eliminate 
the behavior in question, even if the means used are ill-advised. 
He cites, for example, provisions from the University of Michigan's code, which 
was found to be unconstitutionally vague, which prohibited, among other things, 
distributing flyers in the residence halls which contained racist threats, not inviting a 
person to a floor party because she is suspected of being a lesbian, or displaying a 
Confederate flag on the door of one's room (p. 4). The University of Connecticut went 
even farther by prohibiting "' inappropriately directed laughter"' or "' conspicuously 
excluding"' someone from joining in a conversation (p. 4). Reverting to a more 
traditional means of control for a distinctly different kind of problem, Vassar requires 
that anything a student may publish which criticizes the college or its administration 
must be approved by the public relations office (p. 4). 
Regardless of what kind of expression an institution attempts to control, however, 
Miller is correct to point out that "the free exchange of ideas" has traditionally been 
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considered "to be of central importance" to the mission of higher education (pp. 4, 17). 
Moreover, he believes that "universities and colleges are unique in their need to remain 
absolutely autonomous from policies prohibiting specific kinds of speech." This is why 
he sees "the presence of speech codes on college campuses" as both "ironic" and 
"disturbing." The irony stems from the fact that "the academy has always been a bastion 
of liberal and free thinking," but now, just as "repressive governments around the world 
are in the process of liberalizing," universities are tightening up (p. 17). 
Miller suggests that the current rush to establish speech codes is the result of 
successful "pressure from student activists" who have been used as "tools" by "an 
entrenched Left-wing activist network" to "stifle any discussion that dissents from an 
orthodoxy pandering to every special interest group that proclaims itself oppressed" (p. 
17). He asserts that students who openly criticize "the new p.c. orthodoxy" risk direct 
repercussions for the expression of their opinions, and student newspapers which dare 
to express "views counter to the university's official party line on questions of race and 
gender have been either shut down or denied facilities and funding" (p. 17). This issue, 
in particular, was pursued with some intensity in the second and third phases of the 
present study. 
Miller believes that, in the final analysis, "speech codes fail in their mission to 
diminish discriminatory harassment because they mean to prevent discrimination rather 
than overcome it" (p. 17). He agrees with O'Neil that "colleges and universities need 
to work toward solving the problem of discriminatory harassment by maintaining the 
ideals of free inquiry (p. 17). Miller also castigates what he considers to be the "liberal" 
tendency to promote "the concept of group identification and the ideology of 
victimization while concurrently ignoring the primacy of the individual" (p. 17). This 
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"group-entity fixation," in his opinion, has fo:c, , d a number of "ridiculous theories 
about a privileged class of white male oppressors [andl intensifies the resentments that 
speech codes hope to eliminate" (p. 17). Perhaps, O'Neil (1992) shouldn't be so 
surprised that "a normally conservative Court" (p. A40) would strike down the St. Paul 
law. According to Miller, this is precisely what a conservative would advocate. "To 
think freely," he says, ''we must be allowed to learn freely. Failure to challenge speech 
codes now may make future challenges futile" (p. 17). 
In addition to his questionable perception of the reality of privilege in the United 
States, Miller makes a comment which is not only inaccurate, but also overlooks the 
sweeping nature of the problems of free expression on campus. He states that the 
proliferation "of speech codes marks a departure from other forms of university 
censorship" by targeting students rather than "campus speakers or university professors, 
as in the past." He then quotes George Will on the matter who perceives this to be "a 
broader threat to freedom than the liberal mobs that howled down speakers supporting 
the U.S. commitment to Vietnam," and is ultimately more disturbing "than McCarthyism 
... because today the forces of censorship arise within academic culture" (p. 17). 
Speech rights and tenured administrators. Dr. Leonard Jeffries may have a 
different opinion from Miller and Will about the current situation. He sued CCNY for 
$25 million because he was dismissed as chair of the Black Studies department for 
making "comments allegedly anti-semitic and Black supremacist in tone" in public. His 
tenured professorship was not affected (Barnes, 1992, p. 1). 
By even raising such a question as what constitutes "appropriate public 
commentary by faculty who are appointed to chair departments," another aspect of the 
nature and limits of free expression in an academic community is presented. Barnes 
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(1992) reports on the views of a number of people representing a variety of vantage 
points in higher education. One side of the argument in this case is presented by David 
Mercowitz, director of public affairs at the American Council on Education. He points 
out that an administrative position is a discretionary appointment, and not one to which 
anyone has a right (Barnes, p. 1,6). The administration and the governing body must 
always retain the right to determine whether lower administrators can adequately fulfill 
their duties. If it was determined "that the public notoriety of his speech prevented him 
from being an effective administrator, they had the right to remove him and find 
someone who could do a better job"' (p. 6). Similarly, Peter L. French, provost and vice 
president of academic affairs at Mercy College in New York, acknowledges the tension 
that exists "between the line that a university establishes for academic freedom and that 
of a faculty member holding an administrative position." In the former capacity, one 
should be able to report whatever emerges from his or her research without fear of 
negative repercussions. That same kind of freedom does not automatically accompany 
one's administrative position (p. 6). 
Another perspective is offered by Michael Levin, a white member of the 
philosophy department at CCNY who has asserted publicly "that Blacks are intellectually 
inferior to whites." He believes that the public statements of his African American 
colleague should nevertheless be protected by the First Amendment. He further asserts 
that it would be wrong to remove anyone from an administrative position because of 
statements he or she has made as a scholar. Levin, himself, was on the winning end of 
a suit which concluded "that CCNY did not have the right to file disciplinary action 
against" him for writing "a letter to the editor of an academic journal declaring that lack 
of intelligence and not discrimination or poverty is the cause for Blacks' 'meager' 
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representation in the science disciplines" (p. 6). 
In agreement, Ernst Benjamin, general secretary of the American Association of 
University Professors, has said that a tenured faculty member, administrative duties 
notwithstanding, should have 'the same rights as any citizen'" (pp. 6-7). Likewise, one 
speaking on behalf of the ACLU expressed that it would be cause for serious concern 
if Jeffries' removal from a position he held for twenty years was because of his beliefs 
or any remarks he may have made (p. 7). 
In spite of the differences of opinion, two points seem to carry the weight of 
consensus among those commenting. First, if nothing controversial were ever said, there 
would be little conflict, but also no "marketplace of ideas;" and second, there are few 
easy answers or solutions in cases like this (p. 7). One of the purposes of this study was 
to see if those who have to produce the answers and solutions to these problems in 
Lutheran colleges and universities look to their relationship with their churches and the 
values inherent in that relationship to inform their answers and shape their solutions. 
For some, it almost takes the form of a moral or theological imperative. Consequently, 
the next section will examine some of the literature which focuses on at least the moral 
dimension of free expression. The first two issues addressed deal with whether civil or 
criminal remedies should be used for expression problems. Since the presidents in the 
study had an opportunity to address them, it was felt that it would be helpful to provide 
the theoretical arguments supporting each position by their leading spokespersons. 
Legal and Moral Perspectives of Restrictions 
on Racist Speech and Group Defamation 
A legal remedy in tort: Delgado. Two individuals who have invested considerable 
effort into the formulation of a solution for the problem of racist speech are Delgado 
41 
(1982) and Matsuda ( 1989). Both authors have written a significant law review article 
which presented their respective approach. In "Words That Wound: A Tort Action for 
Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling," Delgado (1982) argues that such a remedy 
for these problems "is both permissible and necessary" (p. 134). After examining "the 
harms caused by racism and racial insults to the victims, to the perpetrators, and to 
society as a whole," as well as "the various doctrines under which plaintiffs have brought 
lawsuits for racial insult," he concludes that they "fail to provide adequate protection 
against such language" (p. 134). 
It seems perfectly logical to him, therefore, that if the law is capable of restricting 
segregated schooling, offensive mottos on license plates, unwanted non-violent physical 
contact or the removal of one's hat, it should also be able to address the harm which 
most certainly occurs as a result of a racial insult (p. 145). It is often said, as appropriate 
responses to offensive speech are discussed, that the best solution is "more speech," 
rather than restriction of that which gave rise to the issue in the first place. Delgado 
points out, however, that, unlike the kind of dialogue which can move debaters closer 
to a synthesis or resolution of a social or political issue, more speech in response to a 
racial insult is unlikely to help and may very well cause further injury to either the 
original victim or even the perpetrator (p. 146; 177, note 260). 
The notion that one brings harm to himself or herself when engaged in hateful 
behavior, including expressive activity, is developed further by Delgado. It is easy to 
recognize that "a racial insult is always a dignitary affront, a direct violation of the 
victim's right to be treated respectfully" (p. 143). But it may also be true that those who 
issue insults based solely on the race, gender, or other characteristic or disposition of the 
victim have really degraded themselves in the process, for it could be said that those who 
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would attack the dignity of another in this way have also denigrated their own humanity 
because of their disrespect for themselves and the other (pp. 143-144). 
Legal sanctions available to victims, therefore, may not only relieve "the sense of 
helplessness that leads to psychological harm," but also communicate "to the perpetrator 
and to society that such abuse will not be tolerated" (p. 147). Delgado recognizes that 
law, in itself, will not change the heart of a person, but he does suggest that making the 
consequences of such behavior undesirable to the perpetrator should reduce its 
frequency. Moreover, it could also begin, over time, to establish patterns of behavior 
which gradually evolve into changed attitudes. Consequently, he believes that "a tort for 
racial slurs is a promising vehicle for the eradication of racism" (pp. 148-149). 
The crucial issue for him is not so much whether it is morally right to speak 
offensively to another with the intent to hurt that person -- for most would agree that it 
is not -- but to ascertain whether a constitutional right exists to do so. Delgado takes the 
position that racially offensive speech is outside the scope of First Amendment 
protection. He admits that it is content-based speech and therefore subject to the 
strictest scrutiny by the courts to make sure that speech which should be protected is not 
being proscribed. But he also recognizes that courts are constantly balancing various 
interests, and that when the right of protection is weighed against the values inherent in 
eliminating racist speech, the scales must tip in favor of the latter. He believes that the 
government has a legitimate interest in providing for such a tort action and ultimately 
eliminating racial invective and the harm done to the victims and the entire society. He 
cites Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire which holds "that words which 'by their very 
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace' are not 
protected by the first amendment" (pp. 173-174). Since the primary purpose of a racial 
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insult is to injure another by using words as weapons, by their very nature they are not 
protected (p. 176). He then suggests that it may not even he "speech" at all (p. 176, note 
254). In any event, the argument certainly can be made that such insults can be 
analogous to fighting words (p. 173) or obscenity (p. 177). 
It has been stated that one of the reasons for having freedom of expression in a 
democracy is to provide each member of the society the opportunity to contribute to the 
collective "consent of the governed." Delgado asserts that "[ r ]acial insults do not further 
this goal. On the contrary, they constitute 'badges and incidents of slavery' and 
contribute to a stratified society in which political power is possessed by some and 
denied to others" (p. 178). 
Delgado recommends that an individual bringing a suit in response to a racial 
insult be required to prove that: 1) the language in question was addressed to the 
plaintiff by the defendant; 2) it was intended to demean the plaintiff through reference 
to his or her race; 3) the plaintiff understood the message to be one intended to demean 
by reference to race; and 4) a reasonable person would recognize the message to be a 
racial insult (p. 179). According to Delgado, until the law address affirmatively the 
problem of racism and racial insult, it will continue to convey that equality and justice 
are not fundamental principles and that "respect for individuals is of little importance" 
(p. 141). Many of the presidents in the sample of the present study seemed to agree and 
accepted an action in tort as a legitimate means of resolving offenses of this nature. 
Criminal prosecution for a moral wrong: Matsuda. Building on the work of 
Delgado ( 1982), and writing from the perspective of a minority female who has 
experienced personal attacks as a result of her race and gender, Matsuda ( 1989) 
advocates the use of what she calls "outsider jurisprudence." This is a legal approach for 
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addressing the problem of racist speech which considers the issue from the perspective 
of those traditionally left out or found at the "bottom" of the social scale (p. 2322). 
There is a significant difference between the policies of Delgado and Matsuda, however. 
Whereas the former advocates recognition of an established tort action for racist speech, 
the latter lays out an elaborate argument in support of the view that formal criminal and 
administrative sanction is an appropriate response to racist speech. 
While referring to Delgado's work as representing a "breakthrough," Matsuda 
moves a step farther by encouraging a legal response to racist expression which goes 
beyond allowing a civil lawsuit for a tort to requiring the prosecution of a criminal act 
(p. 2321). She fully recognizes the tension that exists between the desire of many to 
prevent the harm that accompanies racist speech and the need to protect the freedom 
of expression. She even provides a very complete and objective statement of the so-
called "American position" (pp. 2348-2353), which essentially protects the expression of 
just about every idea, including the most reprehensible. In the final analysis, however, 
she sides with the need to eliminate hate speech and the use of criminal sanctions to 
either deter or punish such offenses (p. 2322). 
She cites Bollinger ( 1986) as one of many who point out that hate speech is 
protected by the Constitution, in part, "to reinforce our commitment to tolerance as a 
value" (p. 2322). Given what has happened in the past precisely because minority views 
were not tolerated, she does not take her position lightly, since it is generally held, and 
is often true, that tolerance for one set of views should ensure that all others will be 
heard as well. Nevertheless, there is a difference with hate speech, she believes, for the 
level of tolerance which some must exhibit in order to bear it is not shared equally by 
all members of the community at large. It hits disproportionately hard the victims and 
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those in their group and becomes "a psychic tax imposed on those least able to pay" (p. 
2323). In her opinion, whereas minorities take very seriously the kind of attacks in 
question, and are moved to seek legal redress, non-minorities often wonder what the fuss 
is all about, viewing the attack as an isolated prank (p. 2327). Being the victim of a 
racist attack naturally makes one feel alone and scared. Matsuda suggests that while 
receiving the message is bad enough, the government's tolerant response can become 
even more a source of despair. When the police, for example, protect racist 
demonstrators, when the courts dismiss suits for racial insults, or "when racist attacks 
are officially dismissed as pranks, the victim becomes [ either] a stateless person" or a 
member of a state which supports racism (p. 2338). The point can also be made with 
regard to membership in an academic community where, because of the closer 
relationships that often exist, greater injury could occur if the offense is tolerated by 
those the student has come to trust. The implications for the church that sponsors such 
a college would be even more negative since the church is one institution whose primary 
purpose is supposed to be concerned with the well-being of the individual. 
One of the reasons Matsuda believes immediate redress must be made available 
is because such incidents are rarely isolated. She mentions, particularly, that when one 
occurs on a college campus, "it is rare to hear of one incident only" (p. 2327, note 37). 
She even goes so far as to provide an extensive footnote which refers to incidents 
occurring on various campuses prior to the writing of the article (p. 2333, note 71). 
She also notes that the United States is the only country in the common law 
tradition which demonstrates such a high level of tolerance for racist speech (pp. 2347-
2348). Ironically, the United States has even expressed its support (although the Senate 
has not ratified the agreement) for the elimination of racism, and has recognized the 
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illegitimacy of racist propaganda and the need for its control under the international law 
of human rights (p. 2344). 
Another source of frustration for those seeking greater legal weapons against hate 
speech is the fact that other limitations on expression already exist. The law allows some 
commercial speech to be restricted. Likewise, the law of defamation and the lack of 
protection for obscenity and speech which violates the public order demonstrate that the 
American position is not absolute (p. 2355-2356). The question, then, becomes one of 
determining why restrictions cannot also be extended legitimately to racist speech as 
well. The "public order" categories, such as incitements to riot and "fighting words," 
Matsuda points out, are those which fall outside the scope of First Amendment 
protection because they are likely to "bring men ... to blows" (p. 2355). Pointing out 
that "this is a male-centered standard," she identifies what may be the answer to the 
question posed above; namely, that the prevailing philosophy of law in this country is 
a white male-dominated institution which has had difficulty comprehending how the so-
called "outsiders" she emphasizes in her jurisprudence could feel by this treatment. If 
they could, she presumably would conclude, the law would be different. This is 
reminiscent of John Rawls' ( 1971) A Theory of Justice which suggests that if people did 
not know what position they would hold in society while they were making the rules for 
it, they would be quite sure to protect the rights of those who would be the "least 
advantaged" because they could end up being one of them. 
Therefore, Matsuda advocates treating racist speech as a "sui generis category." 
This would require the use of "a narrow definition of actionable racist speech," but 
would also not violate the integrity of basic First Amendment values. The only 
acceptable alternative would be to expand "existing ... exceptions, such as the 'fighting 
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words' doctrine and the' content/conduct' distinction." The former "non-neutral, value-
laden approach" is preferable because such special treatment will nut only recognize Llie 
seriousness of the matter, it will also "helter preserve free speech" (p. 2357). 
In order for expression to qualify for this proposed restricted category it would 
have to 1) convey a "message ... of racial inferiority," 2) be "directed against a 
historically oppressed group," and 3) be "persecutorial, hateful, and degrading" (p. 
2357). By employing very narrow elements such as these the interference with legitimate 
speech is avoided. Therefore, one would still be allowed to argue, for example, that a 
particular group might be genetically superior as long as it was done "in a context free 
of hatefulness and without the endorsement of persecution." Likewise, stereotyping and 
satire would also be permissible as long as it did not use "persecutorial language" (p. 
2357), as would the research findings of "the dead-wrong social scientist" (p. 2364). All 
this is not to say that such affronts must be tolerated in silence. It still remains very 
appropriate to use speech to counter offensive speech by education, "social approbation, 
boycott, and persuasion" (p. 2357). 
While Matsuda recognizes, even before the decision in R.A.V. v. St, Paul, that 
prohibiting speech on the basis of its content has always been resisted, and is likely to 
be even more so now, she nevertheless argues that "explicit content-based rejection of 
narrowly defined racist speech is more protective of civil liberties than the competing-
interests tests or the likely-to-incite-violence tests that can spill over to censor forms of 
political speech." She asserts that the "need to fight racism at all levels, the value of 
explicit formal rules, and a fear of tyranny ... suggest the wisdom of legal intervention 
with only a narrowly defined class of racist hate propaganda" (p. 2360). 
One controversial aspect of her proposal is the exclusion of members of majority 
48 
groups as people eligible to use the law as a means of redress in response to hate speech 
auacks. She recognizes tlrnt this could be "troublesome" to some, but ultimately believes 
that there is a qualitative difference between the hurt felt by and the harm done to 
minorities as opposed to non-minorities (p. 2361). The difference for her is that "[t)he 
dominant-group member hurt by conflict with the angry nationalist is more likely to 
have access to a safe harbor of exclusive dominant-group interactions" (p. 2361). 
Matsuda also spends some time discussing racist "symbols and regalia" (p. 2365), 
"anti-Semitic literature" (p. 2366), "monetary conspiracy theory and holocaust hoax 
literature" (p. 2367), "ethnic humor" (p. 2368), "the use of racist slurs in the interests 
of realism in books, films, and theater" (p. 2369), and "the right of the Klan to exist 
publicly and to spread a racist message" (p. 2379). For each of these she is open to their 
criminalization, often suggesting that "the experience of victim-group members" serve 
as a guide in the decision (p. 2369). Such a subjective standard for something which also 
seems to fit the category of political expression, makes this part of her argument a bit 
more tenuous. Items in the second survey used in this study sought responses from the 
presidents on some of these topics. 
In the area of campus-based hate speech, Matsuda believes that toleration is more 
harmful for an academic community than fo1 :,llciety in general. Victims learn that they 
cannot come to depend on the institution to provide a sense of community, intellectual 
development, or self-definition (p. 2371). When the racist expression occurs in a 
classroom and is not part of a discussion about the limits of free speech, a very confusing 
message is sent. It also hurts perpetrators by teaching them that they can get away with 
behavior which is counter to the typical objectives of a liberal education, which Matsuda 
believes should include "lessons in critical thought and inquiry," not "cynicism and 
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hate" (p. 2371). 
In the final analysis, she believes that "lw]hen hate speech is protected the First 
Amendment values arc sacrificed" (p. 2377). And when the state is silent, it has 
nevertheless acted, and the implication is an endorsement of or indifference to what is 
widely considered to be "socially unacceptable ... aggression" (p. 2378). Because a 
society expresses its values through its laws, and has done so in many other areas, when 
it doesn't address the problem of racist speech the message is even more direct (p. 2379). 
Matsuda believes that racist speech can be attacked, "not because it isn't really speech, 
[or] because it falls within a hoped-for neutral exception, but because it is wrong" (p. 
2380). This ultimately moves her position into a moral as well as a legal sphere. She 
recognizes the potential for misuse for various legal remedies, but believes that this 
should not deter the effort (p. 2380). For her, the ultimate justification must be the 
belief that each person has inherent worth and "is entitled to a life of dignity" (p. 2381), 
a position one would assume would be shared by the participants in this study. 
Hate speech is free speech: Gard. In direct opposition to Matsuda's position that 
racially insensitive expression in almost every form should constitute a violation of the 
criminal law, in disagreement with Delgado's view of a special tort for racist speech, and 
perhaps even a bit to the right of the Supreme Court majority in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, is 
Gard (1980), who holds the opinion that the "societal interest in free and uninhibited 
expression," even when it is "candid and unpleasant," is so profound that the 
Constitution prohibits anything which would restrict it (p. 581). He offers an opinion 
about the use of tort law in cases where offensive words have caused "severe emotional 
stress" which, considered in light of recently heightened sensitivity to language and racial 
issues, seems remarkable for its insensitivity. He states that the law of torts in American 
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jurisprudence "has consistently held that although personally abusive epithets may cause 
momentary hurt feelings, such a minor injury is simply too trivial for the law to 
recognize" (p. 579). With regard to the "fighting words" doctrine, he does not believe 
that it can "withstand first amendment scrutiny" (p. 581). 
He points out that the decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, which created 
the doctrine of "fighting words," and enumerated the other alleged exceptions to First 
Amendment protection (libel, obscenity, commercial speech, and offensive language), 
is the only case where a conviction was affirmed using this approach (p. 531 ). 
Consequently, he feels that its authority in this narrow holding is suspect and its 
inconsistency with established constitutional law significant. 
The language of the Court in Chaplinsky, which Gard believes has caused the 
current problem, reads as follows: 
"There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, 
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise 
any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the 
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words -- those which 
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach 
of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value 
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality" (p. 533). 
Chaplinsky notwithstanding, Gard asserts in response that 
the fighting words doctrine is nothing more than a quaint remnant of an 
earlier morality that has no place in a democratic society dedicated to the 
principle of free expression. The doctrine, which operates, at best, to 
penalize individuals for failing to show others the respect society deems 
proper and, at worst, to penalize individuals for vehement criticism of 
government officials, is simply not constitutionally justifiable. Whatever 
the desirability of maintaining a polite society, the first amendment 
prohibits the government from seeking its preservation by means of 
censoring expression entitled to constitutional protection (p. 536). 
In the midst of a thorough examination of the elements of the "fighting words" 
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doctrine, Gard points out how important it is to distinguish between speech toward 
individuals and groups, speech for which the focus is content as opposed to the reactions 
it evokes from the hearer in light of the circumstances in which it occurs, and speech 
with audiences which are hostile versus those which arc sympathetic to a subversive 
message (pp. 536-537). 
In order for speech to qualify as "fighting words," it must: 1) "constitute a 
personally abusive epithet," 2) "be addressed in a face-to-face manner," 3) "be directed 
to a specific individual and be descriptive of that individual," and 4) "be uttered under 
such circumstances that the words would have a direct tendency to cause an immediate 
violent response by the average recipient" (p. 563). Gard spends a significant amount 
of time discussing how important the first element is, but also how complex analyses in 
the cases with so-called "mixed utterances" can become if the speech also happens to 
assert a message with sufficient ideological content to bring it within reach of 
constitutional protection (pp. 540-541 ). He then goes on to explain why the facts in 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the very case which gave rise to "fighting words," made 
the case itself a poor candidate for application of the doctrine. He asserts that the 
statements that were made, to whom they were made, and the context in which they were 
uttered, clearly should have invoked the First Amendment to protect them (p. 542). If 
the Supreme Court had considered "the issue of whether the words were objectionable 
merely because of the ideas they expressed," the conviction would not have been upheld 
in his opinion (p. 542). Indeed, he believes a strong argument could be made that this 
particular utterance, because of its political content, should have been "entitled to the 
highest degree of constitutional protection" (pp. 542-543). It is fortunate, therefore, 
according to Gard, that Chaplinsky itself has not become a strong precedent (p. 543). 
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Gard calls the questions that are raised when a personally abusive epithet 
involves the use of racial and religious slurs the most difficult to deal with because they 
take to the limit "the principle that a listener's ideological objection to the content of 
a communication cannot form the foundation for a fighting words conviction" (p. 545). 
He asserts that a "well founded ... judicial recognition" that censorship of racial and 
ethnic slurs, merely to avoid the danger of violence in response to the expression, will 
not be justified (p. 547). This is because such a response is neither "the necessary 
consequence of such speech" nor "the serious evil of the speech" (p. 547). 
Gard does acknowledge that the real evil inherent in such expression is the 
"extraordinary hatefulness and ugliness of the ideas" conveyed in it and the danger that 
certain individuals or groups will embrace them and then act in accordance with those 
ideas. This, he concludes, makes the primary objection to racial and religious slurs one 
which is ideologically based (p. 547). But such expression automatically finds itself 
among that which traditionally is entitled to the highest constitutional protection. 
Therefore, according to this logic, racial and ethnic slurs are, by definition, within the 
scope of the First Amendment. 
A holding, then, that the display of a swastika (or the burning of a cross) can be 
proscribed as fighting words would be in violation of the First Amendment and the 
American "tradition of uninhibited interchange of ideas," since a democratic society 
must afford constitutional protection to "even the most odious ideas" if it "is to retain 
its essential characteristic of popular self-governance" (pp. 547-548). To conclude, 
however, that "it is virtually impossible to find fighting words cases that do not" 
represent an "expression of opinion on issues of public policy" (p. 548) is quite an 
overstatement. Based on the responses of some in this study, it can be concluded that 
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a portion of the sample would agree. 
Gard cites Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), as the best example of the 
pri nci pie that the Constitution protects private expression of dislike and disrespect. 
Similar to its ruling in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, the Supreme Court set aside the conviction 
being appealed on the ground that the statute was found to be invalid on its face because 
it prohibited expression that the First Amendment pt otected. The question of whether 
the expression met the test for fighting words was never reached because the definition 
of "fighting words" in the statute also "proscribed expression that was merely offensive, 
vulgar, insulting, or disgraceful to the person to whom it was addressed" (pp. 548-549). 
Gard points out the importance in distinguishing between the fighting words 
doctrine and the hostile audience doctrine. The former applies to speech directed to an 
individual; the latter when a group is addressed. One significant difference between the 
two is that the police are obligated to protect the speaker from the hostile audience 
whenever possible (pp. 561-562). 
As was evident in the separate opinions in St. Paul, the members of the Supreme 
Court do not always view the application of various doctrines in a similar way. Gard 
cites the dispute over the use of Chaplinsky as support for a group libel conviction in 
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). As a member of the majority in Chaplinsky, 
Justice Black dissented in Beauharnais because it applied a holding based on speech 
addressed to an individual to a situation where the offensive expression was directed 
toward a group (p. 562). Regardless of how the Court holds, it is Gard's contention that 
if offensive language is protected, and expressions of dislike or disrespect are also 
protected, speech which combines them both should receive no less protection (p. 569). 
One of the reasons he cites for the protection of offensive language, which bears 
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somewhat on the issue of racial and religious groups, is that it is often difficult to know 
what may or may not be universally offensive, given the variety of subcultures in the 
society. He fears that what a majority may find unacceptable may not be so perceived 
by a particular group, and to restrict all on the basis of that majority attitude would 
"reflect a myopic ethnocentricity" and increase the risk of a judge or jury making its 
decisions in a very subjective fashion (p. 571). 
With regard to the idea of criminalizing libelous expression (which Matsuda 
would extend to racist speech as well), Gard asserts that much legal opinion is opposed 
to that tendency (pp. 574-575). Citing the Model Penal Code, for example, he reports 
that the criminal law cannot be invoked just because "defamation is evil or damaging to 
a person in ways" which might support a civil action. Instead, it should be reserved "for 
harmful behavior which exceptionally disturbs the community's sense of security" (p. 
575). The latter is precisely what Matsuda, and others who support greater legal 
sanctions for offensive speech, believe is already happening in a most profound way. 
Interestingly, Gard cites "discrimination against ethnic and racial minorities" as 
one of the major reasons for not allowing censorship of messages which would 
nevertheless be offensive or hurtful to some who would hear them (p. 578). Finding an 
acceptable balance is a significant dilemma. Finding a solution which will please 
everyone is clearly impossible. As some comments from the presidents interviewed for 
this study reveal, however, various segments of their campus communities still expect 
balance and solutions to be achieved. 
Hate speech is not speech: Lasson. Taking the position that "Beauharnais is still 
good law" (p. 32) because libel, including group libel, is non-speech" (p. 34), Lasson 
( 1985) considers the tradition of including racial defamation within the scope of free 
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speech and concludes that it is an abuse of the First Amendment (p. 11). He asserts that 
"whenever the speaker's intention, or the perceived effect of his speech, is to cast 
ridicule or contempt upon a racial group" racial defamation occurs. Determining 
"intention" and "effect" is left completely within a court's subjective discretion. He 
believes that the trier of fact in a case "must be free to discern (and punish) bigotry 
masquerading as history or science" (p. 48). 
One of the common arguments in support of an absolutist approach to the First 
Amendment is the notion that all expressive activity should be allowed to compete in 
the so-called marketplace of ideas and succeed or fail on its merits alone. And while 
there is great appeal in this position, Lassan suggests that, in the case of racial 
defamation, there is no legitimate idea for the marketplace to consider. Consequently, 
the principle is not applicable and the expression therefore can be proscribed with no 
fear of violating the First Amendment. He does not even consider racial defamation to 
be a false idea, but solely "a form of assault" (p. 46) that the law has no choice but to 
restrict. 
He recognizes that the difficulty in drawing lines between what is acceptable and 
what is not is inevitable. That alone, however, should not deter those charged with 
drawing them from doing so. Indeed, line-drawing is already quite common in the law, 
especially in First Amendment jurisprudence. Determinations must constantly be made, 
for example, with the analogous case of pornography versus art and claims based on the 
free exercise of religion. Distinguishing "between racial defamation and political 
comment," Lassan concludes, may even be easier than the others (p. 48). 
To those who would say that this still is an infringement on one's liberty, he 
suggests that the only way personal liberty can be measured, especially freedom of 
expression, is by determining 
the degree to which it allows an individual to impose his speech on 
someone else, and the deleterious effect his actions might have on others. 
If either is excessive, the liberty must be restricted. The effect of racial 
defamation is demonstrably deleterious to all persons within the scope of 
its contempt. It lacks constitutional value; its imposition is the verbal 
counterpart of a body blow to all persons swept within the scope of its 
con tern pt, as well as to the social fabric of American democracy. The 
ultimate liberty, after all, is not freedom of speech, but the right to live in 
peace, secure from harassment (p. 53). 
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If expression which is obscene, speech which is dangerous, or statements 
damaging to a person's reputation can be punished, how, Lasson wonders, could one 
ever conclude that speech which conveys racial hatred and contempt should be 
protected? ln his opinion, it is just as "damaging to a free and civilized society" whether 
it is "subtly undercutting human dignity or explicitly calling for the destruction of an 
entire race" (p. 54). 
He admits that it may be impossible to eliminate "private thoughts of racial 
superiority," but asserts that "the survival of democratic principles" could be threatened 
if the idea is allowed free expression (p. 54). According to Lasson, freedom of speech 
was never designed to protect racial defamation. The law should not begin to protect 
it now (p. 55). He looks briefly at the intent of the framers of the Constitution and 
concludes that it provides the following argument against protecting racial defamation: 
Group libel deliberately exacerbates group tensions, playing negatively 
upon the heterogeneous character of American society. The stirring up 
of racial or ethnic "fears, hate, guilt and greed" is fundamentally opposed 
to the Framers' intent to ensure cooperative social pluralism. Insofar as 
differences of opinion are protected by the first amendment, the tenor of 
debate may be anywhere between polite and bitterly caustic . . . . But 
racial defamation is essentially different. By casting contempt on a group 
on the basis of race or ethnicity, the goal is not to participate in debate 
founded on the principle of pluralism, but to destroy it. In this sense, 
racial defamation is subversive speech. Unlike political extremism, in 
which (however distorted its form) the Framers' principle of self-
government is evident, the principle underlying racial defamation is pure 
discrimination. Invidious race and ethnic discrimination has been 
rejected as antithetical to American national policy. See Bob Jones Univ. 
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 ( I 983). The positive intent of the Framers 
to found a nation based on pluralism should not, therefore, be distorted 
to tolerate the free rein of vindictive attack which is unrelated, except in 
appearance, to a constitutional or national purpose (p. 23. note 80). 
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Opinions differ as to the actual current precendential value of Beauharnais v. 
Illinois. The case itself involved an appeal from the conviction of a white supremacist 
who had been charged under a statute making it unlawful 
"to manufacture, sell, or offer for sale, advertise or publish, present or 
exhibit in any public place in this state any publication ... which portrays 
depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, 
of any race, color, creed, or religion which ... exposes the citizens ... to 
contempt, derision, obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace 
or riots" (p. 32, note 144). 
The Supreme Court held that the statute was constitutional. And even though Lhe 
decision was only five to four, three of the dissenters were not opposed to a state's right 
to legislate against group libel. Their respective objections in the case revolved around 
the vagueness of this particular statute, procedural irregularities at the trial, or the 
standards for such statutes, and not the concept of proscribing group libel. Only Justice 
Black, an absolutist on most First Amendment issues, believed that the defendant's 
expression was protected (pp. 32-33). 
While it is true that Beauharnais has never specifically been overruled, there is 
some disagreement among the commentators as to the value of its authority. Lasson 
asserts that the "Court continues to cite it with favor (p. 33). It remains to be seen if 
even that will continue in light of the decision in St. Paul. In any event, it certainly has 
not established a strong precedent. Lasson also points out that "the conceptual 
framework of Chaplinsky, on which Beauharnais was grounded, remains the starting 
point for first amendment analysis" (p. 33). As was stated earlier, however, Justice Black 
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sees a problem in using one case designed for individual encounters as authority for a 
case where the issue is group libel (Gard, p. 569). 
Nevertheless, Beauharnais is still seen by some to "stand ... for the proposition 
that libel is non-speech" (p. 34), a fact Lasson believes is substantiated by reference to 
the rulings in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), and New York v. Ferber, 458 
U.S. 747 (1982), which deal with obscenity, and a comment, also in Ferber, which calls 
the holding in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 ( 1969), an exception to 
Beauharnais. This is significant because Sullivan is sometimes thought to have overruled 
Beauharnais. In short, the conclusion is that the Court seemingly would uphold a statute 
prohibiting racial defamation of a group if it was properly drawn (p. 35). 
Lassan suggests that courts must make at least three inquiries in the process of 
determining the constitutionality of group defamation laws. The first is whether "the 
deleterious effect of racism [is] so substantively evil as to justify state action to prevent 
or counteract it." The second, even with a compelling state interest, is whether "the evil 
persistls] where whole groups, not individual persons, are defamed." Finally, it must be 
determined whether "group libel [is] properly characterized as speech, somewhere within 
the hierarchy of first amendment protection, or ... classified as totally unprotected 
'non-speech"' (p. 37). 
In response to the last concern, Lassan takes the position that group defamation 
is not speech at all since hardly 
any intellect is necessary to hurl racial epithets, paint a swastika, burn a 
cross, or blame a minority group for specific problems. A "free and 
robust exchange of ideas" is nonexistent; there is an absence of debate by 
which the individual can make up his own mind on the basis of all the 
evidence and on every political or moral issue. Thus, racial defamation 
short-circuits the democratic principles of self-government. By 
threatening these basic principles, racism becomes a substantive evil not 
only to those persons directly targeted, but also to all of society (p. 39). 
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Presumably in response to those who would distinguish between fighting words 
to one person a11J group libel, Lasson suggests that "[a]n intimate nexus exists between 
individuals and the groups or associations to which they belong" (p. 39). He recognizes, 
however, that this is still a minority view and that there remains a tendency to reserve 
redress to those incidents where an individual and not a group is the victim. 
Nevertheless, in the final analysis, Lassan maintains that "[w]hen society permits 
destructive attacks on a group, individuals within that group inescapably suffer" (p. 40). 
Seeking legal rights and moral authority for people before principles: Laramee. 
Addressing the issue of "Racism, Group Defamation, and Freedom of Speech on 
Campus," Laramee (1991) offers yet another attempt to confront the delicate balance 
between group defamation and free speech with the hope of arriving at the most prudent 
and just solution to this perplexing problem (p. 61). Sensitive to the crucial role that the 
freedom of expression plays in the democratic society, especially in an academic 
community, he nevertheless also feels that the abuse of this freedom can no longer be 
tolerated and must incur "swift and sever punishment" (p. 62). The fact that the very 
"roots of racism" that need to be eliminated are "found in the language that we use" (p. 
55) compounds the problem of walking the delicate line between the proper balance of 
freedom to speak and freedom from hateful speech. 
He considers "group defamation" to be "any oral, written, or symbolic speech 
that debases or degrades members of a group on the basis of a characteristic that is 
allegedly common to the group, or that by its very utterance inflicts injury on a member 
of a group, or that promotes animosity against a group" (p. 57). By "group" he means 
"an aggregation of people identified by a common race, religion, national origin, 
ethnicity, gender, or sexual preference" (p. 57). His conclusion is that in spite of the 
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risks involved and the chance that some may feel that their First Amendment rights have 
been abridged, "the victims of group and class defamation have waited long enough for 
relief, for some practical and hybrid mechanisms that will not only preserve the principle 
of free speech but also lessen the divisions between groups that often judge each other 
with blind hatred, contempt, and ignorance" (p. 62). 
What makes it risky and also perplexing to tamper in any way with the First 
Amendment is the acknowledged value of freedom of expression for the very groups who 
seek relief for its abuse against them. Laramee cites legal scholar Monroe Freedman 
who, in addressing a Group Defamation and Freedom of Speech Conference in 1988, 
suggested that "the greatest safeguard of minority rights in this country ... along with 
the Equal Protection Clause ... is the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech 
and of association -- an essential limitation on the power of the majority to impose its 
will on any minority" (p. 60). If, however, state officials become the ones who 
"determine which ideas are to be punished as hateful," the potential for a paradoxical 
conflict of interests is created. As "freedom of speech and association is restrained in 
order to protect minorities from group defamation, incalculable harm could be done to 
minority rights of speech and association" (p. 60). 
In the context of today's collegiate environment, Laramee believes that simply 
advocating the traditional "marketplace of ideas" principle does not take into account 
the increased complexity of "the application and function of free speech" on campus, 
and may actually be more limiting than one might expect (p. 61). He suggests that it 
may be more appropriate, from both a legal and moral perspective, to consider the issue 
of group defamation. During periods of racial conflict and unrest, which some believe 
exists now given the number of incidents occurring on campuses across the country, the 
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law must be used as the base from which the right to free expression and the right to be 
free from abusive expression are balanced. At the same time, so that "the moral 
foundation of the academy" can be preserved, the use of the law should be 
supplemented by rigorous efforts in the areas of "education, mediation, counseling, and 
policy initiatives" which do everything possible to meet expression which "debases, 
degrades, inflicts injury, or promotes animosity against minority groups" with 
appropriate sanctions (pp. 61-62). These are the kinds of concerns with which college 
presidents must deal. 
Preliminary research: Penney. Little research has been conducted to elicit from 
institutional leaders either the attitudes toward the problem of offensive expression or 
the means that have been used to address specific incidents. Robert O'Neil ( 1992) has 
recently encouraged research which goes beyond "conjecture and hypothesis" as to the 
relative worth of speech codes and other policies attempting to reconcile the conflicting 
values of free expression and freedom from discrimination and harassment (p. A40). 
One such attempt (Penney, 1992) surveyed a small number of Midwestern 
institutions and found that more than half of those responding did not have codes 
designed to regulate hate speech. Nearly two-thirds also indicated that they had no 
intention of adopting such a code, and about the same amount stated that there had 
been no desire for one expressed on their respective campuses. Penney pointed out in 
an interview which discussed her study ( Cox, 1992) that colleges and universities must 
not only find more effective ways for minority students to express their concerns, they 
must also create a supportive environment where these students are encouraged to 
participate fully in all programs of their institutions. She is not convinced, however, that 
speech codes represent the best solution ( Cox, 1992, p. 10). 
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The instrument used in Penney's study makes no mention of legal rights, moral 
wrongs, or theological concerns of any kind in its examination of campus-based speech 
codes. Neither is there any item in it which would reveal whether a respondent 
institution was church-related. Likewise, in the responses to the study's open-ended 
questions, nothing was written which acknowledged the moral or theological dimension 
of this topic. Finally, in the notes used for her presentation of the study, which she was 
willing to share upon request, there is no reference to the denominational affiliation of 
any of the institutions in the study (Penney, 1992). Church-relatedness clearly was not 
a factor or a consideration in this study. The concept of church-relatedness in private 
colleges and universities, however, has been well studied. What follows is an overview 
of various definitions of church-relatedness and how this study's attempt to use it as a 
variable in the study related to those previous attempts. 
Freedom of Expression in Church-Related Higher Education Institutions 
Introduction. Throughout its formal history, higher education has had a close 
connection with a variety of religious bodies. Indeed, to speak of "church-related higher 
education" up until a little over one hundred years ago would have been to state the 
obvious. Today, many colleges and universities still have definite connections -- granted, 
in varying degrees of strength -- to some established denomination. Consequently, much 
has been written in the field. This section will examine the topic of church-related 
higher education in general and some aspects of Lutheran higher education in particular. 
Some of the issues related to free expression in church-related higher education will also 
be discussed. 
What may be the classic study in this area is the Report of the Danforth 
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Commission written by Pattillo and Mackenzie (1966), Church-Sponsored Higher 
Education in the United States. Based on an extensive survey from which the responses 
of 817 Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish colleges and universities were received, the 
authors offered not only information and analysis on a wide variety of issues and 
problems often unique to these institutions, but also some recommendations as to the 
role they can play in the future of American higher education and how they can aid the 
churches in the fulfillment of their respective missions. 
Intended to be "a systematic assessment of church-related higher education in the 
United States," in order to provide information about institutions and students which 
"had never been studied on a comprehensive basis" (p. v), the project directors set out 
to address five issues: 1) "the most influential forces and ideas, academic and religious, 
that have shaped the church-sponsored institutions of higher education;" 2) "the 
essential facts concerning their students, graduates, faculties, curricula, facilities, 
government (including the forms of relationship with churches), financing, and 
educational results;" 3) "their major points of strength and weakness and their most 
important contributions to American education;" 4) the "distinctive" nature of "their 
... roles as academic and religious institutions in our predominantly secular culture and 
educational system;" and 5) the "courses of action" to "be recommended for their sound 
development in the years ahead" (p. v .). Pertinent to the present study, Pattillo and 
Mackenzie also contribute to the discussion of both defining church-relatedness and the 
role of free expression in church-related higher education. 
To determine which institutions would be included in the study, the researchers 
sent a questionnaire to the 1,189 "non-publicly controlled institution[s], except 
theological seminaries, included in the 1962-63 Education Directory with the request 
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that the president provide ... specific information on any existing church association." 
The response rate to this inquiry was 100 percent, and 817 institutions were considered 
to be sufficiently church-related for inclusion in the main study (p. 19). The researchers 
then used "l q]uestionnaires, legal and historical documents, interviews, statistical 
analyses, testing of students, group discussions, and personal inspection ... as means of 
gathering ... and interpreting" data from each of the 817 schools. In addition, they 
relied heavily on what was gained from "detailed case studies of 50 representative 
colleges and universities" which were part of the sample (pp. v-vi). 
Criteria for definini: church-related hii:her education in America. Pattillo and 
Mackenzie have identified a number of elements which contribute to such a designation 
for church-related institutions in general. They have also formulated a classification of 
four types of institutions based on the respective features of the various schools analyzed. 
In determining whether a college or university is church-related, Pattillo and 
Mackenzie looked at the elements of "board composition, ownership, financial support, 
acceptance of denominational standards, or use of denominational name, educational 
aims, and selection of faculty and administrative personnel" (p. 31 ). In their analysis, 
they found that among the Lutheran institutions which were part of the study in I 963, 
61.4 percent "reported that all six applied to them," and that no Lutheran institution 
reported less than three (p. 34). With 29.5 percent reporting the presence of five 
elements, over 90 percent of these schools reported the presence of at least five (p. 33). 
The following percentages were reported for the elements listed for the Lutheran 
colleges and universities in the study (p. 34-35): 
Element of Relationship 
1. Composition of Board Control 
a. Church membership required 
b. Hoard members nominated/elected by church 
2. Institution owned by church (or religious order or congregation) 
3. Institution receives financial support from official church sources 
a. For educational and general budget 
c. For capital purposes 
4. Institution affiliated with church college organization/subscribes to 
set of standards 
a. Institution affiliated with denominational organization of colleges 
b. Institution subscribes to standards or policy set by 
church for colleges 
5. Institutional statement of purpose reflects religious orientation 
6. Preference given church members in faculty and staff selection 
97.7 
86.4 
79.5 
79.5 
97.7 
93.2 
75.0 
86.4 
52.3 
61.4 
97.7 
86.4 
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After singling out the Lutheran institutions as places "where ... the board 
member is usually required to be a church member" (p. 40); where "ownership l by the 
church] is most frequent" (p. 42); where substantial financial support is provided (p. 46-
47); and where "more affirmative feelings" are found by church members (p. 139), 
Pattillo and Mackenzie conclude that Lutheran institutions have "the most extensive 
relationships with their churches" among Protestant bodies (p. 52). That study did not, 
however, distinguish between the different Lutheran church bodies which sponsor 
institutions, but reported all information for Lutheran colleges in the aggregate. 
Cuninggim ( 1978) addresses the same issue from the perspective of many years 
in service to and observation of church-related higher education. He has also devoted 
considerable thought to what does and does not make an institution church-related. At 
the outset of a substantial analysis of the general topic (see Parsonage, 1978), and 
cognizant of the work of Pattillo and Mackenzie, he identifies what he considers to be 
"myths of church-relatedness" (pp. 17-27). He addresses and attempts to refute the 
usefulness of indicators such as historic ties to and even ownership by a church body (p. 
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18); church members, including clergy, on the governing board (p. 19); the president's 
membership in the sponsoring church (p. 19); the mere fact that religion is. taken 
seriously, since non-church-related colleges theoretically could be more serious here 
than those officially connected (p. 19-20); required courses in religion or the frequency 
of chapel or other worship activities (p. 20); church membership or "creedal conformity" 
of faculty, staff, or students (p. 21); amount of financial support by the sponsoring 
church (p. 22); or a particular "party line of moral attitude or behavior" (p. 23). 
In his analysis, Cuninggim cites the work of Anderson ( 1977) as an example of 
what does not contribute to a better understanding of church-relatedness. In his book, 
Strate&ic Policy Changes at Private Colleges, Anderson devised a "religiosity index" 
which includes eight variables, where the presence of any three would indicate church-
relatedness: [I] "percentage of full-time equivalent students of the same religion, [2 J 
percent of total church support, [3] religious requirements for members of the governing 
board, [ 4] required chapel attendance, [5] compulsory religious courses, [ 6] strict moral 
demands placed upon students, ... [7] statement of religious purpose in catalog, and [ 8] 
specialization of denominational ties in the catalog" (p. 23). Cuninggim claims that, 
while it would be unlikely, an institution with only two indicators present conceivably 
could be more genuinely church-related than one with many more (p. 23). 
Cuninggim then offers his own eight "essentials" which should be present if an 
institution is even to be considered church-related. (Underlined material appeared as 
italics in the original.) 
1. To be church related, a college must want to be and aim to be so related. 
There must be on the part of the college a conscious intention to achieve 
and maintain a continuing relationship with a church or perhaps churches 
and a significant measure of congruence among the constituent groups of 
the college in their understanding of this intention. . . . If genuine, then 
the college will communicate its desire to the church. That is, it would 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
be expected that the college would express clearly in official documents 
and publications its intentionality of relationship. Further, ... the 
college's willingness to own [up] to a connection should make it respectful 
of the church and its representations (p. 74). 
To be church related. a college must make proper provision for religion 
in all its dimensions, in at least rough harmony with the views of its 
sponsoring denomination. . . . In regard to religion, at least two 
affirmations would seem to be common to all churches and their colleges: 
that there is an ultimate source of all life, and that all humankind are kin. 
[That is,] . ; . to love God and neighbor. ... A second implication of the 
insistence that a church-affiliated college must provide properly for 
religion is that it will take worship seriously (pp. 75-77). 
To be church related, a college must put its values and those of its church 
into recognizable operation in every aspect of the life of the institution, 
including the functions of scholarship, teaching, and learning, as well as 
in personnel practices and the campus ethos (pp. 78-79). 
To be church related, a college must be able to count on its church's 
understanding of the educational task in which the college is engaged .. 
. . The emphasis now is on the necessity that the denomination know 
what a college is all about. . . . If a college can't count on its 
denomination's sympathetic understanding of what that particular 
institution feels it must be and do, then the ecclesiastical connection is in 
trouble (pp. 81-82). 
To be church related, a college must receive tangible support from its 
church (p. 82). 
To be church related, a college must be made to feel that the 
denomination also gives it intangible support, when needed and justified 
by the institution's pursuit of its proper purposes (pp. 82-83). 
To be church related, a college must inform and illumine its 
denomination on all matters that would appear to be relevant or useful 
and must welcome being informed and illuminated in return. The heart 
of this proposition is the simple expectation that the college should have 
some amount or kind of beneficent influence on its sponsoring church 
and vice versa (p. 83). 
. .. To be church related, a college must know why it wants to be so 
related, and to complete the reciprocal arrangement, the church must 
know why it wants connections with its colleges. In other words, each 
must develop a rationale for its relationship with the other (p. 84). 
67 
In short, Cuninggim believes that "whatever else qualifies a colJege for a place on the 
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spectrum, it needs to be an institution that, first, puts forth some sort of claim to being 
connected with a church and, second, supports that claim with some sort of observable 
action that makes the claim credible" (pp. 29-30). 
Rand ( 1985), a seasoned veteran administrator in several Lutheran colleges, noted 
on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the Lutheran Educational Conference of 
North America (LECNA), that "[t]here is no one way to define a 'church-related' 
college, but there are those in our churches who would like to see a higher degree of 
uniformity in this regard than we believe proper, or than will be pragmatically 
achievable in the years ahead" (p. 48). Problems that arise as a result of attempts to 
impose such uniformity will be cited later in this review. 
Attempts to classify church-related institutions. Pattillo and Mackenzie (1966) 
have also contributed a four-category typology of church-related colleges. The typology 
is based on their examination of the 817 institutions constituting the sample and their 
observations and interviews during extensive visits to fifty of them. The four types and 
a brief description of each follows. 
The first of these hypothetical composites is the "defender of the faith colle~e." 
It exists to provide the future leaders of the supporting denomination with a liberal arts 
education. Though not a requirement, most of the students and almost all of the faculty 
are members of the sponsoring church body, and their commitment to its tenets and 
beliefs is seen as essential. It views the popular culture of the secular society as being 
in tension with its values, and it expects that students and faculty will support and 
defend loyally the standards of their tradition. Views in conflict with the college or the 
church supporting it are discussed openly, but "they are evaluated in terms of the beliefs 
and principles officially espoused by the institution" (p. 192). Student conduct at these 
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institutions is monitored closely, and all in the community are expected to participate 
regularly in the worship life of the campus which is seen as "a unifying factor" (p. 192). 
In addition, all students must take a certain number of courses in theology or religion 
(p. 192). Members of the church body provide generous financial support for the 
institution and, in return, expect that the college will "defend the faith" on behalf of the 
constituency. The cost of this "clarity of purpose" and "strong religious influence" is a 
certain restriction on freedom since much, at least in the theological arena, is not really 
left open for debate (p. 193). 
The second category in the Pattillo-Mackenzie scheme is the "non-affirming 
colle2e. 11 Technically still church-related, this type is at the other end of the spectrum 
from the "defender of the faith." Neither religious belief nor church membership is a 
factor in the admission of students or the employment of faculty members; likewise 
neither of these groups is attracted to the institution because of its denominational 
affiliation. References in institutional literature to the values present will likely be stated 
more in terms of general moral and ethical concepts than by way of specific spiritual, 
religious, or theological statements. Chapel services are attended by a small number, 
and religion courses may or may not be prescribed as part of the students' general 
education requirements. While some financial support does come from the sponsoring 
body and at least some of the trustees are members of it, it is quite possible that the 
president is not. In short, the institution itself has done much to foster the perception 
that it is non-sectarian in character. While this may result in a less than clear identity, 
it may be perceived as being more "open-minded religiously," which many view as an 
advantage as well as a sign of educational strength and integrity. Attendant to this is a 
greater sense of freedom of inquiry with regard to religious questions and issues, and 
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presumably other issues as well (p. 193). 
The "free Christian ... colle~e" is the third type, and is something of a synthesis 
of the first two. Pattillo and Mackenzie state that while it does acknowledge a definite 
Christian commitment, "[i]t is free because it does not control thought" (p. 194). 
Combining the characteristics of the "defender" and "non-affirming" models, it asserts 
the importance of religion in a liberal arts institution, but "relies on example, persuasive 
presentation of ideas, and a climate of conviction, rather than on conformity, to 
accomplish its ends" (p. 195). Most faculty are active members of the sponsoring church 
body, and many of these provide leadership to the denomination itself (pp. 194-195). 
Students for whom a religious dimension to campus life is important appreciate the 
institution's attempts to find the proper balance between faith and learning. These 
colleges typically assert that they are interested in the development of the "whole 
individual;" that is, addressing the "intellectual, religious, moral, artistic, [and] social" 
needs of its students (p. 194). Worship activities are voluntary but very important. 
Religion courses are challenging, but popular, and an integral part of the curriculum. 
Students may not all believe the same thing in the same way, but all are expected and 
most are willing to struggle "with the basic religious and philosophical questions and 
arrive at a considered position of their own" (p. 195). Faculty also possess the freedom 
to inquire and criticize, but recognize the benefit to both the church and the college if 
it is done in a constructive fashion (p. 195). 
Pattillo and Mackenzie add a fourth model to their scheme: the "Church-related 
university." This is represented by a relatively large (5,000-20,000), urban, religiously 
pluralistic, demographically heterogeneous institution which "serves primarily a 
community or a region rather than a particular religious group" and "draws its financial 
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support from a wide range of sources, including many donors who have little if any 
interest in its function as a church-related institution" (p. 195-196). Because its mission 
also extends to a broad range of graduate and professional programs, the expectation is 
that its religious character, to the extent that it exists, will not be one of its dominant 
features. 
Carlson ( 1977), writing on "the future of church related higher education" over 
a decade after Pattillo and Mackenzie, noted that their four classifications of church-
related institutions were somewhat "controversial" when they appeared (p. 97). The 
reason seems to involve not so much the descriptive content of the groups but the 
connotations conveyed by the designations themselves. For example, those colleges 
included in the "defender of the faith" category felt that it sounded too apologetic. 
Something like "'the affirming college"' would have been preferred. Likewise, those 
assigned the label of"' non-affirming college"' did not like how negative it sounded (pp. 
97-98). 
Other observers of church-related higher education have offered their own 
designations for the differences among the institutions. Pace (1972), for instance, in the 
book, Education and Evangelism: A Profile of Protestant Colleges, offers four types: 
1. Institutions that had Protestant roots but are no longer Protestant 
in any legal sense; 
2. Colleges that remain nominally related to Protestantism but are 
probably on the verge of disengagement; 
3. Colleges established by the major Protestant denominations and 
which retain a connection with the church; [and] 
4. Colleges associated with the evangelical, fundamentalist, and 
interdenominational Christian churches (p. xii). 
Commenting on the value of Pace's contribution, less from the point of view of 
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the categories themselves but with regard to the flagrant, and obviously careless, mis-
classification of one particular institution, Olsen ( 1980) concludes that placing 
"Valparaiso [University] with the so-called Evangelical colleges, presumably because of 
an assumption that LC-MS colleges are conservative and therefore like the evangelical 
schools," could only be done by "someone who really does not know Lutheran 
institutions" and lacks "an historical sense of the Lutheran presence in higher 
education" (p. 19). 
Cuninggim (1978) posits his own groupings as "a valid model of church-
relatedness." He identifies "The Consonant College" ("The Ally"); "The Proclaiming 
College" ("The Witness"); and "The Embodying College" ("The Reflection") (p. 32). 
His descriptions of each follow: 
The Consonant College is an institution that, feeling independent in its 
own operations, is committed to the tradition of its related church and to 
consistency with that tradition in its own behavior. Its values are in the 
main its denomination's values. They are taken seriously and are evident 
in the life of the college and the lives of its alumni/ae .... The Consonant 
College may talk very little about its church-relatedness, and this may be 
one of its marks of consistency with its church, which itself may also be 
less concerned with public protestation (p. 32). 
The Proclaiming College ... is an institution that joyously announces its 
affiliation with its sponsoring denomination at every appropriate occasion. 
But it does more than merely identify its connection; in its program it 
practices what it proclaims in ways that seem approvable to the two 
worlds in which it exists -- education and religion. [It] . . . is the 
acknowledged academic partner of the church, taking seriously both its 
intellectual and its ecclesiastical character. ... The Proclaiming College 
is a free and credible witness to its being an academic partner of its proud 
denominational parent (pp. 34-35). 
The Embodying College constitutes a third category distinct from either 
of the other two but closer to its Proclaiming cousin. Whereas it might 
be said that the Proclaiming College is one whose allegiance is to the 
norms of higher education with ecclesiastical overtones, the Embodying 
College would be one whose allegiance is to the tenets of its church with 
educational overtones. It is the mirror, almost the embodiment, of the 
denomination to which it gives fealty. Whether forced or unforced, it is 
the Reflection of the church, true in every major respect, sound in faith 
and observance. When one walks on its campus, one knows immediately 
where he or she is, ecclesiastically speaking. . . . The denomination 
involved has a clear orthodoxy to uphold, and the Embodying College is 
one of its means for doing so enthusiastically (pp. 35-36). 
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Gamelin ( 1975) is another who has arrived at a classification of colleges. Dealing 
exclusively with Lutheran institutions, he did an analysis of catalog statements which he 
believes provide a good source of information about an institution's identity, purpose, 
and character. He recognizes that such information "may be idealistic" or "claim more 
than the truth," but it is likely to represent "the best expectations that college personnel 
have of their institutions" (p. 3). He found that while many of them "publish almost 
interchangeable statements of philosophy and purpose," they "do not all claim similar 
identity" (p. 3). He concludes that Lutheran colleges and universities fall into three 
main groups: 
1. The "Church College," which "is committed primarily to the service of the 
church from which it receives its primary financing" (p. 3), and is seen as "an 
arm of the church for meeting its educational/vocational needs" (p. 43); 
2. The "Christian College, ... which explicitly affirms a Christian stance" (p. 3); 
and 
3. The "Church-Related College," which is "related to a church body by heritage, 
governance, and financing" (p. 3). 
He also identifies two sub-categories: the "Church Vocations College" and the "Bible-
Centered College." The former is a variation of the "Church College." Its mission is the 
preparation of workers for the sponsoring church. The latter falls into Gamelin's 
"Christian College" category. As the name implies, study of the Bible constitutes the 
primary focus of the curriculum (p. 3). 
In arriving at these categories, Gamelin ( 1975) examined many of the same factors 
identified earlier by other writers, such as ownership and control by and financial 
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support from the church, employment and enrollment of church members, "[a Jffirmation 
of church beliefs and values," and the presence of "programs which serve the church or 
its interests" (µ. 43). When these are added to the various criteria suggested by Pattillo 
and Mackenzie, Anderson, and Cuninggim, one observes in the total list not only some 
duplication but also some criteria unique to each. It is possible, therefore, to construct 
a matrix displaying all the criteria referred to above which have been used in the studies 
cited to define church-relatedness. Table 1, which appears on the following page, 
presents this comparative information. 
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Table 1.--A matrix of the criteria used to define church-relatedness. 
Criteria I Studies* A C G p 
1. Control by church body X 
2. Ownership by church body X X 
3. Financial or other tangible support from official church X X X X 
sources 
4. Make-up of board, including need to be church member X X 
5. Preference given to church members for faculty and staff X X 
positions 
6. Percentage of full-time undergraduate students who are X 
church members 
7. Enrollment of church members X 
8. Required religion courses X 
9. Required chapel attendance X 
10. Provision made for all dimensions of religion X 
11. Statement of purpose reflects conscious intent to be tied X X X 
to church 
12. Church ties stated in college catalog X 
13. College and church know why they want to be in a X 
relationship 
14. Mutual information and influence between college and X 
church 
15. College receives church's intangible support X 
16. Church supports college's educational task X 
17. College's programs serve church's interests X 
18. Values of college and church are operative X 
19. College affirms church's beliefs, values and standards X X 
20. Strict moral demands placed on students X 
* A=Anderson; C=Cuninggim; G=Gamelin; P=Pattillo & Mackenzie. 
An examination of the table reveals that there is little consistency or agreement 
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as to what constitutes church-relatedness, at least on the basis of the four attempts to 
define it which are reported here. The criteria are arranged in an order which allows 
them to be grouped into broad categories represented in the table by the double lines 
separating one category from the next. Criteria 1-4 could be labeled "Governance"; 5-7: 
"Faculty, Staff, and Students"; 8-10: "Instruction and Worship"; 11-20: "Mission and 
Values." 
The relationship between truth and freedom at church-related institutions. 
Frequently in the course of their reporting and analysis, Pattillo and Mackenzie ( 1966) 
confront what they correctly identify as a common dilemma faced by church-related 
institutions and which, from some perspectives, constitutes "the central problem of 
Christian higher education;" namely, how a given college or university can "do justice 
to its avowed purpose as a Christian institution, a purpose which carries with it 
commitment to a set of beliefs, and at the same time maintain the freedom of inquiry 
which most academic people think is necessary for good education" (p. 204). Because 
this also has significant implications for the way in which free expression is viewed on 
church-related campuses, Pattillo and Mackenzie's discussion of faculty and student 
freedom will be more closely examined. 
Pattillo and Mackenzie point out that church-related colleges and universities are 
often criticized, sometimes even from within, for abridging the. freedom of their students 
and faculties (p. 70). Ironically, while an institution of higher education is supposed to 
be engaged in intellectual inquiry, one which is church-related may also believe that it 
must determine the degree to which indoctrination -- or at least intolerance for certain 
views -- will occur. 
Pattillo and Mackenzie propose, m light of this tension which exists, that 
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"freedom, responsibility, and institutional purpose" are essential elements for church-
related institutions and must be balanced and reconciled so that no single element would 
be pursued outside the context of the other two. They also recognize that problems 
usually emerge when one constituency desires to press its own self-interest to the point 
where the rights or the interests of the members of another constituency are violated or 
subordinated (p. 70). 
The goal, then, should be "to reconcile freedom and commitment, or freedom, 
responsibility, and institutional purpose" by constant reference to the values which 
represent both "the convictions of the present staff as to what is good, true, and 
beautiful" as well as "the convictions of previous generations who have contributed time, 
thought, and money to the development of the institution" (pp. 73-74). Consequently, 
these can establish the basis upon which "major decisions affecting the whole character 
of the institution" are made (p. 74), including the role that freedom of expression will 
have on the campus. In their strongest statement regarding freedom in church-related 
colleges and universities, Pattillo and Mackenzie assert: 
Institutional purpose and the responsibility of trustees and staff to 
accomplish it, though essential, must not be permitted to crowd out 
freedom. Once the faculty member is appointed, he should enjoy a large 
measure of freedom in teaching, research, and private life. He, in turn, 
should respect the student's right to freedom. The principle of faculty 
and student freedom must be made unmistakably clear. It is the duty of 
the administration and the trustees to safeguard it. They must insist upon 
as much freedom for the individual as is consonant with the freedom of 
others. They must be willing to tolerate heresy. If a college develops a 
strongly affirmative climate in support of the philosophy implicit in its 
educational purposes, it can afford to have some members of the faculty 
who hold conflicting views. Unanimity is neither necessary nor desirable. 
Freedom is so basic to the process of teaching and learning that colleges 
and universities must protect it at all costs. Moreover ... a Christian 
institution has theological as well as educational reasons for insisting on 
freedom. . . . A definite institutional philosophy does not preclude a 
genuine exposure of the student to alternative views nor prevent free 
inquiry and expression on the part of the faculty (pp. 74-75). 
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Repeatedly, Pattillo and Mackenzie cite concerns expressed to them during their 
research regarding the chilling effect religion allegedly has upon one's ability to search 
for the truth or to engage in unimpeded intellectual inquiry at church-related colleges. 
They state, for example, that "[t]here is a widespread feeling, often unconscious, that 
religion is not genuinely concerned with truth, that by its very nature it is inharmonious 
with the purposes of an academic community" (p. 139). The point is reiterated later, 
when they suggest that it is a commonly held view "in the academic world that freedom 
to teach and to learn is severely circumscribed in institutions conducted under religious 
auspices" (p. 167). 
Martin ( 1966) echoes a similar sentiment, and identifies precisely the kind of 
suspicions that inspired this study, when he acknowledges at the outset of his article on 
"Freedom and Restraint in the Christian College" that 
fi]t is generally assumed among educated people, especially among 
educators, that Christian colleges provide less freedom and more restraint 
than secular colleges. Academic freedom, in particular, is thought to fare 
better in colleges under public auspices than in those affiliated with 
churches. Exceptions are usually made in regard to a few Christian 
colleges, but such allowances are accompanied by reminders that these 
colleges are really more secular than Christian, more independent than 
church-related. The prevailing notion is that Christian educators have 
never trusted Jesus' assurance that "the truth will make you free" (p. 
1372). 
Church-related institutions of higher education, in other words, have the reputation of 
being "restricted environments" (Pattillo and Mackenzie, p. 139), and it is indeed true 
that for some this is an accurate description. The authors also believe, however, that for 
many church bodies it is feasible to reconcile "freedom, responsibility, and institutional 
purpose, as these are involved in the religious character of a college" (p. 204). This is 
accomplished by making sure that a significant portion of the faculty consists of 
practicing church members who are committed to the religious missions of their 
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respective institutions; that freedom of inquiry is guaranteed for students and faculty; 
that an environment is created which leaves no doubt about the institutional mission but 
which also does not require acceptance; and that the relevance of religion to life in 
contemporary society is a permanent topic of exploration by the academic community. 
It is crucial, they point out, to avoid the attitude that religious commitment and freedom 
of inquiry are necessarily mutually exclusive (pp. 204-205). 
Freedom and truth from the Lutheran perspective. Since the purpose of this 
study was to determine the extent to which Lutheran colleges and universities are 
"restricted environments" or whether some have been able to reconcile the tension 
between free inquiry and a Christian witness and identity, this section is provided to 
show how some engaged in or familiar with Lutheran higher education have addressed 
that issue. 
Over the years, but particularly during the 1970s, the Lutheran Educational 
Conference of North America (LECNA), which is made up of the presidents of most of 
the Lutheran colleges and universities, addressed questions of identity and church-
relatedness at many of their annual meetings. The published Papers and Proceedin2s 
of these conventions are helpful in gaining a better understanding of where the group 
was collectively on these and other issues. Much of what follows is taken from reports, 
essays, and lectures offered at these meetings. 
Ahlstrom (1974), while addressing the question "What's Lutheran about higher 
education?" at an annual LECNA meeting, suggests that "investigative spirit" and a 
"willingness to ask the deepest philosophical questions, to question even the most 
accepted assumptions, to pursue the most sensitive kinds of scriptural study" represented 
"what was in many ways a self-conscious Lutheran movement" (p. 12). Indeed, 
Luther's views of history, ethics, rationalism, and scholarship, his 
conception of biblical exegesis, his attitudes toward the canon, his 
willingness to evaluate individual books of the Bible, his understanding 
of the Gospel, even his views on psalmody and hymnody reveal a 
remarkable openness to the investigative spirit (p. 12). 
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In light of this, Ahlstrom then wonders whether "a Lutheran institution of any of these 
types [can] maintain its intellectual health and credibility if it neglects or denies its own 
critical traditions?" (p. 16). And another commentator, who has recognized from his 
position as both an institutional and associational leader the different approaches to 
higher education carried out in the name of Lutheranism, has asserted that, these 
differences notwithstanding, "[o]ur Lutheran theology, (even with nuances of 
interpretations) clearly holds that the search for truth is part of -- and not separate from 
-- our Christian commitment" (Nelson, 1986, p. 28). A college which calls itself 
Lutheran, in other words, should be committed simultaneously to both the "search for 
truth" and "the teaching of Christian values" (p. 29). 
Lotz (1979), in his "reflections on the theological foundations of Lutheran higher 
education," presented as the keynote lecture at a LECNA meeting devoted to 
"institutional mission and identity in Lutheran higher education," points out that Luther 
clearly "treats education specifically as an affair of the mind, of human rationality and 
wisdom" (p. 9), and that his "efforts on behalf of universal education are well known" 
(p. 8). He also explains that church-related institutions rooted in the Reformation 
tradition may justify thorough inquiries in the arts and sciences, including theology, by 
viewing it as the proper use of God's gift of human "creative rationality and wisdom" (p. 
17). Moreover, one accepting it as such is then obligated to see it cultivated and 
developed to the fullest extent as good stewards of the gift and to become "equipped for 
responsible service in the world" (p. 17). 
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Marshall ( l 969), who at the time was the president of the former Lutheran 
Church in America, also recognized, in his comments to I ,utheran college and university 
presidents in the late 1960s, that those who are involved in church-related higher 
education and who take both the "church" and the "education" dimensions of the 
endeavor seriously, must struggle with a complex set of dynamics as they attempt to 
maintain a delicate balance between faith and learning. He states, 
The church should want its campuses to be places where faculty members 
with profound and penetrating faith explore the dangerous areas of 
knowledge, seeking the honest facts about modern life, facing up to all the 
unanswered questions and feeding the results and findings of such 
exploration into the life of the church and its members .... The church 
college should be a forum for ... ascertaining the truth of faith and the 
truth of science (p. 26). 
Olsen (1977) contributed the opening piece in a collection of essays on the need 
for church-related colleges to seek a "viable saga." He points out, in his analysis of 
Sherry's (1967) "Church or College: Either, but Not Both," that church colleges perform 
functions of both church and college by assuming that each has the goal of producing 
people of faith and learning. lt is Sherry's contention that this assumption, which may 
have been accurate in past centuries, is unworkable in the present pluralistic age (Olsen, 
p. 15). 
Rather than seeing pluralism as a disqualification of or deterrent to church-
related institutions, however, Olsen believes that colleges and universities affiliated with 
religious bodies should instead reevaluate their missions and their sagas in light of the 
pluralism of groups, knowledge, and their own values and beliefs (p. 15). Narum's 
(1977) essay on "commitment," which follows Olsen's, affirms this by pointing out that 
"faith and learning, commitment and the search for truth, and thus church and college 
are not incommensurate, but that rightly understood they form a valid and creative 
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partnership in higher education" (pp. 39-40). 
Kauper (1974), addressing a LECNA meeting from the perspective of both a 
constitutional law scholar and frequent lay member of church-wide boards and 
commissions dealing with higher education, also recognized the struggle involved in 
finding the proper balance by shedding "a narrow sectarian view" and yet providing a 
visible witness to Christian faith and values (pp. 32-33). He is also careful to caution 
against allowing this witness to become so indistinct that the institution comes to 
resemble merely another private college (p. 33). 
In the use of reason and the pursuit of intellectual excellence, then, Christian 
revelation should not "dictate the results of rational inquiry," and each academic 
discipline should be "free to pursue truth for truth's sake on the grounds of its own 
methodological canons and in accord with the rules of logical argument" (Lotz, 1979, p. 
17). Furthermore, holding professors to a specific standard of orthodoxy in terms of 
what they explore or what findings they choose to report as a result of their inquiries, 
is evidence more of "a theological failure of nerve" or a lack of faith that "the truths of 
the Christian faith can hold their own" than a reliable method of safeguarding that truth 
(p. 17). Lotz feels it is important to emphasize that what distinguishes Christian scholars 
from their non-Christian colleagues is not that they will find different facts, but that they 
will "see the same facts differently;" the former "contemplating them in the light of the 
Christian revelation" which is received on faith (pp. 17-18). 
Joining the throng of those who view church-related higher education as a 
"both/and" rather than an "either/or" proposition, Vos ( 1977) suggests, in his essay on 
faculty in church-related colleges, that there indeed is a way to find "unity amid 
heterogeneity" in Lutheran institutions. He states, 
Liberal education itself demands that an arena of openness, freedom, and 
diversity be present in order for meaningful teaching and learning to Lake 
place. A Lutheran college should provide an environment of real 
dialogue between the Gospel and other current faiths, philosophies, and 
ways of life. Such dialogue takes place most authentically in a setting of 
heterogeneity (p. 111 ). 
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Bertram (1974), a Lutheran seminary professor who addressed the annual 
LECN A meeting shortly after experiencing personally the consequences of teaching in 
an environment that demanded not only unity but also uniformity, has concluded that 
those denominations which seek to avoid a full commitment to free inquiry and 
expression are not only susceptible to "the harshest intolerance" (p. 19), but also will 
find higher education, in the truest sense of the term, including the truest Lutheran 
sense, close to impossible (p. 19). Differences of opinion about this issue have likely 
contributed to the "identity crisis" experienced by some Lutheran institutions of higher 
education and identified by Farwell in his "President's Report" to LECNA (1974, p. 6). 
Nevertheless, "[m]ost Lutheran colleges," according to Gamelin (1975), "want to 
maintain a Christian identity" (p. 44). Claiming to be able to provide "a living Christian 
community and a Christian view of life," these institutions genuinely seem not to want 
to join those churches whose colleges have "depreciate[d] religious claims by ignoring 
or disparaging them, secularizing them, consigning them (sometimes affectionately) to 
tradition, or treating them as equally valid or invalid" (p. 44). 
Carlson ( 1977), a former Lutheran college president who later served as director 
of The Minnesota Private Colleges Council, presumably is able to appreciate the value 
and place of church-related colleges across the spectrum in terms of religiosity. For him, 
however, the purpose of education is unequivocal. It is simply "the pursuit of truth in 
its own right and for its own sake ... and the development in the student of the capacity 
to discern and use it" (p. 29). He notes further, in his book on "the future of church-
related higher education," 
that the orientation of both teacher and student is toward the "pursuit" 
of truth, rather than merely its transmission. It is not, in any case, a 
matter of merely transferring some content from one container to another; 
it is the development in the student of the capacity to recognize truth and 
to use it. The student is to become a competent learner and knower, 
capable of recognizing, verifying, and validating what presumes to qualify 
as truth. But this is not an end in itself. Truth is to be both used and 
served, depending on the nature of the truth involved. Knowing and 
doing are integral to one another (p. 29). 
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It must also be presumed that, in order to know the truth and to be able to distinguish 
it from that which is not true, one must be given the opportunity to choose from both 
varieties of information, and be allowed to come to his or her own determination as to 
the reliability or veracity of the matter under consideration, and to be able to assert the 
truth of a matter even though others may disagree. This requires, as Carlson recognizes, 
the ability to teach and learn in an environment where people "with minds open to any 
outcomes which the facts dictate" have "complete exposure to all relevant data." lie 
fears that if this is not the case, the agency or institution that controls the flow of 
information will "slant" it to reflect its own ends (p. 45). 
Carlson is concerned that those church-related colleges and universities whose 
commitment to their own moral and religious values is such that no honest question or 
challenge to them would be tolerated will not provide adequate support for academic 
freedom and the pursuit of "the truth wherever it may lead." As an alternative, 
however, he suggests that "a commitment to take seriously all moral and religious issues 
and positions would appear to be more consistent with academic freedom and the 
essential purposes of education than would any limitation of that concern" (p. 53). 
From his perspective, it is the church-related institution which is the best suited and 
most well-equipped to display "a high sense of calling to the academic life and the 
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pursuit of truth," for that is its very mission; and the institution and its faculty is 
obligated to assist the student to do this wherever it leads, regardless of the outcome. 
Neither should this pose a threat to the church which supports the truth-seeking college. 
Indeed, Carlson feels the church should "insist on it," for "[t]o prescribe outcomes for 
individuals on any issue is to call in question the validity of the educational process 
itself, since it denies the investigator the right to be guided by evidence or reason" (p. 
163). This calls to mind Luther's legendary words in response to the question at the 
Diet of Worms concerning whether or not he would disavow the theological views he 
came to hold based on his new understanding of the Bible: "' Unless I am convicted by 
Scripture and plain reason -- I do not accept the authority of popes and councils, for 
they have contradicted each other -- my conscience is captive to the Word of God. I 
cannot and will not recant anything, for to go against conscience is neither right nor 
safe" (Bainton, 1950, p. 144; emphasis added). 
Several colleges and universities which have descended from the tradition born 
in the events represented by that utterance and subsequent developments have affirmed 
in their catalogs the importance of pursuing truth, often mentioning specifically the value 
of free expression to the process. In 1975, as part of "A Report to the Commission on 
the Future" for LECNA, Gamelin analyzed the content of the catalogs of all Lutheran 
colleges and universities in a study which attempted to determine the "church-related 
identity" of this segment of private higher education. Some of the statements he cites 
from those documents address the issue of free expression and are quoted here as 
samples of how institutions from the population claim to balance free inquiry with the 
values of a Christian college. 
Concordia College (Moorhead, Minnesota), asserts that "' the Christian college 
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fosters a true spirit of free and honest intellectual inquiry according to the highest 
traditions of liberal education: we are invited and challenged to test all things"' 
(Gamelin, p. 9). Pacific Lutheran University, after affirming that 11 'all truth is God's 
truth,"' states that 11 'the University, in achieving its educational and spiritual goals, 
maintains the right and indeed the obligation of faculty and students to engage in an 
unbiased search for truth in all realms"' (p. 11). St. Olaf's catalog stated: 11 ' ln the spirit 
of free inquiry and free expression, St. Olaf aims to offer an education that prepares for 
self-understanding, vocational usefulness, and responsible citizenship. Indispensable to 
this program is a confrontation with The Christian Gospel, hopefully leading to a mature 
faith in God"' (p. 11 ). 
After acknowledging the value of its church-relatedness and its acceptance of 
11 
'God as the ultimate source of all life and truth,"' the statement from Wartburg College 
supported the view that 11 '(f]reedom to explore all facets of God's truth is held to be an 
essential feature of this church-relatedness"' (p. 12). Meanwhile, Susquehanna College 
was offering this description of its intellectual commitment: 
'There is respect for and understanding of the traditions and beliefs of 
the Christian faith, but there is no hinderance to free exploration of ideas, 
no attempt on the part of the church to inhibit the free exchange of 
viewpoints. If Susquehanna's parallel commitments to inquiry and to 
faith seem to be in tension with one another, this is not only recognized 
but considered helpful' (p. 13). 
Augustana (Rock Island, Illinois) recognized the need to balance one's personal 
freedom with his or her obligation to others in the context of their religious beliefs when 
it said that 11 'freedom of choice as a citizen is coupled with responsibility for one's own 
behavior and the welfare of others. Students are encouraged to make rational 
judgements and personal commitments that are consistent with moral integrity and the 
Christian faith"' (p. 15). 
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Finally, Muhlenberg College, while affirming the need for exploration, also 
downplayed the value of a phrase common to discussions about the role of free 
expression as a means to the truth: "' Our religious associations serve to remind us that 
truly liberating education is not a ruthless quest for the 'right answers' in the "market-
place of ideas," but a process through which people acquire self-understanding, a 
capacity to communicate values, and the ability to improve the quality of human life"' 
(p. 16 ). Here, according to this statement, at least, it sounds like the conflict between 
the right to express oneself and the obligation to be sensitive to the feelings of another 
was recognized. 
In sum, a number of Lutheran colleges and universities consider the freedom to 
pursue truth wherever it leads to be essential, provided that the means employed are 
civil and done within the context of Christian concern and respect for all people. How 
the presidents of each institution in the sample specifically sought to balance these two 
dimensions is what the study set out to examine. 
Summary 
This chapter began with an examination of the tension that exists between the 
value of free expression in an academic community and the values a church-related 
college or university may possess which would require it to impose limits on expression 
in support of those institutional values. It also looked at some of the reasons why the 
attitudes of Lutheran college and university presidents on this topic might be of interest 
and value to the higher education community. 
A general examination of freedom of expression lil higher education was 
presented through an analysis of a recent Supreme Court decision and the critical 
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response to it. Various other incidents, policies, and court cases were also included. 
Reference was then made to several theoretical works which discussed certain 
legal and moral issues related to some of the more extreme forms of expression dealt 
with on college and university campuses. Arguments regarding the use of both tort and 
criminal law as a response to racist speech and group defamation as well as the issue of 
the legal and moral status of hate speech itself was discussed. A single study conducted 
on free expression in higher education was also briefly reviewed. 
The final section of the literature review examined freedom of expression in 
church-related higher education. It began by looking at the criteria used in four 
different attempts to define the concept of "church-relatedness." Both the relationship 
between truth and freedom and whether church-related institutions are capable of 
reconciling a search for truth and a commitment to their Christian beliefs and values 
were then identified as central factors in resolving the problem posed in the study. What 
has been said about that relationship and the tension inherent in it was examined by 
both general commentators and those involved in Lutheran higher education. 
CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Population and Selection of Sample 
The population for this study was the presidents of the forty-five American 
colleges and universities which are affiliated with or have historic ties to the Lutheran 
Church. This represents every Lutheran institution of higher education in the country. 
Appendix 1 provides the names of the presidents in office at each institution at the time 
the study was conducted, the winter and spring of 1993. 
Ten of these schools are owned and operated by the Lutheran Church-Missouri 
Synod (LCMS) and together constitute the Concordia University System. While the 
individual schools themselves have functioned as agencies of the church both 
individually and collectively for many years (the oldest since 1864 and the newest having 
been founded in 1976), the Concordia University System was established in 1992 to 
coordinate the operations of these institutions in a more systematic way. They include 
the following: 
Concordia College 
Concordia Lutheran College 
Concordia College 
Christ College Irvine 
Concordia University Wisconsin 
Concordia College 
Concordia University 
Concordia College 
Concordia College 
Concordia College 
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Ann Arbor, Michigan 
Austin, Texas 
Bronxville, New York 
Irvine, California 
Mequon, Wisconsin 
Portland, Oregon 
River Forest, Illinois 
St. Paul, Minnesota 
Selma, Alabama 
Seward, Nebraska. 
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Another institution, Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, Indiana, though always 
independent of any direct denominational control, has maintained a strong informal 
relationship with the LCMS since the Lutheran University Association gained control 
of the institution in 1925. All of its presidents have been members of the LCMS clergy. 
Three colleges are owned and operated by the Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran 
Synod (WELS): Dr. Martin Luther College, New Ulm, Minnesota; Northwestern College, 
Watertown, Wisconsin; and Wisconsin Lutheran College, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. One 
junior college, Bethany Lutheran College, Mankato, Minnesota, is operated by the small 
Evangelical Lutheran Synod. Another institution, Immanuel Lutheran College, Eau 
Claire, Wisconsin, is affiliated with the Church of the Lutheran Confession, an 
association of a handful of congregations. 
The remaining twenty-nine institutions are affiliated, in varying degrees of 
strength, with the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA), a denomination 
formed in 1988 as a result of a merger between the American Lutheran Church (ALC), 
the Lutheran Church in America (LCA), and the Association of Evangelical Lutheran 
Churches (AELC). While the AELC -- a relatively small and somewhat transitory 
denomination formed as a result of a split in the LCMS in the middle 1970s -- did not 
have any colleges or universities of its own, the ALC and the LCA have had a long 
history of involvement in higher education, beginning in 1832 with the founding of 
Gettysburg College. The higher education institutions of the ELCA are listed below with 
their pre-merger denominational affiliations in parentheses. It should be noted that 
California Lutheran College (now University) was established as a joint venture between 
the ALC and the LCA. 
Augsburg College (ALC) 
Augustana College (LCA) 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 
Rock Island, Illinois 
Augustana College (ALC) 
Bethany College (LCA) 
California Lutheran University (Joint) 
Capital University (ALC) 
Carthage College (LCA) 
Concordia College (Al ,C) 
Dana College (ALC) 
Gettysburg College (LCA) 
Grand View College (LCA) 
Gustavus Adolphus College (LCA) 
Lenoir-Rhyne College (LCA) 
Luther College (ALC) 
Midland Lutheran College (LCA) 
Muhlenberg College (LCA) 
Newberry College (LCA) 
Pacific Lutheran University (ALC) 
Roanoke College (LCA) 
St. Olaf College (ALC) 
Suomi College (LCA) 
Susquehanna University (LCA) 
Texas Lutheran College (ALC) 
Thiel College (LCA) 
Upsala College (LCA) 
Wagner College (LCA) 
Waldorf College (ALC) 
Wartburg College (ALC) 
Wittenburg University (LCA) 
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Sioux Falls, South Dakota 
Lindsborg, Kansas 
Thousand Oaks, California 
Columbus, Ohio 
Kenosha, Wisconsin 
Moorhead, Minnesota 
Blair, Nebraska 
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania 
Des Moines, Iowa 
St. Peter, Minnesota 
Hickory, North Carolina 
Decorah, Iowa 
Fremont, Nebraska 
Allentown, Pennsylvania 
Newberry, South Carolina 
Tacoma, Washington 
Salem, Virginia 
Northfield, Minnesota 
Hancock, Michigan 
Selinsgrove, Pennsylvania 
Seguin, Texas 
Greenville, Pennsylvania 
East Orange, New Jersey 
Staten Island, New York 
Forest City, Iowa 
Waverly, Iowa 
Springfield, Ohio. 
These forty-five institutions, while technically all "Lutheran" in an affiliational 
sense, vary widely in terms of the degree to which they exhibit the signs or traits of that 
tradition or even acknowledge the relationship. Indeed, when they are examined for 
evidence of something called "Lutheran-ness," or "church-relatedness," they are 
distributed all across a continuum with some on either extreme; that is, some very 
Lutheran and others only nominally so. 
Nevertheless, in spite of both the actual or merely the perceived differences that 
exist among these colleges and universities, there is one unifying factor related to the 
denominational identity of most of them. With the exception of the three WELS 
schools, Bethany (Mankato), and Immanuel (Eau Claire), the remaining forty are 
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members of the Lutheran Educational Conference of North America (LECNA), which 
was estahlished in 1910 "to encourage, assist and promote cooperation among Lutheran 
colleges, universities and seminaries by activities such as an annual meeling, public 
policy monitoring, and selected projects" (LECNA, 1988, Papers and Proceedings of the 
74th Annual Meeting). With offices in Washington, D.C., LECNA employs an Executive 
Director along with a small clerical staff. 
Presidents of Lutheran colleges and universities were chosen for the study 
because the researcher wished to understand better the way these institutions, through 
their presidents, would address the problem of offensive, controversial, or inappropriate 
expression among the people on their campuses, particularly students, both in the 
context of First Amendment principles and the presidents' own understanding of the 
missions of their institutions. In other words, how would the president balance the value 
of free expression on a Christian college campus with the value of establishing limits on 
expression which may be considered inappropriate for some reason? 
The presidents of these institutions were viewed as establishing a good population 
to investigate because they not only represent a significant tradition of church-related 
higher education but also were perceived by the researcher to be relatively diverse in 
terms of how their institutions would exhibit characteristics of church-relatedness and 
how they would respond with regard to questions about free expression on their 
campuses. 
At the outset of the study the potential existed for the population and the sample 
to be the same inasmuch as the actual sample was determined through the process of 
self-selection by the respondents. That is, the sample consisted of all those in the 
population who elected to complete both the first and second survey instruments. 
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Because the members of this sample technically are volunteers, and there were 
five individuals who elected not to participate, the question of the sample's 
representativeness must be addressed. Given the breakdown of the various institutions 
by church body provided above, it can be seen that with twenty-nine institutions, the 
level of response from the ELCA would not be diminished significantly if some did not 
participate. Had any of the eleven LCMS institutions, or the three from the WELS, or 
either of the single colleges from the ELS or CLC had declined to participate, a greater 
degree of representativeness would have been lost. The fact that all five non-responses 
were from the ELCA, however, means that this church body still had more than twice 
as many respondents from it as from the next largest group. Consequently, the sample 
remains as representative as it could possibly be with five members (or eleven percent) 
of the population excluded. 
Procedures 
Data Gathering 
Prior to any collection of data or contact with the presidents, the executive 
director of the Lutheran Educational Conference of North America (LECNA) was 
consulted about the possibility of administering a survey (which was to become the 
second instrument) to the presidents who attended the annual LECNA meeting. Upon 
his recommendation, a formal request to address and survey the presidents at the 
February, 1993 meeting was made to the LECNA executive committee. The researcher 
began data collection when he sent a researcher-designed survey and a cover letter, 
representing the first phase of the study, to all forty-five Lutheran college and university 
presidents explaining the study, inviting their participation, and requesting that they 
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provide certain personal and institutional information (Appendices 2 and 3). A mail 
follow-up to the first request was sent to those not responding after one week (Appendix 
4), and one week after that a telephone follow-up was conducted. This resulted in the 
return of 43 completed surveys for a response rate of 96%. 
The second phase began when another researcher-designed instrument consisting 
of 48 closed-ended statements was administered to thirty-five of the presidents at the 
annual LECNA meeting held February 7-8, 1993 (Appendix 5). A week later copies of 
this second survey was mailed, with appropriate cover letters (Appendices 6 and 7), to 
those presidents who either did not attend the LECNA meeting or who did attend but 
did not complete and return the survey to the researcher at that time. Follow-up 
telephone calls were made to those who received the second instrument by mail. 
Ultimately, 40 completed surveys were returned, representing a response rate of 89%. 
The data from the first two instruments were entered into computer files, and 
frequencies and cross-tabulations were performed with SPSS. Responses to the first two 
instruments were then tabulated and summarized (Appendices 13 and 14) and mailed 
to those respondents who had requested a copy of the results. 
At the end of the second survey instrument, a space was provided for those in the 
sample to indicate their willingness to participate in the third, or interview, phase of the 
study. Those who responded positively were sent a letter (Appendix 8) thanking them 
and requesting that they select a time during the months of April and May of 1993 when 
they would be able to answer questions on the topic of free expression in academic 
communities, generally, and on their campuses in particular. In order to make it as 
convenient as possible for them, they were asked to state first, second, and third choices 
for the date and time of the interview. Those returning this sheet (Appendix 9) were 
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then sent a confirmation (Appendix 10) along with a copy of the questions used in the 
interview (Appendix 11). One follow-up letter (Appendix 12) was mailed a month later 
to those not responding. The interviews ranged from thirty minutes to one hour and 
fifteen minutes with approximately forty-five minutes being the typical length. Each 
interview was tape recorded with the permission of the subject and then transcribed. 
The interviews did not consist merely of a straightforward reading, in order, of 
the nine printed questions with no dialogue occurring between the subject and the 
interviewer. Instead, the subjects were encouraged to provide their responses during the 
course of a flexibly structured conversation where the questions served as focal points 
in the dialogue. Their statements were then often followed-up by other inquiries 
including the invitation to address various hypothetical situations based upon and 
suggested by the original responses to the questions. In short, the interviews were 
conducted in an interactive way. Every effort was made by the interviewer, however, to 
avoid the suggestion that a particular response or view was preferred or valued more 
highly. Presidents from the following seventeen institutions participated in this phase 
of the study: 
Bethany College, KS 
Bethany Lutheran College, MN 
Carthage College, WI 
Christ College Irvine, CA 
Concordia College, M 1 
Concordia College, NY 
Concordia College, MN 
Concordia University, IL 
Concordia College, MN 
Concordia College, NE 
Dana College, NE 
Gustavus Adolphus College, MN 
Susquehanna University, PA 
Thiel College, PA 
Upsala College, NJ 
Valparaiso University, IN 
(ELCA) 
(ELS) 
(ELCA) 
(LCMS) 
(LCMS) 
(LCMS) 
(ELCA) 
(LCMS) 
(LCMS) 
(LCMS) 
(ELCA) 
(ELCA) 
(ELCA) 
(ELCA) 
(ELCA) 
(Ind.-LCMS) 
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Waldorf College, IA (ELCA). 
Ethical Safeguards and Considerations 
To ensure that participation in any phase of this study involved no risk for the 
subjects, a copy of a formal proposal of the study was submitted to the Institutional 
Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects of Loyola University. It was 
determined that the study, as proposed, carried no risk for those involved. 
Two other precautions were also taken to safeguard the rights of the subjects. 
First, they were assured that every effort would be made to avoid identifying either them 
or their institutions by name in the reporting of the results. Secondly, those who 
participated in the interview phase of the study were assured that their responses would 
not be tape-recorded without their express permission which they could provide on the 
form used to schedule the interviews themselves. 
Instrumentation 
Description 
Three researcher-designed instruments were used in this study, two written 
surveys and a list of interview questions. 
First Survey. The first survey (Appendix 2) was in two parts. One part requested 
certain personal background information about the presidents such as age, ethnic 
ancestry, education, administrative experience, and church membership. In the other 
part, certain facts about the institutions they served were solicited as well. The following 
information was requested: 1) student enrollment and the percentage of the students that 
is Lutheran; 2) the number of full-time faculty members and the percentage of this group 
that is Lutheran; 3) the number of theology courses required for graduation as part of 
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the institution's general education requirements; 4) how often in a typical week formal 
worship services or devotions are conducted; 5) the frequency of communion services; 
6) whether the academic year begins and ends with a special worship service; 7) the 
frequency with which faculty meetings open with prayer or some other form of 
devotional activity; 8) whether the president is required to be a member of the 
institution's sponsoring church; 9) whether he is required to be a member of that 
church's clergy; 10) whether there is any individual or group in the structure of the 
institution's sponsoring church body, other than the local board, which has a legal right 
to exercise control over institutional policy; 11) whether the institution has a written 
policy or code which specifically limits, restricts, or prohibits expression of any kind or 
for any reason; and 12) the church body with which the institution is affiliated, both at 
the time of the study and in 1985 which was prior to the merger uniting the ALC and 
the LCA. 
Ten items among those in the first instrument were selected to establish a score 
for church-relatedness which could assist in distinguishing between the institutions in 
terms of a number of priorities, practices, or policies which are at least related to the 
connections they have with the churches with which they are affiliated or identified. The 
items themselves and an explanation of the weight assigned for each response to arrive 
al the score are listed below. The number in parentheses after each item is the number 
of the item on the instrument (Appendix 3). 
The percentage of undergraduate students who are Lutheran ( # 2). One point 
for each ten percent. 
The percentage of full-time faculty members who are Lutheran ( # 4). One point 
for each ten percent. 
The number of religion courses required for graduation as part of the 
institution's general education ( # 5). One point for each course. 
98 
The number of formal worship services held on campus each week ( # 6). One 
poiul for each number reported. 
The practice of opening the academic year with a worship service ( # 8). One 
point if held. 
The practice of closing the academic year with a worship service ( # 9). One 
point if held. 
The frequency with which faculty meetings are opened with either a prayer or 
some other devotional activity ( # 10). Three points for "always;" two points for 
"usually;" one point for "seldom;" zero points for "never." 
The policy that the President is required to be a member of the sponsoring 
church body ( # 11). One point if he is. 
The policy that the President is required to be a member of the clergy of the 
sponsoring church ( # 12). One point if he is. 
The existence of some authority above the Board which can exercise control over 
institutional policy ( # 13). One point if there is. 
The purpose for determining church-relatedness for the institutions in this study 
through a use of ten items in the first survey was to arrive at a score which could then 
be compared or related to the score of tolerance for freedom of expression derived from 
the responses of the presidents of those institutions to the statements in the second 
survey. The researcher wished to use criteria which could be reported by the presidents 
themselves and which focused on how "Lutheran" an institution was. Since nothing was 
found in the literature which provided a quantitative method for calculaling the church-
relatedness of Lutheran colleges and universities, the researcher decided that this could 
best be determined by examining factors such as the percentage of Lutherans on the 
faculty and in the student body, as well as whether the president was required to be 
Lutheran or even an ordained Lutheran minister. In the area of governance, the study 
did not request information about the religious affiliation of the institution's board 
members, as two studies cited in the literature review did (Anderson, 1977; Pattillo and 
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Mackenzie, 1966). What it did seek to find, however, was whether there was some 
authority beyond the local board, such as a council of the church body itself, which had 
authority over institutional policy. It was felt by the researcher that this would be a 
better indicator of church-relatedness than even financial support from the church body, 
a criterion used by the studies cited in the literature review in their determination of 
church-relatedness (Anderson, 1977; Cuninggim, 1978; Gamelin, 1975; Pattillo and 
Mackenzie, 1966). 
Perhaps the most distinct difference between the criteria used in the present study 
and those discussed in Chapter 2 is in the area of worship practices. In light of the 
researcher's assumption that worship arguably is one of the primary activities for a 
church, as well as his observation that it seems to have both traditional and practical 
significance for Lutherans particularly, he deemed it appropriate to examine factors such 
as the number of formal services held on the campus per week, the frequency of 
devotional activity at the start of campus meetings, and the use of worship services to 
open and close the academic year in determining relative church-relatedness. Obviously, 
providing an opportunity for worship does not guarantee that what happens is genuine. 
Nevertheless, this researcher believed that increased opportunities would indicated a 
desire on the part of the institution to provide the formal means for the members of the 
community to acknowledge in worship the values supposedly inherent in being a college 
of the church. 
A similar argument might be made for including courses in religion or theology 
as part of the general education requirements of the institution. Every college and 
university has only a finite number of credit hours that can be reserved for required 
courses, and it is typical for faculties to struggle with how those hours are to be allotted. 
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This researcher believed that those institutions which were willing to commit more hours 
to religion or theology courses, in spite of the arguments which could be offered for the 
inclusion of other types of courses, could be considered more "religious" or church-
related than those opting for requirements in other disciplines. 
The one area which the current study did not use at all in its quantitative 
determination of church-relatedness was that which was designated "Mission and 
Values" in Table 1. Among the other four studies reported there (Anderson, 1977; 
Cuninggim, 1978; Gamelin, 1975; Pattillo and Mackenzie, 1966), a number of different 
criteria were identified. In Cuninggim's (1978) analysis, this is the primary focus in 
arriving at a definition. There is no denying that mutual support and shared values 
between the college and its sponsoring church body are crucial to the relationship 
between the two. The problem for this study, however, is that this was not seen as 
something that could be readily measured by the kind of quantitative means that was 
used to determine church-relatedness. Moreover, it was believed that evidence of this 
underlying shared sense of mission could be assumed in the criteria that were used. 
In sum, the current study employed at least one criterion for its determination 
of church-relatedness from each of the major categories identified in Table 1 with the 
exception of the last one, for reasons that were just explained. It should be emphasized, 
however, that one of the foci of this study has been to find how the missions and values 
of the institutions in the sample are incorporated into the attitudes of their presidents 
with regard to the role free expression plays on their campuses. The analysis of this 
matter, however, is addressed in the section which reports on the interview phase of the 
study. One of the key issues in this regard relates to the alleged tension that exists 
between truth and freedom at church-related institutions of higher education. 
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With regard to the points assigned for each item, the researcher determined, in 
the absence of previous studies attempting to make similar assessments, that the weights 
were relatively equal and, if applied consistently to each response, would produce a 
useable score. 
Second Survey. The second instrument (Appendix 5), another researcher-
designed survey, sought to elicit presidential responses which would reveal their attitudes 
in a number of areas and on several issues related to free expression in society generally 
(13 items), in higher education (15 items), in Lutheran higher education specifically (10 
items), and on their campuses in particular (10 items), with the ultimate purpose of 
arriving at a determination of support for expression or restraint, the dependent variable. 
It consisted of forty-eight statements to which the subject could respond in one of five 
ways: strongly agree, mildly agree, neither agree nor disagree, mildly disagree, or strongly 
disagree. A copy of the complete instrument, along with the frequency and percentage 
of responses, can be found in Appendix 14. 
The second survey was designed to provide information which would allow for 
a determination of the degree of support for free expression which existed at all of the 
institutions in the sample. In order to accomplish this, each of the 48 items in the 
second survey was assigned (on the five-point scale) a response which represented what 
was determined by the researcher to be the one most supportive of free expression. By 
comparing the actual responses of the presidents to those designed to indicate the 
greatest support for free expression, and assigning certain points for each response 
relative to the "standard pro-expression response," it was then possible to calculate a 
score for each of the forty respondents which represented their position on a scale of 
"freedom" and "restraint" where one's degree of tolerance or support for free expression 
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could be determined. For example, if the respondent placed a" 1" (for "strongly agree") 
next to a statement where a "1" represented the most "pro-expression" response for that 
item, a score of five points was awarded. If the most "pro-expression" response was a 
"5" (for "strongly disagree"), but the subject answered "1" ("strongly agree"), the item 
would receive a score of one point. With one through five points possible for each of 
the forty-eight items, the total "pro-expression" score could range from a low of 48 to 
a maximum of 240. The higher the score, the more supportive of free expression the 
responses supposedly were, collectively. Appendix 5 provides the responses for each 
item which represent what has been determined to be the most favorable response from 
a free-expression perspective and on which basis the individual scores were computed. 
Interview Questions. The third instrument (Appendix 11) consisted of nine open-
ended interview questions and was designed to add depth and texture to the findings, to 
clarify what might have appeared as ambiguous in the results of the other two 
instruments, and to help confirm the reliability of the second instrument in particular. 
The questions sought information about the following: 1) what incidents, if any, have 
occurred on the respondents' campuses where free expression was perceived to have 
been an issue; 2) what concerns may have been expressed by members of their campus 
communities regarding either one's freedom to express himself or herself or 3) what 
abuses of that freedom were reported by someone else; 4) what respondents would rate 
their institutions in terms of the degree of its church-relatedness and what criteria they 
used to come to that determination; 5) what the respondents' view of the role of free 
expression was in the context of a church-related academic community and 6) what 
perspectives and values have informed those views; 7) what presidential response to 
student expression was, specifically with regard to the student newspaper; 8) what their 
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view was of written policies designed to limit expression on the campus; and 9) what, if 
anything, their board has said with regard to the issue of free expression on the campus. 
Interview questions were sent to respondents along with the Interview Confirmation 
Letter (Appendix 10) which informed them of the date and time the interview would 
take place as soon as they returned the Interview Appointment Form (Appendix 11). 
It was hoped that the ability to see the questions prior to the interviews would enable 
the presidents to provide more thoughtful responses. 
Validity and Reliability 
Validity is concerned with whether the instruments used in the study measure 
what they purport to measure. The first survey consisted of a straightforward request 
for specific demographic information. It was determined by a panel of experts to be 
aptly suited for its intended purpose. Because the information sought in the second 
survey consisted of presidential attitudes on a number of matters related to free 
expression, content validity was considered to be the most appropriate type of validity 
for the instrument used here. The same panel of experts examined the 48-items in this 
survey and determined that it contained a valid representation of material for the topic 
under study in light of the method being used to study it. The instrument is also valid 
in terms of construct validity, for it does appear to have provided a useful measurement 
of the degree to which the respondents supported either freedom or restraint with regard 
to free expression in higher education. 
An attempt was also made to ascertain the reliability of the second instrument, 
or its ability to produce consistent scores. Because only one form of this instrument was 
administered only one time, and only to the members of this particular sample, a 
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determination could not be made regarding consistency that might have occurred 
between two forms of the same instrument or between scores on the same instrument 
given at different times. Consequently, the reliability was tested by looking at the 
consistency which existed among items in the instrument. Using the split-half method 
with the Spearman-Brown Formula, responses to the odd and even scores were 
compared first. This analysis produced a result of r = .38. This procedure was 
performed again using groups of six items where x=items 1-6, 13-18, 25-30, and 37-42, 
and y=items 7-12, 19-24, 31-36, and 43-48. The result here was r=.04. 
While this raises a question concerning the reliability of the instrument, at least 
in terms of using analyses like these to determine such reliability, these rather divergent 
and low results also raise a question regarding the appropriateness of using this 
particular type of analysis at all, for it may be possible that the very nature of the inquiry 
has contributed to an apparent lack of internal consistency and that the responses 
themselves, and not necessarily the items in the instrument, have produced such results. 
This explanation is suggested because a number of respondents commented on the 
difficulty they found in providing consistent responses. One, for example, wrote at the 
end of his survey, "It is obvious that I lack consistency." Others commented during the 
interviews that they found the topic to be so perplexing that they felt as if they were, as 
one put it, "speaking out of both sides of my mouth." 
Design 
This was a descriptive exploratory study which used, at the conclusion of the first 
two phases, a comparison of two scores to determine the effect that the church 
relatedness of each institution (the independent variable) had on the presidents' altitudes 
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with regard to the nature and limits of free expression m higher education {the 
dependent variable). Scales for each of these measurements were established on the 
basis of the responses to the first two instruments and the scores were paired and plotted 
on a graph to display the relative position not only of each individual institution but also 
of the institutions as each was situated in relation to the others in its denominational 
group. Once the position of each institution was established, it would also then be 
possible to assign a label to each one based on its location in one of the quadrants on 
the graph, Secular-Freedom, Religious-Freedom, Secular-Restraint, or Religious-
Restraint. 
Specific Hypothesis 
The hypothesis was that the higher an institution scored on the scale of church-
relatedness, the more supportive of restrictions on expression a president would be, as 
measured on the scale of tolerance or support for free expression. Conversely, the 
presidents of those institutions which were more "secular" than "religious" on the scale 
of church-relatedness would produce responses representing greater support for free 
expression. 
Statistical Analysis 
The analysis consisted of the tabulation of the responses from the first two 
instruments and a comparison of the two variables to see if there was any relationship 
between the church-relatedness of an institution and the support or tolerance for free 
expression based on the responses of each institution's presidents. 
Also, the points for each of the paired scores were plotted to display the relative 
106 
position of each institution on a two-dimensional graph producing the quadrants referred 
to above. The horizontal axis represents the Secular-Religious scale, while the vertical 
axis represents the Freedom-Restraint scale. 
The placement of the midpoint for each scale could not be selected arbitrarily 
because to do so would alter the parameters of the quadrants. The "secular-religious" 
scale midpoint was set at 27, which is midway between the two extreme scores on this 
scale. It was determined that the midpoint for the "freedom-restraint" scale should be 
set at point 144 because that represents the score which would result if one responded 
to all 48 items on the second survey with "neither agree nor disagree." 
Using the paired scores, a point for each of the forty institutions was plotted on 
the graph. The points of the institutions in each of the Lutheran church bodies 
represented in the study were then connected to demonstrate not only the relation of 
each institution to the others in their denomination, but also the relation of the different 
denominations to each other. 
Summary 
The population for this three-phase study was the presidents of the forty-five 
Lutheran colleges and universities in the United States. The sample consisted of the 
forty members of the population who elected to respond to both the first and second 
survey instruments used. 
The first survey was mailed to all the presidents and sought personal and 
institutional information which would contribute to the establishment of a score of 
church-relatedness for each institution. The second survey consisted of forty-eight 
statements with which the respondents could either agree or disagree on a five-point 
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scale. It was designed to elicit data which would produce a score for each respondent 
that represented his attitude toward freedom of expression. It was administered in 
person to a large number of the presidents assembled for an annual meeting. Those who 
did not attend the meeting or complete the survey there were sent an instrument in the 
mail. Mail and telephone follow-ups were conducted for both the first and second 
phases of the study. Validity of the instruments was established by a panel of experts 
who judged that they would measure what they were designed to measure. Attempts to 
establish statistically the reliability of the second instrument produced very low estimates 
which could be attributed as much to inconsistent responses, due to the nature of the 
topic, as to the internal inconsistency of the items in the instrument itself. 
Taped telephone interviews with the seventeen presidents who volunteered to 
participate in the third phase of the study were then conducted to provide depth to the 
findings and to add a more personal dimension to what some of the subjects felt was a 
relatively perplexing topic. 
The hypothesis in this descriptive exploratory study was that an institution's score 
on the scale of church-relatedness (the independent variable) would be related to the 
president's score on the scale of tolerance for free expression (the dependent variable). 
Specifically, the more secular an institution on a scale from secular to religious, the 
stronger its president's support would be for freedom of expression on a scale of 
freedom and restraint. Support for the hypothesis was determined by constructing a two 
dimensional graph which displays the two scales on intersecting axes. By plotting the 
points of each pair of scores, both the relative positions of each individual institution 
and president's scores can be seen, as well as the various denominational patterns 
produced by the placement of the points. This will be shown in the next chapter which 
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provides a report on the specific results of all three phases of the study and an analysis 
of the data represented in those results. 
CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Introduction 
In this chapter the results from the two surveys administered and the interviews 
conducted for the study will be presented. The characteristics of the respondents and 
the institutions, as well as a determination regarding the concept of church-relatedness 
will be provided as part of the results and analysis of Phase One. The results and 
analysis of Phase Two give rise to a determination of presidential support for either 
expressive freedom or restraint. Data from the first two phases will be presented in the 
form of a graph to demonstrate how the two variables of church-relatedness and support 
for free expression converge when the scores from each of these dimensions are paired. 
In the results and analysis of Phase Three, the interview data are reported 
primarily in terms of what was found regarding how the presidents perceived the notion 
of church-relatedness and the criteria they cited as they considered the church-
relatedness of their own institutions; the nature of the incidents occurring on their 
campuses where freedom of expression became an issue; and the support for both 
freedom and restraint that the presidents themselves displayed in their comments 
representative examples of which are provided. The qualitative data from the third 
phase will then be analyzed insofar as they support or refute the findings from the first 
two phases. 
Finally, the hypothesis of the study will be examined in light of the data and a 
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brief summary of the foregoing analysis will be provided as a way of introducing the 
presentation of findings and conclusions to be offered in Chapter Five. 
Results and Analysis of Phase One 
The first survey was mailed to all members of the population in January, 1993. 
Designed by the researcher specifically for this study, it consisted of twenty-five items, 
some of which were open-ended requests for information and others which presented 
items with limited-choice responses to questions about the institution in general, campus 
policies in particular, and the respondent's personal background. One section requested 
information about the presidents such as age, ethnic ancestry, education, experience, and 
church membership. The other section sought certain facts about the institutions they 
served. This information was used to arrive at a determination of each institution's 
relative degree of church-relatedness and explored such areas as student enrollment and 
the percentage of the students that is Lutheran; the number of full-time faculty members 
and the percentage of this group that is Lutheran; and the number of theology courses 
required for graduation as part of the institution's general education requirements. It 
also inquired about the frequency of formal worship services or devotions in a typical 
week, communion services, or faculty meetings opening with prayer or some other form 
of devotional activity. Other questions dealt with whether the academic year begins and 
ends with a special worship service; whether the president is required to be a member 
of the institution's sponsoring church; whether he is required to be a member of that 
church's clergy; whether there is any individual or group in the structure of the 
institution's sponsoring church body, other than the local board, which has a legal right 
to exercise control over institutional policy; and whether the institution has a written 
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policy or code which specifically limits, restricts, or prohibits expression of any kind or 
for any reason. Finally, information was requested concerning the institution's 
denominational affiliation, both at the time of the study and in 1985, which was prior to 
the merger uniting the ALC and the LCA. 
The frequency and percentage of responses for each of these items can be found, 
along with the complete instrument, in Appendix 13. The reporting of these results will 
consist of a description of the respondents' characteristics through the use of text and 
tables, followed by a determination of church-relatedness which was made for each 
institution. 
Characteristics of the Respondents 
The 40 individuals who responded to both the first and second surveys are all 
white males over the age of forty-five, with the exception of one man who is an African-
American. The ages and racial/ethnic ancestry of the respondents are described more 
specifically in Tables 2 and 3. For the item on racial/ethnic ancestry, respondents were 
permitted to check as many categories as they believed were appropriate to describe 
them best. 
Table 2.--Age distribution of respondents. N = 40. Mean= 55.75. 
A~e f % 
45-49 10 25.0 
50-54 9 22.5 
55-59 9 22.5 
60-64 7 17.5 
65-69 4 10.0 
75-79 1 2.5 
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Almost one-half (19, or 47.5%) of the sample were under the age of 55, with ten still in 
their 40s. Five were over 65. The respondent between 75-79 has been the president of 
three Lutheran colleges throughout his career. He left office in July, 1993, after serving 
as interim president at an institution engaged in a presidential search. 
Table 3.--Racial/ethnic ancestry of respondents. N = 40. 
Racial/ethnic ancestry 
African 
English 
Finnish 
German 
Irish 
Norwegian 
Swedish 
Norwegian/Swedish 
English/Norwegian 
German/Norwegian/Swedish 
Danish/German 
Danish/Norwegian 
English/German 
Danish/Swedish 
English/German/Irish 
German/Irish/Norwegian/Scottish/Swiss/Polish 
Unknown (adopted) 
f 
1 
3 
1 
18 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2.5 
7.5 
2.5 
45.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
Regarding ethnic ancestry, most of the respondents claim German or 
Scandinavian backgrounds, both of which have strong Lutheran heritages and 
connections. Nearly one-half (18, or 45%) marked only "German." When that is added 
to those who indicated "German" as part of their heritage, along with another ethnic 
category, the number goes up to 23 (57.5% ). Those identifying some Scandinavian 
background (which included "Danish," "Finnish," "Norwegian," "Swedish," or any 
combination of these groups), totaled 13 (32.5% ). 
The respondents were also asked about their denominational affiliation. Their 
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responses appear in Table 4. With the exception of the one individual who is a 
Presbyterian, and the one who left this item blank, the presidents claim membership in, 
or at least identify with, the church bodies with which their institutions are affiliated. 
Table 4.--Denominational affiliation of respondents. N = 40. 
Denominational affiliation f 
Church of Lutheran Confession 1 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America 22a 
Evangelical Lutheran Synod 1 
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod 11 
Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod 3 
Other: Presbyterian 1 
no response 1 
a One indicated "not formal member." 
2.5 
55.0 
2.5 
27.5 
7.5 
2.5 
2.5 
Seventeen of the 40 respondents ( 42.5%) indicated that they were ordained 
members of the clergy. The denominations in which they hold membership appear in 
Table 5. Only 4 (10%) of the 40 institutions require that their president be an ordained 
Lutheran minister. 
Table 5.--Clergy membership of respondents. N = 17. 
Clergy membership 
Church of Lutheran Confession 
Evan. Lutheran Church in America 
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod 
Wisconsin Evan. Lutheran Synod 
f 
1 
7 
7 
2 
5.88 
41.18 
41.18 
11.76 
Respondents were also asked how long they had been at their current institutions 
in any capacity, how long they had been president at their current institutions, how long 
they had been administrators in higher education, and how long they had served in 
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Lutheran higher education. The frequencies of those responses are provided below in 
Tables 6-9, respectively. 
Table 6.--Length of time at current institution in any capacity. N = 40. Mean= 12. 
Number of years f % 
0-5 14 35.0 
6-10 8 20.0 
11-15 6 15.0 
16-20 4 10.0 
21-25 2 5.0 
26-30 4 10.0 
31-35 2 5.0 
Table 7.--Length of time as president at current institution. N = 40. Mean= 8.075. 
Number of years f % 
0-5 17 42.5 
6-10 9 22.5 
11-15 9 22.5 
16-20 5 12.5 
Table 8.--Length of time as an administrator in higher education. N = 40. Mean= 18.825. 
Number of years f % 
0-5 years 0 0.0 
6-10 5 12.5 
11-15 10 25.0 
16-20 8 20.0 
21-25 8 20.0 
26-30 7 17.5 
31-35 2 5.0 
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Table 9.--Length of time in Lutheran higher education in any capacity. N = 40. 
Mean =21.3. 
Number of years f % 
0-5 years 5 12.5 
6-10 5 12.5 
11-15 2 5.0 
16-20 5 12.5 
21-25 5 12.5 
26-30 9 22.5 
31-35 6 15.0 
36-40 2 5.0 
41-45 1 2.5 
Some observations to note from these data might include the fact that over half 
of the presidents (55%) have been at their current institutions for 10 years or less (Table 
6). Since some could have moved into office from other positions on their faculties, the 
percentage of those serving as president at their current institutions for 10 years or less 
is even higher at 65% (Table 7). That is not to say, however, that they are inexperienced 
administrators. While 17 ( 42.5%) have held their current position for 5 years or less, 
every one of them has more than 5 years of administrative experience in higher 
education, with 17 ( 42.5%) reporting more than 20 years in some administrative role 
(Table 8). 
When it comes to service in Lutheran higher education, the group's collective 
experience is much more evenly distributed (Table 9). Some are newcomers and others 
have spent their entire careers in this sector, with the average tenure being 21.3 years. 
Finally, one notes that 75% of the presidents received an undergraduate degree 
from a Lutheran college or university, and 8 of them currently preside at their own alma 
maters. Thirty-four (85%) possess an earned doctorate. The type and frequency of 
doctoral degrees held by the presidents are displayed in Table 10. 
Table 10.--Type of doctoral degree held by respondents. N =34. 
Degree 
Ph.D. 
Ed.D. 
S.M.D.a 
Th.D. 
J.D. 
a Doctor of Sacred Music 
f 
27 
4 
1 
1 
l 
79.5 
11.8 
2.9 
2.9 
2.9 
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The respondents were also asked to indicate their academic disciplines or majors 
for the degrees they received. Table 11 provides a listing of the various fields 
represented by this group of individuals. It is based on the discipline cited for the 
highest degree earned. Some of the areas were combined for the sake of this display. 
The actual responses as they were received appear as part of the results of the first 
survey (Appendix 13). 
Table 11.--Academic disciplines reported by the respondents. N = 40. 
Discipline 
American Civilization/Studies 
Chemistry 
Comm unicati on/Speech/Rhetoric 
English 
Education/ Administration 
Educational Psychology 
History/Church History 
Law 
Math 
Music 
Philosophy 
Physiology 
Political Science 
Religion/Theology 
Social Psychology 
Zoology 
f 
2 
1 
3 
1 
9 
1 
6 
l 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
6 
1 
1 
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Almost one quarter of the respondents (9, or 22.5%) cite education or 
educational administration as their academic discipline. Two other areas, tied for 
second in terms of frequency with 6 (15%), are history, which includes church history, 
and religion/theology. These were followed by mathematics with 4 ( 10%). 
Institutional Characteristics 
Concerning that part of the first survey dealing with institutional information, the 
responses displayed in Table 12 reveal that 17 (42.5%) of the 40 institutions have 
enrollments of 1000 students or less (6, or 14 %, with 500 or less). Another 13 (32.5%) 
have between 1000 and 2000 students. The remaining 11 (27.5%) have over 2000 
students, with just one institution reporting an enrollment of over 3000. 
Table 12.--Fall, 1992 undergraduate enrollment of institutions in the sample. N =40. 
Undergraduate enrollment f % 
500 or less 6 15.0 
501-1000 10 25.0 
1001-1500 10 25.0 
1501-2000 3 7.5 
2001-2500 6 15.0 
2501-3000 4 10.0 
Over 3000 1 2.5 
With regard to the percentage of Lutheran students at these institutions (Table 
13), only 2 schools (5%) have under 10%. Another 5 ( 12.5%) are between 10 and 19%. 
Sixteen colleges and universities ( 40%) have between 20 and 50% of their undergraduate 
enrollments made up of students reporting that they are Lutheran. Twelve schools 
(30%) are between 50 and 80%, and 5 colleges (12.5%) have student bodies that are 
over 80% Lutheran. Three of those report that all of their students are members of 
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some Lutheran church. 
Table 13.--Percentage of Lutheran undergraduate students at institutions in the sample. 
N=40. 
Institutional percentage f % 
Under 10% 2 5.0 
10-19% 5 12.5 
20-29% 3 7.5 
30-39% 8 20.0 
40-49% 5 12.5 
50-59% 8 20.0 
60-69% 3 7.5 
70-79% 1 2.5 
80-89% 1 2.5 
90-99% 1 2.5 
100% 3 7.5 
When it comes to the number of faculty and the percentage that is Lutheran, the 
responses, especially to the latter inquiry, were a little more vague. Table 14 shows that 
25 ( 62.5%) of the institutions report having 100 or less full-time faculty members. Ten 
(25%) have between 101 and 200, and only 4 (10%) have over 200. 
Table 14.--Number of full-time faculty at institutions in the sample. N = 40. 
Number of faculty f % 
50 or less 11 27.5 
51-100 14 35.0 
101-150 5 12.5 
151-200 5 12.5 
201-250 1 2.5 
251-300 3 7.5 
no response 1 2.5 
When asked to provide figures about the percentage of their faculties that are 
Lutheran (Table 15), 10% stated that they did not know, some adding, 11 We don't ask." 
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Three respondents (7.5%) left that space blank. A little more than one-quarter (27.5%) 
of the schools report having faculties where less than half of the people on them are 
members of the Lutheran church. Just over one-half of them (22, or 55%) have more 
than 50% Lutheran faculty, with 7 institutions (17.5%) reporting that all of their 
professors are Lutheran. 
Table 15.--Percentage of full-time Lutheran faculty at institutions in the sample. N =40. 
I nsti tu tional percen taie f % 
Under 10% 1 2.5 
10-19% 1 2.5 
20-29% 2 5.0 
30-39% 5 12.5 
40-49% 2 5.0 
50-59% 5 12.5 
60-69% 2 5.0 
70-79% 1 2.5 
80-89% 1 2.5 
90-99% 6 15.0 
100% 7 17.5 
"Don't know" 4 10.0 
no response 3 7.5 
The number of required religion or theology courses ranges from 0 - 8 (Table 16 ). 
The most common requirement is 2 courses which exists for 15 institutions (37.5% ). 
Another 8 (20%) require 3 courses and 7 more (17.5%) require 4. Students at 4 
institutions ( 10%) must take only 1 course in religion or theology for their entire 
program. 
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Table 16.--Number of theology or religion courses required for graduation as part of the 
institution's general education requirement for undergraduate students at institutions in 
the sample. N =40. 
Number of courses f % 
0 1 2.5 
1 4 10.0 
2 15 37.5 
3 8 20.0 
4 7 17.5 
5 0 0.0 
6 2 5.0 
7 0 0.0 
8 1 2.0 
no response 2 5.0 
Reported frequency of chapel or worship services or formal group devotions per 
week ranged from 1 - 15. The most common response was 5 times per week, the 
practice at 8 institutions (20% ). This suggests a routine of daily chapel throughout the 
week. Twice a week (probably once on Wednesday and a Sunday service) is also 
common, with 7 schools (17.5%) responding this way. Five institutions (12.5%) reported 
conducting 4 services and another 5 provided the opportunity for formal worship 6 times 
per week. It was not always possible to determine the nature of the worship experience 
counted in the reported number, but the comments of some indicated that Sunday 
services were not conducted because students were encouraged to visit local 
congregations where, in some cases, the church was virtually across the street from the 
campus. A few comments written on the surveys indicated that services were also 
conducted for students of other denominations and faiths by clergy of those traditions, 
including some for their Roman Catholic and Jewish students. None of the institutions 
have mandatory chapel attendance, although a few make a point of indicating that while 
it is not required, it is expected and strongly encouraged for all students. 
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The nature of the responses to the question concerning the frequency of the 
celebration of Holy Communion make it somewhat difficult to summarize, for so many 
different confessional practices exist among the various church bodies represented by the 
institutions in the study. For instance, some schools, including some of the most church-
related, indicate emphatically that they never have Communion on the campus; that it 
can only be received at local congregations. Another much larger institution, on the 
other hand, has it 5 times a week during daily chapel. Consequently, it was not used as 
an indicator in the determination of church-relatedness. Also, some schools reported 
the frequency not by week or month as the item requested, but by semester or year. 
One can generalize, however, that it most commonly is offered once per week (18, or 
45%, reported that frequency; 2 have it four times per month, and another 2, six times 
per month). 
With regard to opening and closing worship services, it was found that 35 (87.5%) 
of the institutions begin each academic year with an event that could be considered a 
worship service and all but one of them (97.5%) close the year with a baccalaureate or 
closing worship service. 
One question inquired as to the frequency that faculty meetings were begun with 
prayer or some other form of devotional activity. The results were as follows: 
f % 
Always 35 87.5 
Usually 2 5.0 
Seldom 1 2.5 
Never 2 5.0 
On another topic, 34 (85%) of the institutions require that the president be 
Lutheran. All but a couple (one for sure who is Presbyterian and possibly the one who 
did not respond) are, in fact, members of some Lutheran body. Only 4 schools (10%) 
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require that the president be a member of the clergy of the sponsoring church. On the 
item dealing with the existence of some individual or group with authority to exercise 
control over institutional policy, 15 (37.5%) answered in the affirmative. 
The presidents were also asked if their institution had a written policy or code 
that specifically limited, restricted, or prohibited expression of any kind for any reason. 
Eighteen ( 45%) indicated that they did. 
One of the most important aspects of institutional information received for the 
purposes of this study was the denominational affiliation of the institution both presently 
and also as it existed in 1985. This is because there is significant interest in finding 
whether such affiliation has any relationship to how the presidents responded to many 
of the items in the second survey. 
The following tables present the names of the Lutheran church bodies which 
sponsor institutions of higher education and the number of colleges or universities 
owned, operated, or identified with each. All 5 of the institutions whose presidents 
refused to participate in both the first and second surveys are affiliated with the ELCA. 
Table 17.--Denominational affiliation in 1993 of the Lutheran colleges and universities 
in the sample. N =40. 
Church body f % 
Church of Lutheran Confession 1 2.5 
Evan. Lutheran Synod 1 2.5 
Evan. Lutheran Church in America 24 60.0 
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod 11 27.5 
Lutheran-Independent 0 0.0 
Wisconsin Evan. Lutheran Synod 3 7.5 
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Table 18.--Denominational affiliation in 1985 of the Lutheran colleges and universities 
in the sample. N =40. 
Church body f % 
American Lutheran Church 10 25.0 
Church of Lutheran Confession 1 2.5 
Evan. Lutheran Synod 1 2.5 
Joint ALC/LCA 1 2.5 
Lutheran- Independent 0 0.0 
Lutheran Church in America 13 32.5 
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod 11 27.5 
Wisconsin Evan. Lutheran Synod 3 7.5 
It is interesting to note that one of the ELCA colleges which provided affiliational 
information for 1985, left the space blank for 1993. (It is included, nevertheless, in the 
figures above.) One conclusion might be that it may no longer view itself as being 
connected in any meaningful way with the church body which still claims it as one of its 
schools. This suspicion is supported by language in the college's catalog regarding its 
Lutheran character. The most that is acknowledged is a historical or traditional 
connection. It states, 
Like so many other small, private colleges, [Institution 41 J also benefits 
from the historical tradition of theological origins. A Lutheran seminary 
in the late 1800's, [Institution 41 's] evolution to independent college did 
not alter its commitment to meaningful traditions of incorporating 
considerations of ethics and values integrally in its academic offerings. 
Later under a section on "History" it states, "The college is ... associated with the 
ELCA." 
Interestingly, one of the other institutions in the sample, in actual fact, is not 
linked officially to any church body; that is, it truly is an independent institution. 
Consequently, the "Lutheran-Independent" designation was included as an option on the 
list. The president of this institution, however, elected to identify his university with the 
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LCMS, since it does have an historic connection and several informal ties with that 
church. Moreover, he is a member of the LCMS clergy, just as all of his predecessors 
have been. Consequently, all data pertaining to and received from that institution was 
included along with the ten schools of the LCMS. 
It will be recalled that the ELCA is the result of a merger of the ALC and the 
LCA which took place in 1988. The reason for requesting pre-merger affiliational 
information was to see if the schools of the ALC or the LCA display any distinctive 
tendencies as their presidents responded to the 48 items in the second survey instrument. 
Determination of Church-Relatedness 
One of the objectives of the study was to determine the degree of church-
relatedness of the institutions in the sample. In order to do this, selected items from the 
first survey were analyzed and each institution was assigned a score based on the 
information provided. Chapter 3, which outlined the methodology used in the study, 
enumerated the ten items among those in the first instrument which were used to 
establish a score of church-relatedness for each institution. 
When the individual institutions are analyzed using these criteria, their scores 
range from 7 - 47 with low scores reflecting a less church-related posture compared to 
those with higher scores. Table 19 presents the scores of the 40 institutions in the 
sa~nple. The names of the colleges and universities have been replaced by an 
identification number to provide the anonymity that was promised to all and specifically 
requested by some of the institutions. The numbers are those assigned before the final 
sample was established. Consequently, numbers above 40 are used and those assigned 
to the five institutions which ultimately did not participate (29, 33, 35, 43, and 45) are 
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omitttJ from the list. 
Table 19.--Frequency of institutional scores on ten criteria of church-relatedness. N = 40. 
Score f Institution 
7 1 39 
9 2 22,41 
11 l 36 
12 1 23 
13 1 7 
15 2 26,38 
16 3 2,4, 30 
17 2 8, 24 
18 2 28,32 
19 2 3, 37 
20 l 17 
21 2 6, 27 
22 l 20 
23 1 13 
25 1 34 
26 1 12 
27 1 1 
29 2 16,42 
30 4 5, 9, 14, 15 
31 1 19 
32 1 11 
33 2 10, 40 
34 1 44 
35 1 18 
42 1 21 
44 1 31 
47 1 25 
It is suggested, therefore, that by creating a scale using these scores, with 
"secular" on the low side and "religious" for the higher scores, the institutions' relative 
positions of church-relatedness can be established and ultimately compared to the scores 
derived from a determination of each institution's respective support for expressive 
freedom or restraint to see if there is any pattern to the paired responses. 
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Results and Analysis of Phase Two 
Responses to the Survey 
The researcher-designed survey which constituted the second phase sought to 
elicit presidential responses which would reveal their attitudes in a number of areas and 
on several issues related to free expression in society generally (13 items), in higher 
education (15 items), in Lutheran higher education specifically (10 items), and on their 
campuses in particular (10 items). Thus, the survey consisted of 48 statements to which 
the members of the sample could respond in one of five ways: strongly agree, mildly 
agree, neither agree nor disagree, mildly disagree, or strongly disagree. 
As stated earlier, this instrument was first administered at a meeting which 35 of 
the presidents attended. Of that number, 25 submitted completed surveys. One week 
later instruments were mailed, both to the 10 who had been at the meeting but had not 
completed the survey, as well as to the 10 who had not attended. This mailing and two 
telephone follow-ups resulted in a total of 40 instruments being completed. While 43 
individuals responded to the first phase, only the 40 who responded to both were 
considered part of the sample. This represents a return rate of 88.9%. The two 
individuals who elected not to respond to either instrument, and the three who answered 
only the first, told the researcher in person that they would not participate. None were 
willing to give specific reasons for their refusal. 
A copy of the complete instrument, along with the frequency and percentage of 
responses, can be found in Appendix 14. As explained in Chapter Three, responses for 
each item were also judged against hypothetical responses (see Appendix 5) which 
represented what was considered to be the most supportive of free expression on the 
basis of whether expression was either supported or restricted by the responses given. 
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By comparing the actual responses to those designed to indicate the greatest support for 
free expression, it was then possible to calculate a score for each of the 40 respondents 
which represented the respondent's position on a scale of "freedom" and "restraint" 
where one's degree of tolerance for free expression could be measured. 
Table 20 presents a summary of all the responses for each item in the second 
survey and is followed by a discussion of the specific results for each of the items. 
Appendix 5 or Appendix 14, both of which reproduce the statements in the second 
survey, should be consulted for the wording of any item in the survey. 
Table 20.--Summary of responses to second survey instrument. 
strongly mildly neither mildly strongly 
agree agree agree nor disagree disagree 
disagree 
Item # f % f % f % f % f % 
1 36 90.0 4 10.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
2 4 10.0 4 10.0 1 2.5 10 25.0 21 52.5 
3 9 22.5 7 17.5 6 15.0 5 12.5 13 32.5 
4 28 70.0 9 22.5 1 2.5 0 0.0 2 5.0 
5 2 5.0 5 12.5 15 37.5 11 27.5 7 17.5 
6 35 87.5 4 10.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 2.5 
7 a 25 62.5 7 17.5 4 10.0 2 5.0 1 2.5 
8 4 10.0 11 27.5 10 25.0 6 15.0 9 22.5 
9 4 10.0 10 25.0 11 27.5 6 15.0 9 22.5 
10 27 67.5 11 27.5 1 2.5 1 2.5 0 0.0 
11 31 77.5 7 17.5 2 5.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
12 25 62.5 11 27.5 2 5.0 2 5.0 0 0.0 
13 16 40.0 20 50.0 1 2.5 1 2.5 2 5.0 
14 2 5.0 5 12.5 7 17.5 12 30.0 14 35.0 
15 a 6 15.0 6 15.0 6 15.0 14 35.0 7 17.5 
128 
16 19 47.5 11 27.5 3 7.5 6 15.0 1 2.5 
17 1 2.5 6 15.0 6 15.0 14 35.0 13 32.5 
18 a 2 5.0 4 10.0 5 12.5 18 45.0 10 25.0 
19 2 5.0 4 10.0 2 5.0 15 37.5 17 42.5 
20 4 10.0 7 17.5 12 30.0 9 22.5 8 20.0 
21 27 67.5 10 25.0 2 5.0 1 2.5 0 0.0 
22 2 5.0 5 12.5 6 15.0 12 30.0 15 37.5 
23 3 7.5 12 30.0 7 17.5 10 25.0 8 20.0 
24 5 12.5 19 47.5 5 12.5 4 10.0 7 17.5 
25 10 25.0 16 40.0 4 10.0 7 17.5 3 7.5 
26 4 10.0 14 35.0 10 25.0 2 5.0 10 25.0 
27 11 27.5 15 37.5 7 17.5 3 7.5 4 10.0 
28 7 17.5 5 12.5 3 7.5 5 12.5 20 50.0 
29 33 82 .. 5 3 7.5 1 2.5 2 5.0 1 2.5 
30 28 70.0 4 10.0 2 5.0 5 12.5 1 2.5 
31 26 65.0 3 7.5 4 10.0 7 17.5 0 0.0 
32 24 60.0 5 12.5 2 5.0 2 5.0 7 17 .. 5 
33 5 12.5 3 7.5 3 7.5 15 37.5 14 35.0 
34 b 3 7.5 14 35.0 2 5.0 7 17.5 13 32.5 
35 14 35.0 10 25.0 11 27.5 3 7.5 2 5.0 
36 a 7 17.5 2 5.0 7 17.5 10 25.0 13 32.5 
37 4 10.0 3 7.5 3 7.5 4 10.0 26 65.0 
38 15 37.5 10 25.0 8 20.0 5 12.5 2 5.0 
39 5 12.5 2 5.0 4 10.0 13 32.5 16 40.0 
40 2 5.0 2 5.0 2 5.0 4 10.0 30 75.0 
41 14 35.0 15 37.5 5 12.5 4 40.0 2 5.0 
42 11 27.5 11 27.5 5 12.5 5 12.5 8 20.0 
43 10 25.0 9 22.5 5 12.5 5 12.5 11 27.5 
44 9 22.5 14 35.0 5 12.5 5 12.5 7 17.5 
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45 C 15 37.5 12 30.0 7 17.5 2 5.0 3 7.5 
46 4 10.0 8 20.0 6 15.0 14 35.0 8 20.0 
47 16 40.0 20 50.0 2 5.0 0 0.0 2 5.0 
48 a 12 30.0 10 25.0 8 20.0 5 12.5 4 2.5 
a One respondent marked "?". b One respondent marked "depends." c One respondent 
revised the question. 
The following discussion will present a narrative summary of the results of the 
second survey, for the most part, on an item-by-item basis. It started with a statement 
with which all respondents, as expected, agreed, 90% of them strongly. It asserted 
simply, "Freedom of expression is one of the most important rights in a democratic 
society." It was followed in item 2 by, "There are some issues which should not be 
discussed in any setting." Twenty-one presidents (52.5%) selected "strongly disagree." 
Another 10 (25%) mildly disagreed for a total of 77.5% who seem to believe that every 
issue has at least some appropriate place where it can be discussed. Four individuals 
each, however, in spite of how important freedom of expression was to all of them in 
item 1, either strongly agreed or mildly agreed with this statement. Some things, 
according to these responses, apparently should never be discussed. 
When the denominational affiliation of the respondents to this item is examined, 
one finds that all 3 of the presidents of the WELS colleges are among the 8 (20%) who 
agree. Two of the 11 from the LCMS mildly agree, and 3 of the 23 ELCA presidents 
agree. It should be kept in mind as one works through these results that how the 
presidents of the respective church bodies -- particularly of the ELCA, LCMS, and 
WELS -- responded as collective groups was also of significant interest to the researcher, 
Consequently, those data will be reported along with the results of other selected cross-
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tabulations of the survey items when a noteworthy pattern seems to exist. 
The third item attempts to get a response to a statement which alludes to a 
specific part of the U. S. Constitution, as well as one interpretation of that language, 
which has been endorsed over the years by a number of judges and commentators. lt 
states, "The First Amendment's right to free expression should be considered an absolute 
right; that is, no law should be passed which abridges this freedom." Nine (22.5%) 
strongly agree and 13 (32.5%) strongly disagree. When the respective "mild" responses 
are added to these it comes to 40% who agree and 45% who disagree. Likewise, no 
generalizations can be made with regard to specific church bodies, for each 
denomination is scattered across the continuum. Two individuals who would not include 
themselves in the "absolutist" camp made reference in the margins of the instrument to 
the familiar exception to the freedom of speech; namely, the proscription against yelling 
"Fire!" in a crowded theater. 
Number 4 is the first to insert the topic of education into the survey. le also 
suggests that expression may vary in terms of its value. The item states, "Some 
expression may be so offensive as to lack any social or educational value." Seventy 
percent strongly agree, with another 22.5% who mildly agree for a total of 92.5%. 
Number 5 makes reference to another common constitutional problem, the direct 
conflict of two significant rights. The responses to this item indicate just how perplexing 
such issues can be. It states, "If, in a given situation, the right to free expression finds 
itself in direct conflict with another constitutional right (such as the right to be free from 
discriminatory treatment), free expression should be given preference." Over one-third 
(37.5%) could neither agree nor disagree, the highest number giving that response for 
any of the items in the survey. Of those who could make a choice, however, almost half 
131 
(45%) did agree, most of them mildly, providing some popular support for the principle 
that rights of expression are considered to be preferred freedoms in constitutional 
jurisprudence. One respondent underlined "discriminatory treatment" in the item and 
added the comment, "This is not a constitutionally protected right." One might 
justifiably differ with that conclusion, however, if it is true that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does indeed prohibit at least some discriminatory 
treatment when it says, "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws." That certainly is how it has been interpreted by the 
Supreme Court over the years. (It is also interesting to note that this individual reported 
having earned a B.A. in history and an M.A. in political science. In other words, he, of 
all people, should have known better.) 
The sixth item attempts to determine the collective view of the respondents on 
one aspect of an important philosophical issue, the relationship between law and 
morality. It states, "Just because a person has a constitutional right to say something 
does not necessarily mean it is morally right to say it." All but one of the respondents 
either strongly agreed (87.5%) or mildly agreed (10%). 
Number 7 is the first to introduce the concept of Christian values and beliefs into 
the survey. It states, "The Constitution protects some expression that is inconsistent with 
certain Christian values and beliefs." Twenty-five of the 40 presidents (62.5%) strongly 
agree. When the 7 who mildly agree are added to this, the percentage of those in 
agreement goes up to 80. 
Items 8 and 9 address two issues in the law of free expression which have been 
discussed in the literature (see Chapter Two) and are somewhat controversial because 
they involve the use of the civil and criminal law, respectively, as a response to or 
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remedy for offensive expression. Number 8 states, "A person who can demonstrate that 
genuine offense was caused by the expression of another should be able to succeed in 
a civil suit against that individual." Number 9 also begins the same way but concludes 
with the language, 11 ••• should be able to find recourse in the criminal laws of the state." 
Even though a significant difference exists between the technical arguments which favor 
civil remedies as opposed to those of a criminal nature, the presidents responded, 
collectively at least, in almost identical fashion to these two items. The only difference 
in the two frequency lists is a change of one "mildly agree" response in number 8 to 
"neither agree nor disagree" in number 9. One might have expected greater willingness 
to support civil remedies, such as in tort or defamation, over criminal sanctions for 
expression which causes offense, although there is a movement which is attempting to 
increase the use of the latter in such cases. As it happens, however, there is only the 
smallest reduction of support for a criminal -- as opposed to a civil -- response. 
A closer examination of the responses to these two items, however, reveals that 
more shifting took place in the aggregate than the one response from agreement for civil 
suits to neither agree nor disagree for criminal prosecution. Of the 40 pairs of responses 
to these two items, 23 people (57.5%) gave the same answer to both. Eight (20%) 
presidents gave a higher response to number 8. That is, they felt more strongly about 
a civil remedy as opposed to one from criminal law. However, 9 respondents (22.5%) 
felt that the criminal law was more appropriate and gave a higher response to number 
9. Looking at this item from the perspective of denominational affiliation, one finds that 
considerable movement took place among all the church bodies. The WELS colleges 
tended to favor criminal sanctions over civil. Whereas the presidents of these three 
schools responded with either mildly disagree (2) or neither agree nor disagree ( 1) for 
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number 8, two of them moved to the agree side for number 9. The LCMS presidents as 
a group, on the other hand, agree more with civil over criminal remedies. Five of the 
11 favored civil suits, but only 3 agreed with the use of criminal trials. Likewise, the 
ELCA presidents shifted slightly in favor of civil remedies. Eleven of the 24 agreed in 
number 8 (civil) whereas only 8 of 24 agreed in number 9 (criminal). 
Items 10, 11, and 12 treat in slightly different ways the relationship between the 
value of free and open expression and the goals of a liberal education in a collegial 
setting. Number 10 states, "Freedom of expression is one of the most valuable 
commodities that can exist on any college or university campus." With the exception of 
one LCMS president who mildly disagreed with that statement and one ELCA 
respondent who could neither agree nor disagree, everyone else (95%) agreed, over two-
thirds (67.5%) strongly. 
To the assertion in number 11 that "The discussion of unpopular ideas is an 
essential aspect of a liberal education," there was almost unanimous agreement. Ninety-
five percent (77.5% strongly agreeing) recognize this as being an inherent part of the 
process of intellectual development. The two individuals who could neither agree nor 
disagree were from an ELCA college and a WELS college. 
Number 12 takes the idea in number 11 a step farther when it states, "The 
discussion of ideas which may be offensive to certain individuals or groups is 
occasionally necessary to accomplish the goals of a liberal education." Here, total 
agreement was almost as strong as the combined responses for the previous item (90% ), 
but the relative strength did diminish somewhat. Whereas 31 presidents strongly agreed 
with the statement in number 11, only 25 of the 40 (62.5%) strongly agreed in number 
12. One each from the LCMS and the WELS mildly disagreed. Two more would not 
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agree or disagree. 
Number 13 makes reference to one of the recognized exceptions to the general 
principle that expression should be free and unrestrained under the First Amendment, 
and it seeks to find the degree to which members of the sample agree. It states, "It is 
appropriate to put limits on expression because of the time, place, or manner in which 
it occurs." It is not known how many respondents were familiar with the actual phrase 
involved, but a full 90% agreed (40% strongly, 50% mildly). Only 3 individuals 
disagreed; 1 from the LCMS (mildly) and 2 from the ELCA (strongly). 
Number 14 attempts to discern the extent to which it makes a difference to the 
respondents where on the campus expression takes place. It states, "Some topics are 
appropriate to discuss in a classroom setting but not outside the class." Evidently, to 
most, it does not seem to matter where such discussions occur. Thirty-five percent 
strongly disagree and 30% do so mildly. Those few (17.5%) who seem to agree that 
some things are alright to talk about in -- but not out of -- class include representatives 
from the CLC (1), the ELCA (3), the LCMS (2), and the WELS (1). 
Moving to another specific venue on the campus, item 15 inquires about whether 
"Students should be able to say anything they want when they are in their residence hall 
rooms." The most frequent response was "mildly disagree" (35%). Another 17.5% 
strongly disagreed, making it just a little over one-half who were opposed to this 
position. An equal number of responses (6, or 15%) for the two "agree" choices and the 
one in between, rounds off the relatively inconclusive collective response to this 
statement. The ones who did agree, that is, those who favored unrestricted speech for 
students in their rooms, were from the ELCA (8 of 24) and the LCMS (4 of 11). 
Number 16 seeks to find if the respective roles of the two key populations in an 
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academic community are perceived any differently by those who lead them. It states, 
"Students and professors should be held to the same standard regarding free expression 
when acting as members of the campus community." Of the 7 presidents who disagree 
(6 mildly), 5 of them are from the LCMS which is almost 50% of that entire cohort. 
Five others from the LCMS joined most of the ELCA (20 of 24) and all 3 WELS 
presidents in agreeing with a common standard for both groups. 
Another category of campus speaker is introduced into the setting in number 17. 
It asks whether "Outside speakers should have greater freedom while on the campus 
making a presentation than is typically allowed students or professors addressing the 
same issue in class." Only 7 people in this sample (17.5%) think they should, and only 
one of them feels strongly about it. On the other hand 67.5% of the presidents do not 
feel that outside speakers should have any greater freedom than students and professors. 
Of all those who disagreed with the statement, 32.5% felt strongly and 35% felt mildly 
opposed to it. Of those who favored a different standard, 2 were from the ELCA (both 
mild), 4 from the LCMS (3 mild and 1 strong), and 1 from the WELS (mild). 
Number 18 is the first of 10 items located throughout the remainder of the survey 
which request the presidents to respond to specific situations in terms of what action 
they might take on their own campuses when confronted with the problem presented. 
It states, "The institution you serve would take the same action against a student for 
inappropriate off-campus expression as it would if the expression had occurred on the 
campus." According to the responses, a large majority of them (70%) would not take 
the same action. Fifteen percent would take the same action and the remaining 15% 
could not commit to one position or the other; or they did not understand the question, 
one respondent having marked "?" in the space instead of one of the standard options. 
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Of the 6 individuals who make up the 15% agreemg, all five church bodies are 
represented, the LCMS having 2 who mildly agree. Of the 2 who strongly disagree, l is 
from the WELS and 1 from the CLC. 
It was pointed out early in the first chapter that while the First Amendment's 
guarantee of free expression is automatically applicable to public institutions of higher 
education, inasmuch as they are, inherently, governmental agencies, the same is not true 
for private institutions, including those operated or sponsored by church bodies. It is 
also true, however, that all private institutions can adopt or impose upon themselves the 
obligations of the First Amendment by simply saying, usually in their official 
publications, that this is their desire and intent. Item number 19 seeks to find how the 
presidents feel, in a general way, about the distinction between these two sectors. It also 
is the first item to mention specifically Lutheran institutions when it states, "Lutheran 
colleges and universities should always follow the same standards for expression as 
public colleges and universities." 
When the item was drafted, it was done with the assumption that the typical 
respondent would view public institutions as representing the most free, open, and 
tolerant environments in terms of expression, and that this and other similar items would 
provide a way to determine the degree to which Lutheran college and university 
presidents felt their institutions should simulate that environment. For many, that may 
indeed be how the item was perceived, but it also became apparent, based on comments 
made during the interviews and reported later, that some who may be very much in 
favor of open and free expression on their campus would disagree with the statement in 
number 19 because of the restrictions public institutions must impose (for other 
constitutional reasons) on some expression which is related to religion. The actual 
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responses to this item were as follows: 5% strongly agreed, 10% mildly agreed, 37.5% 
mildly disagreed, and 42.5% strongly disagreed, representing an 80% opposition rate. 
The written comments of two respondents who registered the strongest disagreement are 
worth quoting here. One explained that he answered this way ''because at most public 
universities, prayer, for example, is forbidden. Lutheran colleges should not have that 
standard!" The other stated, "Not so in liturgical settings; the question is not precise." 
In other words, for a church-related college to employ the same standard as a public 
university in the area of free expression, there likely would be restrictions or limitations 
for the religious institution which would be inconsistent with its mission as a college of 
the church. A similar sentiment was also expressed by two of the presidents who 
participated in the interview phase of the study. Of the 6 institutions that did agree, 1 
was from the LCMS (mild) and the other 5 from the ELCA ( 2 strong, 3 mild). 
To ascertain how the presidents of Lutheran colleges and universities would view 
the importance of free expression vis-a-vis the feelings of someone hurt by expression 
which was offensive to him or her, item 20 sought to find out whether they felt that 
"Lutheran colleges and universities should place a higher priority on a person's feelings 
than on another's right to say something offensive to that person." More disagreed 
(42.5%) than agreed (27.5%; only 10% strongly), but a full 30% could neither agree nor 
disagree. When the responses to this item are examined by church body, it was found 
that 67% of the WELS presidents, 36% of the LCMS presidents, and only 17% of the 
presidents from the ELCA schools said the priority in a Lutheran college or university 
should be the person's feelings. Of the 17 individuals who disagree, the ELCA accounts 
for 12 (6 mild and 6 strong). 
It is interesting to examine how some of the other variables are related to the 
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responses for this item. While the low numbers involved probably render these findings 
less than highly significant, some trends or tendencies still seem to emerge from the data. 
When one looks, for example, at how the fact of a respondent's attendance at a Lutheran 
college related to his response to this item, it is discovered that, of the 8 presidents who 
did not go to one of the institutions represented in the sample, none agreed that such 
schools should "place a higher priority on a person's feelings than on another's right to 
say something offensive to that person." Not everyone who did attend a Lutheran 
college did agree; in fact, 12 of the 32 (37.5%) specifically disagreed. Nevertheless, all 
those who did agree 11 (34%) received their undergraduate degrees from a Lutheran 
college or university. 
A similar finding is made when one examines the responses of the presidents who 
are required to be ordained to hold their positions. None of them disagreed with the 
statement in number 20. 
There also seems to be a perceptible difference between presidents of those 
institutions where more than 50% of the faculty is Lutheran and those with less than 
50%. Of the 11 who agreed with the statement, 9 (82%) served at institutions where 
more than half of the faculty were Lutheran. When the responses of the 17 who 
disagreed are examined, one finds that 11 (65%) are from schools where less than one-
half of the faculty are members of some Lutheran church. 
As a follow-up to the somewhat general principle explored in number 20, items 
21 and 22 seek a response based specifically on how local religious values inform one's 
view of the role of expression and whether conflict with those values would result in 
some sanction at the respondents' own institutions. 
Item 21 states, "Some expression could be considered to be in clear conflict with 
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the religious values of the institution you serve." This is followed immediately by 
number 22 which says, "Expression which is considered to be in clear conflict with the 
religious values of the institution you serve would be prohibited and punished." While 
37 of the 40 (92.5%) do agree with the statement in number 21 ( with 27 of them, or 
67.5%, doing so strongly), only 7 (17.5%), agree with the statement in number 22 (and 
only 2 of them strongly). Of those 7, there are 2 each from the ELCA and the WELS 
and 3 from the LCMS. Presumably, then, the 67.5% who disagree with number 22 
would neither prohibit nor punish expression found to be in clear conflict with their 
respective religious values. lf the 15% who would neither agree nor disagree with this 
statement is added (since here no decision may be a decision not to prohibit or punish 
after all), then the opposition to this kind of reaction or response to such expression is 
increased to 82.5%. An examination of the responses to this item by church body shows 
that the colleges of the WELS are more likely to prohibit and punish the expression in 
question than any of the others. 
Items 23 and 24 offer normative statements about how Lutheran institutions, 
specifically, should respond to two distinct problems that sometimes arise, the suggestion 
in the wording of each being that a restrictive solution is desirable. Number 23 states, 
"Lutheran colleges and universities should establish and enforce limits on expression 
which is found to be offensive by certain identifiable groups on the campus." Number 
24 gets a bit more pointed when it says, "Lutheran colleges and universities should 
establish policies which make punishable the uttering of racial epithets." It would be 
expected that those who favor limits in the first case would also support them in the 
second, since racial epithets represent a common (and relatively grievous) form of the 
problem suggested in number 23. One would also anticipate that a higher level of 
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agreement would be registered with number 24 because it does identify a more serious 
offense, and this, in fact, is what happened. The total of those agreeing with number 23 
was 15 (37 .5% ), as opposed to the 24 ( 60%) who agreed with the statement in number 
24. Forty-five percent disagreed with number 23 versus 27.5% who were opposed 
(17.5% strongly disagreeing) to the statement in item 24. 
It is also interesting to see how the different Lutheran bodies responded to these 
two items. All the presidents of the WELS colleges mildly agreed with item 23; all also 
agreed with number 24, one strongly. The LCMS respondents split on both questions 
but the distinction was much sharper for the statement on racial epithets. On number 
23, 6 of the 11 agreed (2 strongly) and 2 disagreed (1 strongly). On number 24, however, 
9 agreed (again, 2 strongly) and the other 2 disagreed, this time both strongly. Assuming 
that the two who disagreed in both were the same people, it is strange that one would 
have only mild disagreement on number 23 but change it to strong disagreement in 
number 24, especially when the movement for most of the other respondents was to 
greater agreement with the punishment of epithets. 
The respondent from the one ELS school mildly disagreed with number 23 and 
strongly agreed with number 24, demonstrating the "logic" just suggested. Likewise, the 
one president of the CLC moved from mildly disagree for the more general "offensive 
expression" addressed in item 23 to mild agreement for policies and punishment of 
racial epithets in Lutheran institutions. Responses of the ELCA presidents were much 
more distributed across the spectrum; although, like their counterparts from the other 
denominations, more agreed with a more restrictive response to racial epithets (10 of 24, 
or 42%) than general offensive expression ( 6 of 24, or 25% ). 
Number 24 is another interesting item to examine from the perspective of some 
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of the other data collected about the characteristics of the respondents and their 
institutions. For example, when the variable, "percent of faculty who are Lutheran" is 
looked at, certain tendencies seem to emerge. When the responses from the 22 schools 
with over 50% Lutheran faculty are examined, one finds that 17 (77%) agree that 
"Lutheran colleges and universities should establish policies which make punishable the 
uttering of racial epithets." Looking at the 18 schools with faculties under 50% 
Lutheran, it is found that only 7 (39%) agree. Another way to look at the same data is 
to say that of the 24 people who agreed, 17 (71 % ) are from schools where at least half 
of the faculty are Lutheran. 
Another variable which seems to demonstrate a remarkable pattern of responses 
for item 24 is the number of years the respondent had been president at his current 
institution. The range was from 1 - 20 years, and it seems that the longer one has been 
in his current office, the more likely he is to agree strongly with the ban and punishment 
of racial epithets and the less likely to disagree strongly. Everyone who strongly agreed 
(5 people) had been in office over 10 years. Everyone who strongly disagreed (7 people) 
had been in office for less than 12 years. Of the 14 presidents with over 10 years as 
president at their current institution, 12 (86%) agree. 
As might be expected, the results are similar when the variable, "years at one's 
current institution in any capacity" is examined. Here, the range is from 1 - 33 years. 
Again, there is rare disagreement (only 2 of 11, or 18%) once a person has been at his 
current institution in any role for more than 11 years. 
Item number 25 attempted to discover to what extent the respondents would 
agree with the following statement: "Lutheran colleges and universities should not 
prohibit and punish expression which is in conflict with its values, but respond only with 
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admonition, education, and information about why it opposes the position it finds 
offensive." Here, 65% agree (25% strongly). Twenty-five percent also disagree. Corning 
as it does after two items which discuss policies and punishments, the focus in this one 
shifts somewhat and suggests that perhaps there is another way to respond besides 
imposing limits and sanctions on behavior. It would be interesting to see if the responses 
would be any different if this item had appeared before numbers 23 and 24. In spite of 
their relative placement, however, this item did have the highest rate of agreement, 65%, 
as opposed to 37.5% and 60% for items 23 and 24, respectively. It should also be 
pointed out that this is relatively consistent with the results of item 22 which presents 
very close to an opposite position. It will be recalled that the agree/disagree division 
there was 17.5%/67.5%, which is quite close to the 65% agreement of number 25. 
If any generalization could be made concerning the responses to this item 
according to denominational affiliation, it would be that, of the three larger bodies, the 
presidents of the ELCA colleges and universities would be less supportive of restrictions 
and punishments for expression which conflicts with their institutions' values and more 
inclined to admonish, educate, and inform those in violation of these standards. 
Seventy-five percent of this group (18 of 24) agreed, as opposed to only 45.5% of the 
LCMS presidents and 33.3% of those from the WELS. Interestingly, the president from 
the ELS also agreed (mildly) as did the one from the CLC (strongly); a notable point 
since the presidents of those two sma11er institutions report that they identify with and 
more closely resemble WELS schools than those from the LCMS and certainly those of 
the ELCA. 
The responses to number 26 provide an opportunity to see if the presidents have 
different expectations for public institutions on the matter of policies against and 
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punishment for the expression of racial slurs. The actual item states, "Public colleges 
and universities should establish policies which make punishable the uttering of racial 
epithets." Whereas 60% agreed with the statement when it applied to Lutheran colleges 
and universities (item 24), only 45% think this should happen in the public sector (only 
10% strongly). One quarter of the sample would neither agree nor disagree. Thirty 
percent disagreed, but it is interesting to note that another full quarter disagreed 
strongly, presumably because they would expect expression in public institutions to be 
free regardless of the content. Ten of the 12 among those who disagree are from the 
ELCA. The other 2 are from the LCMS. The presidents of the CLC and ELS colleges 
each responded the same way for items 24 and 26; that is, expressing no difference 
between public or Lutheran colleges when it comes to handling racial epithets. They 
supported policies and punishment for both sectors. 
Item numbers 27 and 28 provide another opportunity to see how the sample 
views expression about a controversial topic, first in public institutions and then in their 
own. The two statements, respectively, are as follows: 27) "The student newspaper at 
a public college or university should have a right to carry an advertisement for an 
abortion clinic." 28) "The student newspaper at the institution you serve would be 
permitted to carry an advertisement for an abortion clinic." More than twice as many 
agreed with number 27 as did with number 28 (65% versus 30% ). Strong disagreement 
was registered by only 10% in number 27 but a full 50% in number 28. Another 12.5% 
disagreed mildly with the latter item. It might also be added that even though total 
disagreement is very low, of the 7 who did disagree, 5 of them (71 % ) had been president 
at their current institutions for more than 12 years. Likewise, there is no disagreement 
on item 27 by those who did not receive their undergraduate degrees at I ,utheran 
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colleges. 
An examination of the responses to these items (especially number 28) by church 
affiliation is striking. For instance, of the 20 presidents who expressed in the strongest 
possible way that their student newspaper would not be allowed to carry an 
advertisement for an abortion clinic, only 5 were from the ELCA's 24 schools. All 3 
WELS schools, 10 of the 11 LCMS schools, as well as both the ELS and the CLC 
institutions were in this group. Twelve of the 24 ELCA institutions, on the other hand, 
would permit such information to be provided in their student newspapers. 
When the variable of "percentage of Lutheran students" is examined, one finds 
that once the rate is over 70%, the only response to this item is "strongly disagree." A 
similar result occurs for the "percentage of Lutheran faculty." Of the 17 presidents who 
serve institutions with 60% or more Lutheran faculty, 16 (94%) disagreed. 
Three more variables merit discussion here as well. The first, is "number of 
weekly worship services." Ten institutions report having more than 6 opportunities for 
formal worship on the campus per week. Of those, 8 (80%) disagree strongly with the 
statement in number 28. A similar result is found for "number of religion courses 
required." Of the 18 presidents whose schools require more than 2 such courses for 
graduation, 16 (89%) would not permit abortion advertisements in their student 
newspapers. Finally, the 4 whose institutions require that they be ordained all disagree 
in item 28. 
Item 29 stated, "The student newspaper at the institution you serve is free to 
criticize your administrative decisions." Thirty-six of the 40 presidents (90%) agreed (33 
strongly). Of the 3 who disagreed, there was one each from the CLC (mildly), the WELS 
(strongly), and the LCMS (mildly). All the ELCA presidents agreed strongly. 
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The issues in items 30, 31, and 32 can be examined together since they all deal 
with the freedom of the student newspaper at Lutheran colleges and universities to 
express criticism of the sponsoring church body on three matters which, it was thought, 
could be seen as becoming more progressively controversial in the order in which they 
are presented. Number 30 stated, "The student newspaper at a Lutheran college or 
university should be free to criticize the position taken by the sponsoring church body 
on a matter of public policy." Numbers 31 and 32 substitute " ... on a matter relating 
to church practice," and " ... on a matter of biblical interpretation," respectively. 
If one looks at the resr,,mse "strongly agree" for each of these three items, there 
is, indeed, a gradual diminishing of support from number 30 through number 32. 
Seventy percent answered this way when the issue was public policy, 65% when it was 
church practice, and 60% when the criticism concerned biblical interpretation. Taking 
total agreement into account, the percentages are 80, 72.5, and 72.5 for items 30, 31, and 
32, respectively. In short, a vast majority of the Lutheran colleges and universities, taken 
as a whole, tolerate editorial criticism of the positions taken by their sponsoring church 
bodies. Focusing on those few who disagree, one sees that only 15% do for item 30 
(12.5% mildly); 17.5% for item 31 (all mildly); and 22.5% for item 32 (17.5% strongly). 
In general, those schools with smaller student bodies, but with a higher percentage of 
Lutheran students, tend to disagree more. 
Even more interesting is how the individual church bodies line up specifically on 
these issues. Indeed, there are few items in the entire survey which produce such polar 
extremes in terms of denominational response than do these. For question 30, all but 
one of the ELCA schools strongly agree with the newspaper's right to criticize the 
church body's position on matters of public policy. (The one that did not join his fellow 
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23 ELCA colleagues chose "neither agree nor disagree" as he did for many items. This 
is also the same president who did not admit to a current denominational affiliation for 
the institution, and whose presence in the group of Lutheran colleges and universities 
is most tenuous according to the perceptions of many. lt is also the same institution, 
mentioned earlier, which views its church affiliation as more historical than actual.) In 
any event, the ELCA is quite unified on this matter. The same is true for the colleges 
of the WELS, but taking the opposite position. All three presidents of that church body 
believe that student newspapers at Lutheran colleges and universities should not criticize 
the position of its church body, even on issues of public policy. As one might expect, 
the same is therefore also true for church practice and matters of biblical interpretation. 
The progressive nature of these three questions is nevertheless reflected in the responses 
of the WELS presidents too, however, because while only 1 of the 3 strongly disagreed 
on item 30 when the issue was only public policy, 2 disagree for the item that deals with 
church practice and 3 for the one on biblical interpretation. The LCMS presidents start 
out with a relatively high degree of tolerance in item 30, with 8 of the 11 agreeing (5 
strongly). Three disagreed mildly. When the issue turned to church practice, 6 still 
agreed (4 strongly), but 4 also disagreed mildly. One was neutral. By the time they got 
to biblical interpretation, however, the diversity of the schools of the LCMS had become 
more clear, with 6 agreeing and 5 disagreeing ( 4 strongly). In other words, almost half 
of the LCMS presidents line up like their WELS colleagues (and also the one from the 
CLC) on the issue of criticism of the church's position on biblical interpretation. Those 
in the other half are more like their counterparts from the ELCA who consistently agree 
across the board on all three items. The existence of two camps in the LCMS is depicted 
quite clearly when all the data from the first two surveys are displayed graphically later 
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in the chapter. 
Items 33 and 34 deal with the freedom of "underground" newspapers on the 
campuses of the respondents. The first inquires whether "You would restrict the 
distribution of an unofficial (or 'underground') student newspaper on your campus 
regardless of whether any of its content was offensive." The second is altered slightly to 
read, "You would restrict the distribution of an unofficial ( or 'underground') student 
newspaper on your campus only if its content was offensive." The changed condition 
in item 34 regarding the content of the material in the publication seemed to make a 
difference to some. Whereas the agree/disagree split for item 33 was 20%172.5%, for 
item 34 it was 42.5%/35%. All three of the church bodies which sponsor multiple 
institutions were split on both of these items, including the WELS, which had 2 colleges 
strongly agreeing with restriction in both sets of circumstances and 1 disagreeing. While 
the split in this camp is somewhat notable, since the three schools usually responded 
similarly, the responses do represent a pattern in reverse of the majority of the other 
presidents, a somewhat common occurrence. It might also be noted of this item that of 
the 8 individuals who agreed, all had attended Lutheran colleges as undergraduates. 
One comment written on the instrument next to this item is worth reporting. A 
president from an ELCA college who responded "strongly disagree" to both items 33 
and 34 pointed out, "The issue is not 'official' vs. 'unofficial' ( or underground), but 
whether those who edit and write the 'unofficial' paper identify themselves or not. If 
not, then it is to be regarded as not protected by the canons of academic freedom." 
Items 35 - 40 consist of three pairs of statements (35 and 38, 36 and 39, 37 and 
40) which attempt to compare how the respondents feel about the three issues contained 
in them from the perspective, first, of the freedom of students at public colleges and 
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universities, and then at their own institutions. The intent was, again, to present 
situations which were perceived by the researcher to be progressively more difficult to 
tolerate. The first pair (35 and 38) asks whether "Students at a public college or 
university should be free l or 'at the institution you serve would be free'] to display a 
Confederate flag on the door of their residence hall room." The language of the second 
pair (36 and 39) states, "Students at a public college or university should be free [or 'at 
the institution you serve would be free'] to wear clothing on the campus which clearly 
communicates that a specified racial or ethnic group is intellectually inferior." The third 
pair (37 and 40), offering perhaps the most extreme situation, inquire as to whether 
"Students at a public college or university should be free [or 'at the institution you serve 
would be free' J to wear clothing on the campus which clearly communicates that a 
specified racial or ethnic group should be exterminated." It should be noted that when 
the issue is asked in the context of the public sector it is framed in normative language 
such as " ... should be free .... " Those items which deal with the presidents' own 
campuses, on the other hand, are stated in terms of " ... would be free .... " 
With regard to the display of the Confederate flag, there is not a great deal of 
difference between the responses to the two items. The amount agreeing with the 
statement relating to public institutions totals 60%, while all those willing to tolerate 
such expression on their own campuses equals 62.5%. In other words, these 
respondents, collectively, say they would give their students more freedom than they 
think students at public institutions should have. The WELS was the only church body 
not represented among those who agreed to any degree for both items. All but one of 
the eleven LCMS schools and over half (54%) of the ELCA institutions would allow it 
for their own students. 
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The next pair of items addressed the issue of clothing being worn with an 
undeniahly offensive message; namely, that a certain identifiable group is intellectually 
inferior. Here the presidents were much less tolerant for students both on public and 
their own campuses, and the degree of intolerance was greater locally. Only 22.5% 
supported the freedom of public students in this situation, while an even smaller 17 .5% 
said their students would be free to wear clothing with such a message. Those 
supporting freedom for public students here include 1 president from the LCMS and 8 
from the ELCA. With regard to the respondents' campuses, only 7 ELCA presidents say 
they would agree (5 strongly) to permit their own students to express themselves in this 
way. 
The results from the cross-tabulations of two additional variables with number 
39 are worth mentioning. Looking again at "percentage of Lutheran students," one sees 
that there was only disagreement (89% strong) for those institutions where 60% or more 
of the students are Lutheran. When related to the number of religion courses required 
for graduation, it is found that for the 18 schools where more than two courses are 
required, not one agreed with the statement in number 39. 
The statements in items 37 and 40 represent a very controversial and offensive 
means of expression, arguably more so than with either the display of a Confederate flag 
or aspersions concerning the intelligence of a particular racial or ethnic group. To 
suggest that the members of such a group should be exterminated, in the minds of many, 
is intolerable. Some members of this sample, however, were willing to tolerate it, 
presumably for the sake of the principle involved, for students at public institutions as 
well as at their own. The rate, however, is much lower than for either of the other two 
situations. Only 17.5% agreed (10% strongly) in number 37 which addressed what 
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should be allowed on public campuses. Six of these were from the ELCA and one from 
the LCMS. Only 4 individuals ( 10%) would allow this message to be worn by students 
at their own institutions. All of these were from ELCA schools. Total disagreement 
amounted to 85%, with 75% holding the opinion strongly. The 10% disagreeing mildly 
were also from the ELCA. 
Only strong disagreement was registered on number 37 by presidents serving 
institutions with student bodies over 60% Lutheran. Likewise, there was no agreement 
of any degree from all schools with more than 6 formal worship opportunities per week. 
The 4 who are required to be ordained all disagree as well. f'or number 40, there was 
no agreement by any president whose school had over 50% Lutheran students. 
The next item gets more general again and pursues an issue that is developed in 
the four succeeding items as well. Basically, it concerns the degree of tolerance for 
certain -- or all -- kinds of expression in institutions of higher education in light of the 
fact that expression and discussion of ideas is a key component of the experience. The 
differences introduced in the language of items 42 through 45 include weighing the value 
and degree of freedom in colleges and universities as opposed to society in general, and 
also comparing the so-called "standard of decency" expected in both public and 
Lutheran institutions with society at large. Whereas items 42 and 43 take the position 
that more freedom should be tolerated in the educational setting because of the alleged 
goal of seeking "truth by any means," items 44 and 45 present the opposite opinion; 
namely, that not more freedom, but more self-restraint in expressive matters should be 
expected from people engaged in higher education. After reproducing these items, the 
responses to each will be summarized. 
Number 41 states, "College and university campuses should be the most tolerant 
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places when it comes to expression and the free exchange of ideas, whatever their value." 
This statement is similar to number 10, discussed above, in that it connects the value of 
free expression to the educational process. While not reporting a level of agreement as 
high as in that previous item, almost three-quarters (29 of 40, or 72.5%) of the presidents 
agreed. One of only two who strongly disagreed, a mathematician from a highly 
respected ELCA college, provided an explanation for why he could not support such a 
position. Evidently taking a very literal reading of the statement, he added, 
"Mathematicians should not 'tolerate' a statement that 2 + 2 = 5." His point is well 
taken, although the assumption in the question, admittedly not specifically stated, was 
that this applied to ideas where there was as of yet no clear way to refute them with 
unequivocal facts. The other strong disagreement was registered by the president of one 
of the WELS schools. The 4 individuals (10%) who mildly disagreed came from the 
ELCA (1), the LCMS (2), and the WELS (1). 
Number 42 states: "Expression which might not be tolerated in society at large 
should be allowed on a public college or university campus because of the academic 
interest in seeking the truth by any means." The only difference in number 43 is the 
substitution of the word "Lutheran" for the word "public." In the responses to the first 
item in this pair, an equal number (11) both strongly agreed and mildly agreed, making 
the total 55%. With the change from the public to the Lutheran campus, there appears 
to have been only a very slight downward shift of a few responses among the ELCA and 
the LCMS presidents to bring the total agreement to 47.5%. The 3 WELS presidents 
strongly disagreed with both statements, the CLC president moved from mild to strong 
disagreement, and the respondent from the ELS went from mild agreement to mild 
disagreement. It might be noted that one respondent added this comment after 
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recording agreement: "So long as it is not disruptive." None of the four who are 
required to be ordained agreed in either of these items. 
Items 44 and 45 are identical with the exception of the one word change, as in 
42 and 43, reflecting the desire to see the difference in the respondents' views between 
public and Lutheran higher education. The statement is as follows: "Expression on 
public [ or Lutheran] college and university campuses should adhere to a higher standard 
of decency than is required in society at large because more is expected of those who are 
supposed to be engaged in legitimate intellectual pursuits." As suggested above, these 
items are viewed as presenting a position somewhat opposed to the value of extended 
freedom in the academic setting; that is, proposing that those "engaged in legitimate 
intellectual pursuits" will rise above a tolerance for what many believe to be intolerable 
and not worthy of protection, either by the Constitution or institutional policy. 
Whereas 55% and 47.5%, respectively, agreed with the positions posed in items 
42 and 43 (that colleges and universities should tolerate, for the sake of the search for 
truth, what might not be accepted in society at large), the responses to items 44 and 45 
seem to suggest that these respondents have a preference for a higher standard for higher 
education, with an even higher standard being expected for campuses like theirs. The 
percentage agreeing with the statement in number 44 is 57.5; 67.5% agree with the one 
in number 45. One might expect that the majority of these were in the minority for the 
previous pair of items which supported a more open educational environment. That this 
is true for the colleges of the WELS is clearly evident from the data when analyzed along 
denominational lines. On both items, 44 and 45, these presidents agreed, whereas they 
disagreed uniformly on items 42 and 43. 
With the responses from the CLC and the ELS, both of the presidents of these 
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small, lone schools of their respective denominations strongly disagreed on item 44, 
supposedly suggesting that the standard in public education need not be high at all. 
When it came to Lutheran education, however, the CLC person strongly agreed and the 
ELS individual moved to the neutral position. Responses from the ELCA presidents 
look very similar collectively between the two items. The LCMS presidents, as a group, 
did shift in favor of a higher standard for Lutheran education. Whereas 6 of 11 agreed 
and only 3 disagreed in number 44, 9 agreed and only 1 disagreed in number 45. It 
could also be added that for number 45, none of the schools with more than 60% 
Lutheran students disagreed with the statement here. 
Some written comments accompanied the responses to number 45 which are 
worth noting. One person drew a line through the words "legitimate intellectual 
pursuits" and replaced them with "religious and spiritual pursuits," answering "strongly 
agree" for the revised question. (This response was not included among the others 
answered the same way because the question was revised.) Another underlined the word 
"decency." A third underlined the words "because more is expected of those who are 
supposed to be engaged in legitimate intellectual pursuits," and noted that this is the 
"wrong reason," suggesting that the reason for a higher standard of decency is not 
intellectual pursuit, but something else. 
The last three items in the survey, numbers 46, 47, and 48, represent an attempt 
to determine how the presidents of the Lutheran colleges and universities in the study 
view the problem of offensive or defamatory expression, not so much in terms of how 
they might address a specific problem, or what opinion they hold about the role of free 
expression in higher education generally, or the church-related sector in particular, but 
rather how they might classify the problematic expression along something 
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approximating a scale of philosophical categories. In other words, do they view the kind 
of expression described in these items as merely a legal or constitutional matter to deal 
with according to the applicable statutory law or court decision; or, does it go beyond 
the law and require that the issues be addressed according to certain moral or ethical 
considerations; or, finally, does the problem suggest to them that there are theological 
or spiritual issues involved which might require approaching concerns or problems in 
this area as one would when other matters of a religious nature arise? The exact 
statement in items 46, 47, and 48 is as follows: "Expression which could be considered 
offensive or defamatory because it contains a message intended to hurt its hearers 
through the use of language that is racist, sexist, or based on some other characteristic 
of the hearer presents a problem that is primarily legal or constitutional [ or 'moral and 
ethical', or 'theological and spiritual'] in nature." 
Of the three categories, more presidents felt that the situation presented in the 
statements posed primarily a moral or ethical problem. A full 90% agreed ( 40% 
strongly) in number 47 that it was more appropriate to view it this way than in terms of 
law (number 46) or theology (number 48). Those seeing it primarily as a legal problem 
amounted to 30% (only 10% agreeing strongly). Fifty-five percent agreed that it was 
primarily a theological problem. 
Even though these three statements, taken together, should have received 
responses which would have been relatively self-exclusive, such was not the case. In 
other words, one would think that if a respondent viewed an approach as "primary" the 
others would not be so viewed, and that there would not have been so many responses 
which did not take the self-exclusive nature of these approaches into account. In fact, 
some specifically avoided being confined by the word "primarily" in the statements and 
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responded to all of them with the same choice. Three members of the sample, 
recognizing the seeming inconsistency of such responses, made an effort to at least 
explain the reason for answering the way they did. One who marked "strongly agree" 
for items 46 and 47 drew a bracket around them and wrote "both." (Incidently, after 
item 48, which he left blank, he wrote, "No idea what this means." It is interesting to 
note, further, that this individual is the president of the institution which turned out to 
be the most "secular" in terms of church-relatedness, and also the most free on the scale 
of freedom and restraint.) Another, answering "neither agree nor disagree" for all three, 
added that it is "both constitutional and moral ... and spiritual [ sic l-" The third 
president, answering "strongly agree" for all three, wrote, "My responses to questions 46, 
47 and 48 are contradictory in that not all three can be primary at the same time; 
therefore I have removed the word primary from each of the three sentences in selecting 
my responses." (These responses and the accompanying notes from the respondents 
themselves may help explain why the reliability estimates for this instrument were low.) 
Some movement of the data takes place when the responses to the three items 
are examined by church body. There is a general tendency for the respondents of the 
CLC, ELS, and WELS to move gradually toward greater agreement as they went from 
the legal to the moral and on to the theological categories. For example, both CLC and 
ELS presidents marked "mildly disagree" on item 46, moved to mildly agree for number 
47, and then for number 48, one (ELS) remained at mildly agree, while the CLC 
president moved further to strongly agree. On item 46 the WELS had one each at 
mildly disagree, mildly agree and strongly agree. On number 47, the one who had 
disagreed on 46 had joined his colleague on mildly agree. When offered the choice of 
identifying the problem as theological, all three strongly agreed. 
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Tracing the LCMS presidents through the series, one finds that 4 of 11 agreed ( 1 
strongly) and 8 disagreed on number 46; 10 agreed (3 strongly) and only l disagreed on 
number 47; and 7 agreed (4 strongly) and 2 disagreed on number 48. While the greatest 
collective agreement was to see this as primarily a moral problem, feelings of strongest 
agreement were expressed when the ability to identify the problem as one with 
theological or spiritual implications was provided as an option. 
The ELCA presidents seem to feel that the statement posed more than a mere 
legal problem, is primarily a matter or morality or ethics, but could also carry with it 
some theological implications as well. One-quarter of this segment of the sample (6 of 
24) agreed (2 strongly) that it was primarily a legal problem. Twenty of the 24 agreed 
(12 strongly) that the issue was primarily a moral one. Eleven (5 strongly) saw it as a 
theological concern. It is worth noting that 6 of the 24 indicated that they could neither 
agree nor disagree here, leaving the remaining 6 to disagree (2 strongly) with the 
proposition that offensive or defamatory expression is primarily a theological problem. 
Some miscellaneous information from selected cross-tabulations for number 48 
includes the following: All those from institutions which required the president to be 
ordained agreed strongly; one who is a non-Lutheran trained in law also agreed strongly; 
and all those without doctorates disagreed that the issue is primarily a theological or 
spiritual problem. 
Determination of Support for Freedom or Restraint 
The second survey was designed to provide information which would allow for 
a determination of each president's level of support for free expression on his campus. 
As was explained in Chapter Three, each item was assigned a response which 
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corresponded to what was determined by the researcher to represent the one most 
supportive of free expression on a five-point scale and each instrument was then scored 
accordingly based on how the actual responses compared to the standard pro-expression 
response. It will also be recalled that the total pro-expression score could range from 
a low of 48 to a maximum of 240. The higher the score, the more supportive of free 
expression the responses supposedly were collectively. ln fact, the actual scores ranged 
from 92 - 214. Appendix 5, which is the second survey instrument, displays the standard 
pro-expression responses on the basis of which the scores on the "freedom - restraint" 
scales were calculated. Table 21 lists the frequency of institutional scores for the pro-
expression responses to the second survey. 
It is suggested that by creating a scale using these sources, with "restraint" on the 
low side and "freedom" for the higher scores, the institutions' relative positions of 
tolerance for expression can be determined and compared to the scores derived from the 
determination, already reported, of each institution's level of church-relatedness to see 
if there is any pattern to the combined responses. 
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Table 21.--Frequency of institutional scores on 48-item free expression (second) survey. 
Score f Institution 
92 1 21 
108 1 17 
109 1 31 
116 1 19 
118 1 44 
122 1 11 
125 2 12, 18 
126 1 25 
128 2 6, 10 
137 1 20 
139 2 9,41 
144 1 14 
145 2 23,38 
146 3 4,26,28 
152 1 5 
153 1 13 
155 3 2, 24,34 
159 2 37,42 
160 1 16 
164 1 32 
165 1 1 
168 1 36 
175 2 7,40 
178 1 8 
182 1 27 
185 1 3 
188 1 15 
194 1 30 
199 1 22 
214 1 39 
Convergence of Phases One and Two 
While it is interesting to look at the results of each individual item in the second 
survey and compare them to the results of a number of variables from the first survey, 
especially the denominational affiliation of the respective institutions, a more significant 
picture of how the responses to these two survey instruments relate collectively can be 
seen when the paired scores from the two scales of church-relatedness and expressive 
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tolerance are plotted on a graph (Figure 1) with intersecting axes, displaying the relative 
positions of each institution to all the others. The paired scores are listed in Table 22. 
Figure 1, which follows, consists of a two-variable diagram where the horizontal 
axis represents the scale of church-relatedness and the vertical axis represents the scale 
of expressive freedom and restraint. Given the fact that one scale goes from "secular" 
to "religious" and the other from "freedom" to "restraint," the resulting quadrants can 
be labeled according to the four institutional models which emerge: 
1. Secular-Freedom (upper left) 
2. Secular-Restraint (lower left) 
3. Religious-Freedom (upper right) 
4. Religious-Restraint (lower right) 
The placement of the midpoint for each scale could not be selected arbitrarily 
because to do so would affect the location of each institution in its appropriate quadrant. 
The "secular-religious" scale midpoint was set at 27, which is midway between the two 
extreme scores on this scale which ranged from 7 - 47. It was determined that the 
midpoint for the "freedom-restraint" scale (which had a range of scores from 92 - 214) 
should be set at point 144 because that represents the score which would result if all 48 
items on the second survey were given the response "neither agree nor disagree." 
The resulting diagram, therefore, displays the relative position of each institution 
to all the others. Moreover, each institution, except for those few which fall precisely 
on one of the axes, can be identified as clearly being one of the four types. 
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Table 22.--Paired scores from both scales for all institutions in the study. 
Institution Scores 
l 27,165 
2 16,155 
3 19,185 
4 16,146 
5 30,152 
6 21,128 
7 13,175 
8 17,178 
9 30,139 
10 33,128 
11 32,122 
12 26,125 
13 23.153 
14 30,144 
15 30,188 
16 29,160 
17 20,108 
18 35,125 
19 31,116 
20 22,137 
21 42,92 
22 9,199 
23 12,145 
24 17,155 
25 47,126 
26 15,146 
27 21,182 
28 18,146 
30 16,194 
31 44,109 
32 18,167 
34 25,155 
36 11,168 
37 19,159 
38 15,145 
39 7,214 
40 33,175 
41 9,139 
42 29,159 
44 34,118 
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Figure 1.--Graph of coordinates from the scores of the first and second surveys. 
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Upon examination of the graph, one sees a number of things. First, there is the 
tendency of the points to flow from the general direction of secular-freedom in the 
upper left to religious-restraint in the lower right. In other words, there does seem to 
be a negative relationship between high church-relatedness and presidential support for 
expressive freedom. More specifically, the more secular the institution, the more free 
it is also more likely to be. Conversely, the more religious the college or university, the 
greater the likelihood that it will also exhibit signs of being a bit more restrictive in terms 
of the degree to which free expression is tolerated. 
It is obvious from the figure that this relationship is not perfect; that is, the 
diagram produced is not a straight line from the upper left-hand corner which moves 
diagonally through the midpoint to the lower right-hand corner with no points on either 
side of that diagonal line. Nevertheless, the placement of most of the points is in that 
general direction. It will be noted that the institution which proved to be the most 
"secular" ( # 39) also occupies the position of most "free." And while the one that is the 
most "religious" ( #25) is not the one demonstrating the most "restraint" ( #21), these 
two are not very far apart, and clearly are in the same quadrant. 
Perhaps the most visibly striking finding among these quantitative data is what 
results when the outside points of each church body's individual members are connected 
to form the geometric shapes shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. --Denominational clusters based on the paired scores of the first two surveys. 
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The one which dominates the upper left-hand quadrant connects, in a counter-
clockwise direction, points 39, 41, 6, 42, 1, 27, 30, and then back to 39 again. Every 
point on, as well as inside, this shape represents all (and only) the institutions of the 
ELCA. 
At the opposite extreme in the lower right quadrant is a small triangle made up 
of three lines connecting the points 44, 21, and 31. Again, these are self-contained in 
that they intersect no other figure. They represent the three colleges of the WELS. 
The eleven institutions of the LCMS have not aligned themselves as compactly, 
although they too have avoided any contact with either of the other denominations as 
they form their "free" and "restrained" camps. The small triangle in the upper right-
hand quadrant, made up of points 15, 16, and 40, represents the institutions which fall 
outside the hypothetical expectation for Lutheran colleges and universities on the topic 
explored here. That is, they are academic communities that are both religious and free. 
The other group from the LCMS, the four-sided figure (created by connecting points 14, 
17, 19, 18, and 14), is a cluster which is very similar in terms of the range of religious-
ness or church-relatedness displayed (with the exception of #s 12 and 17), but being 
considerably below the horizontal axis in the expected range for those which are more 
"religious." While Institution 17 seems clearly to be outside either of the typical LCMS 
orbits, there is a reasonable explanation, given the historical mission of that particular 
institution, which is clearly unique among these schools, for this is the Historically Black 
College of the LCMS. What accounts for its placement in the secular-restraint quadrant, 
among other things, is a low Lutheran enrollment and a very strict attitude toward and 
relative intolerance for a number of behaviors, apparently including some expressive 
freedom, which is what many of the constituents of this institution demand. 
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Of the two institutions which are left floating alone to certain extent ( # 5 of the 
ELS and # 25 of the CLC), the placement of the first is something of a surprise, while 
that of the second is not. First, it was expected that they would be closer to each other 
than they are. But it was also thought that their similar location would have been closer 
to the three schools of the WELS than either of them actually are and perhaps to the 
lower right of them as well. The interview with the president from # 5 confirmed that 
this small and conservative junior college is nevertheless led by one who takes freedom 
of expression seriously -- the fact that it ranks higher in "freedom" than several ELCA 
institutions is remarkable -- while maintaining its unmistakable religious character. 
Finally, it is also somewhat striking to see the existence of a distinct corridor of 
un-plotted space between the shapes which make up the ELCA and the LCMS, a chasm 
which is somewhat symbolic of relations between the two church bodies, if not always 
between the faculties and presidents of their respective member institutions. The even 
greater distinction between the collective responses of the ELCA and the WELS 
presidents also reflects what is generally perceived to be the relationship between these 
two denominations. In this context it also might be fitting to recall a fact noted earlier 
in Chapter l; namely, that the colleges of the WELS, ELS, and CLC do not participate 
in the activities of LECNA, the conference which brings the presidents of the ELCA and 
the LCMS together annually, supports research in and the study of Lutheran higher 
education, and also sponsors various cooperative ventures such as travel seminars and 
other joint projects of a curricular nature. More can and will be said concerning the 
results from Phases One and Two, but at this point the results of the interview phase will 
be presented. 
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Results and Analysis of Phase Three 
It will be recalled that 17 of the 40 presidents in the sample agreed to discuss a 
variety of issues related to the topic of free expression in Lutheran higher education 
from their perspectives as the chief executive officers of their own institutions. The 
purpose of conducting the interviews was to add depth and texture to the study as well 
as to see whether the examples and conclusions drawn from them would confirm the 
findings or clarify any ambiguities produced in the more objective responses to the first 
two surveys. While nine questions were used in the interviews (see Appendix 11), the 
results reported here will draw selectively from only a few of the areas explored; namely, 
the respondents' determination of the degree of church-relatedness of their institutions 
and the criteria used to make that determination, the nature of the incidents they have 
cited which involve free expression problems on their campuses, and a variety of general 
comments which are supportive of both freedom and restraint of expression in an 
academic community. 
Church-Relatedness 
Each president was asked about the church-relatedness of his own institution and 
the criteria he employed to arrive at a rating on a scale of l to 5, where l represents an 
institution which is not church-related at all and 5 represents one which is very church-
related. All but one of the presidents interviewed provided a numerical rating, but it 
clearly was difficult for several of them to commit to a particular score. Some provided 
ranges and suggested certain conditions or contingencies which made them feel like the 
score should be one thing if seen from one perspective but something else if viewed from 
another. For instance, one rated his institution between 3 and 4 if compared to the 
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colleges of various other denominations, but only a 2 or 3 if compared to other Lutheran 
colleges. Another suggested that if he considered the personnel and ethos of the 
institution, it would be a 4 or 5; but if he looked at the different constituencies with 
which he interacted on behalf of the college, the score would be lower. He also 
distinguished between the students in their traditional undergraduate program and those 
in the adult degree-completion program, commenting that the church-relatedness 
appears to be different from one to another. One institution which actually scored 
relatively high on the basis of the responses to the first survey was assigned only a 3 by 
the president in the interview. 
Table 23 presents the church-relatedness scores reported by the presidents 
interviewed. It should be remembered that it would be inappropriate to compare these 
scores with each other for any reason other than to report them as individual responses 
to the same question since each respondent used different criteria to arrive at his rating. 
Table 23.--Frequency of scores of institutional church-relatedness reported by presidents 
interviewed. These are based on a scale of 1 - 5 where 1 is not church-related at all and 
5 is very church-related. N = 17. 
Ratin1: f Institution 
2-3, 3-4 1 36 
3 1 40 
3-4 2 10, 20 
4 3 8,24,28 
4-5 3 5, 13, 16 
5 6 4, 9, 12, 15, 18, 42 
Table 24 compares the actual scores of church-relatedness calculated on the basis 
of the first survey [A] and the self-reported scores of the 17 presidents provided during 
the interviews [B]. Scale A ranges from 7 to 47. Scale B goes from 1 to 5. The low 
scores on both scales represent a less church-related, or a more secular institution. 
Table 24.--Comparison of actual and self-reported scores of church-relatedness. 
39* 36 38, 4, 8, 13, 12, 16, 
24,20 42, 5, 9, 15 
[A] 7-14 15-22 23-30 
36** 40,36** 
10, 20 
[B] 1 2 3 
* Institution 39 would not give a self-rating. 
** Institution 36 gave two self-ratings. 
10, 40, 18 
31-38 39-47 
8, 24, 38, 4, 9, 12, 
5, 13, 16 15, 18, 42 
4 5 
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It is obvious that the presidents have perspectives of how church-related their 
institutions are which are different from those based on the criteria used for that 
determination in the first survey. As Table 24 shows, none of those interviewed had 
actual scores of church-relatedness which fell within the top 20% of the range. Six, 
however, did give themselves the highest rating on a scale of 1 to 5. 
As can be seen in Figure 3 below, which illustrates the relative position of just 
the presidents interviewed, Institutions 9, 15, 18, and 42 do fall within one of the two 
"religious" quadrants. The other two who scored themselves a "5" (Institutions 4 and 
12), are situated in the "secular" side of the graph. 
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Figure 3.--Plotted coordinates of the institutions involved in the interviews. 
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There are also 6 who scored themselves a "4." Again, one of them fell within the 
comparable range on the actual scale. Indeed, 5 of the 6 were two units lower with 
scores on the actual scale ranging from 15-22. It is also interesting to note that 2 of the 
institutions that rated themselves in the "3" range actually emerged (on the basis of 
having scores from the first phase between 31 and 38) as being more church-related than 
they saw themselves. 
In short, presidential perceptions of church-relatedness were always either lower 
or higher than what was demonstrated on the basis of the criteria used in Phase One. 
However, as noted earlier, this could be attributed almost exclusively to the fact that 
different criteria were used for the self-rating and the determination made for the study. 
It would have been interesting to see if their ratings would have been closer if they had 
been asked to consider only the 10 objective criteria used in Phase One. 
With regard to the criteria the presidents identified as having been used to arrive 
at the scores printed above in Scale B, they mentioned, collectively, 40 different factors 
which they claimed contributed to such a determination. The criteria cited are listed 
below in eight groups with the frequency of times cited and the identification numbers 
of the individuals mentioning each one shown in parenthesis. After all these data were 
gathered and recorded, group headings were established on the basis of categories which 
were devised in light of the main idea or emphasis found in each comment. It should 
be emphasized that by citing a particular criterion, a president was not necessarily 
reporting that the condition existed at his institution; only that he believed it was 
appropriate to use in arriving at a determination of the church-relatedness of a college 
or university. 
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Mission and Identity 
History and Heritage (f = 5; # s 8, 10, 24, 36, 38). 
Mission Statement: Institution is committed to religious purpose and tenets of 
church body and/or Lutheran theology (f=7; #s 4, 5, 12, 13, 15, 16, 42). 
Church-related purpose proclaimed in literature (f=2; #s 4, 20). 
Church-related by choice; self-identified as church-related (f = 3; # s 8, 13, 40). 
Church Relations 
Identification with church body and a consciousness of what church-relatedness 
means (f=5; #s 8, 12, 20, 24, 38). 
Relationship of the college to congregations of the church; college seeks input 
from the church (f = 5; # s 4, 24, 36, 38, 42). 
Church perceives college as church-related (f= l; # 13). 
Church body expects it to be Lutheran college for Lutheran people (f = l; # 10). 
Values espoused by the president give evidence of church-relatedness (f = 2; # s 
20, 24). 
President participates in national and regional church gatherings (f = 1; # 4). 
College hosts church conventions and gatherings (f= l; # 4). 
College addresses the issue of church-relatedness in a scholarly way, e.g., with 
task forces and outside speakers (f = 2; # s 20, 36). 
Church-relations position on staff (f = 1; # 38). 
Ownership and Governance 
Board members must be church members (f=8; #s 5, 9, 13, 15, 16, 20, 39, 40). 
Church body elects governing board (f=5; #s 5, 15, 16, 24, 38). 
Board members committed to church-relatedness (f= 1; # 15). 
Ownership by church (f=6; # s 5, 9, 15, 18, 20, 24). 
Operated by church including budget control (f=3; #s 9, 12, 18). 
Financial support by church (f = 7; # s 9, 10, 12, 16, 20, 24, 39). 
Personnel 
President required to be Lutheran (f=3; #s 20, 24, 38). 
Church selects president (f = l; # 18). 
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Faculty asked to support the institutional mission as a college of the church 
(f =2; # s 20, 42). 
Preference in hiring members or desire to have strong representation or maintain 
a credible presence of church members (f = 8; # s 9, JO, 13, 15, 16, 24, 36, 40). 
Religion faculty is Lutheran (f = l; # 20). 
Church approves all hiring of faculty (f = 1; # 18). 
Campus Climate 
The nature of interrelationships and how people view each other on campus 
(f= l; # 15). 
Daily activities of college are done in the spirit of church-relatedness; a spiritual 
emphasis permeates the campus (f=7; #s 4, 8, 12, 20, 24, 36, 39). 
Campus climate is student-centered; care and concern for their character and 
spiritual life (f = 1; # 8). 
Students 
Religion of students or number of Lutheran students on campus (f =9; #s 5, 10, 
13, 15, 16, 20, 24, 40, 42). 
Code of conduct or behavior established by college (f = 2; # s 24, 36). 
Scholarship and financial aid for Lutheran students and ministers (f = 1; # 38). 
College is committed to diversity includes recruitment of minority students for 
ministry (f= 1; # 39). 
Ministry and Worship 
Worship practices (f=6; # s 4, 9, 15, 20, 24, 36). 
Frequency of chapel (f = 2; # s 9, 20). 
Importance of campus ministry and influence of personnel such as campus pastor 
or chaplain (f = 3; # s 13, 20, 38). 
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Curriculum 
Academic programs reflect church connection and address questions of faith 
(f=2; #s 13, 42). 
Content of religious instruction is Lutheran (f= 1; # 9). 
College prepares church workers (f= 1; # 12). 
Required religion courses (f = 5; # s 9, 20, 24, 36, 38). 
All curriculum and programs approved by church (f= 1; # 18). 
The following analysis of these data includes 1) an examination of those criteria 
which emerge as most important to the presidents, collectively, based on frequency with 
which they were mentioned, and 2) a comparison of them to the criteria used in Phase 
One to arrive at the score for church-relatedness used in the study. 
If one looks at all the criteria which were mentioned by at least five or more 
respondents, one could offer the following hypothetical profile based on an examination 
of those 13 factors: A church-related college or university is one which is owned and 
supported financially by the sponsoring denomination. It also identifies with that church 
body in terms of its history and heritage, its religious tenets and official theology (all of 
which is clearly reflected in the institution's mission statement), and relates to and seeks 
input from the congregations of the church. Members of the governing board are not 
only required to be members of the sponsoring church, they are elected to it by the 
church as well. Likewise, there is a preference in hiring and recruiting church members 
to work at and attend the college so that a strong representation and credible presence 
can be maintained. Finally, the daily activities of life on the campus reflect a spirit of 
church-relatedness. In addition to the fact that formal worship opportunities are 
frequent and play an important role in the life of the institution, students are also 
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required to take a certain number of courses in religion or theology. In short, a spiritual 
emphasis seems to permeate the campus. 
In general, if one examines the 10 items listed in Chapter 3 and used in this study 
to arrive at a determination of church-relatedness and compares it to the criteria cited 
most frequently by those who participated in the interviews, a common thread of 
emphasis can be seen running through both, particularly with regard to the Lutheran 
presence on the campus and the role that religious instruction, formal worship, and 
other forms of devotional activity play in the life of the community. 
Incidents 
Those interviewed also cited a total of 44 incidents which, in their opinions, 
raised issues of free expression on their campuses. These were grouped by the 
researcher into 8 categories with anywhere from 2 to 8 incidents in each. What follows 
is a brief description of each incident as reported by those interviewed, organized 
according to the category groupings and listed in order from the most frequent to the 
least. 
The first category is Student Newspapers and 10 incidents were cited relating to 
the campus press. They included the following: 
an article reporting the results of a sexual activity survey was censored (prior 
restraint before distribution) because it was done in bad taste; 
the letters F U C K U were arranged in a vertical acrostic in the paper, which 
resulted in disciplinary action for the students responsible; 
underground newspapers appeared and were not discouraged; 
official campus paper's articles are reviewed for content, even though 
uncontrolled underground papers are tolerated; 
the president commented that underground papers are tolerated because he 
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found that they become less frequent that way, but he believes that they really do 
not contribute to debate in any meaningful way; 
an underground newspaper began addressing the sponsoring church's position on 
various issues causing some concern to elements of the community; 
the editorials in a campus paper lead to increasingly bitter exchanges between 
students, resulting in a campus forum on the topic; 
an ambiguous cartoon in the student newspaper about abortion caused concern 
on the campus which and led to the president speaking to the responsible 
student; 
some students took offense at a newspaper editorial which resulted in a "hateful 
exchange"; 
the newspaper was criticized by many on the campus for allowing pro-choice or 
pro-gay expression in it. 
The next category of incidents in terms of frequency is called Fine Arts Issues. 
It includes the following nine situations identified by the presidents: 
A play was canceled after the first performance due to what was considered to 
be offensive content; 
theater presentations which included language offensive to some were allowed in 
spite of complaints that it was inconsistent with the values of a Christian college; 
"street language" in a literary journal which offended some local pastors was 
defended; 
complaints over certain language or situations in dramatic presentations were 
received but the practice was defended; 
a student talent-show performance was considered by other students to be in bad 
taste and the curtain was dropped on the act; 
a theater production with a realistic embrace was objected to by some, but 
allowed and defended; 
a concern was expressed over the use of nude models in art courses, but the 
practice was allowed; 
complaints were registered over theater offerings containing scenes and dialogue 
offensive to some; 
a campus literary publication containing a piece with a sexual tone and vulgar 
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language offended board members who communicated their concern to the 
president. 
The third grouping, containing eight incidents, is categorized as Racial or l lale 
Speech issues and includes the following: 
verbal sexual advances and racial statements made by African American males 
were directed to white females, resulting in the dismissal of the men involved; 
a hateful phone call was made to a Jewish student, whose African American 
roommate became offended as well; 
a swastika on a publicity poster for a dramatic production about a concentration 
camp was viewed out of context, misunderstood, and a cause of offense to many; 
derogatory language was used against an Hispanic student who perceived it as 
hate speech; 
a Confederate flag on display in a campus Civil War museum was objected to by 
local African American pastors; 
African American males at a fraternity party were called "niggers"; 
white faculty members expressed a reluctance to discuss the breakdown of the 
African American family in their classes; 
African American students indicated that they were hesitant to talk about the 
intolerance they see or experience; 
Seven incidents which were cited were classified as Gay/Lesbian issues and 
include the following: 
newspaper editorials supporting gay rights caused offense when they were 
displayed on a student's residence hall room; 
objection was expressed towards a policy which did not allow one to openly 
advocate a gay lifestyle or promote the gay movement; 
some felt it was inappropriate for a faculty member to invite a lesbian to speak 
in her class; 
a gay community group was not allowed to distribute material on the campus 
which advocated a homosexual lifestyle; 
in spite of some opposition, a gay community group was allowed to distribute 
material when it was modified to address only gay rights and not advocacy; 
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a faculty member who appeared on TV in a role which implied either his 
involvement with or endorsement of homosexuality was ultimately dismissed; 
signs addressing gay issues were put up and torn down. 
There were four incidents cited which gave rise to a category called Outside/ 
Controversial Speakers which basically consisted of occasions when a person perceived 
to be inflammatory or likely to cause offense was invited to speak on a campus and some 
objection to their anticipated presence was expressed. 
The remaining three categories each have two incidents in them. Both of the 
incidents in the first category, Abortion Protests, took place at the same institution. 
They involved a right-to-life group putting up white crosses on the campus to protest the 
fact that abortions are performed, and the display of art pieces produced by pro-choice 
people which angered the pro-life people. 
The next category is Cursing and Vulgarity and the two incidents reported here 
involve a student who used God's name in vain in a class which caused offence, 
especially when the professor did not admonish him for it, and a song with vulgar lyrics 
being sung to or in the presence of some women. 
The last category is Academic Freedom, and consists of two unrelated incidents. 
One arose when a science professor made it clear that he not only supported evolution 
but was openly critical of those who accepted the tenets of creationism. The other was 
not an incident so much as an occasion where students came to the president for 
permission to conduct a forum where the issue of academic freedom itself was to be 
discussed and he informed them that neither the forum nor the topic needed approval 
but could simply be conducted. 
On the basis of the incidents cited by the presidents, one could conclude that 
they have experienced a representative sample of free expression problems and most 
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likely were able to identify with the hypothetical incidents and issues put before them 
in the second survey for their response. 
Examples of Support for Freedom and Restraint 
Approximately 14 hours of discussion with a relatively diverse selection of 
Lutheran college and university presidents concerning the nature and limits of free 
expression in church-related institutions of higher education produced many interesting 
statements. Some were made in support of protecting and extending what was perceived 
to be an essential right for members of an academic community, but others showed no 
reluctance in asserting the need for restraint in the area of free expression. What follows 
is a sampling of some of the remarks made from both perspectives. The information that 
appears in the brackets in relation to either a president or his institution include the 
identification numbers explained earlier and the institution's type based on the 
quadrants of the graph in Figure 3. 
One president [5, Religious-Freedom] established at the outset the principle that 
guided him in his reflections and decisions on this topic. Even though he could assert 
that "the First Amendment ... surely guides us as an institution," he added that, in the 
end, "our religious principles stand stronger than that." Moreover, he declared that 
we are going to be guided by our beliefs as an institution in terms of what 
is right in terms of the Christian faith. While it may be somewhat difficult 
for some people to believe ... we have an obligation to our church ... 
and there isn't going to be any question where the institution stands. 
Demonstrating how easy it is to hold seemingly contradictory positions on the 
matter, however, the same president moved back to a pro-expression position by 
pointing out that 
part of your existence in the world is to understand where other people 
are coming from. Even if you don't agree with them you have to 
understand them, and unless you investigate and listen to some open 
inquiry, you're never going to get far enough in order to exist in a positive 
way in our very pluralistic society. 
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Ultimately, in what seems to be an attempt to reconcile the two views, he concluded, 
"We, in our very limited way, try to maintain our commitment to the liberal arts and 
open inquiry." 
He also pointed out, however, that "there are limitations whether we are at the 
most liberal institution in our country or the most conservative." The difference, it 
appears, hinges on the nature of one's values and how one views right and wrong. He 
is familiar with graduates of his institution who have gone on to large state universities 
and have had their expression limited by "professors [who] just totally disallow the 
discussion to take place in their classroom" if the topic may evoke comments which 
reflect the Christian perspective. He also claims that "much of the problem we are 
having in this country is because we have artificially defined freedom of expression to 
mean 'any and all' rather than some sort of guideline of what is really right and wrong." 
Whether it is "a political correctness issue" or one coming "from the conservative side, 
... lots of discussion and freedom ... is hampered." 
Expressing support for restraint from a slightly different perspective, another 
president [ 15, Religious-Freedom] admitted to being motivated by "love and concern for 
our neighbor." Recognizing that this is likely to result in limits on expression "even 
though [the message] is true and right," he confesses to "a common sort of respect for 
... human beings that leads me to not ... say something that [will] deliberately hurt 
someone." Although his responses on the second survey resulted in one of the highest 
scores in support of free expression, this president's interview continued to emphasize 
the balance that is necessary in these matters. He states, "In the exercise of our freedom 
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of expression, one of the facts that we may have to consider at times is 'How is this 
really going to affect somebody?"' 
Recognizing also that there is risk involved in trying to maintain the proper 
balance, this president asserted that "there would be a readiness on the part of the 
institution to take some risk." Evidence of this is his unwillingness "to say that 
everybody who comes to this campus has to hold to either our theological or politically 
correct point of view." Ultimately, however, he seems to see freedom of expression as 
merely one of many "important principles" which are 
hedged about by a whole range of other things that we believe strongly as 
well: respect for human beings, treating people with dignity, not 
destroying other human beings emotionally or psychologically or 
physically or morally or spiritually. And if I respect those things, then it 
will also inform the kinds of decisions that I make. 
The president of the most secular and also the most free institution [39], 
according to the scores derived from the first two phases of the study, affirmed in his 
interview the impressions left in the surveys. Commenting on whether their should be 
different standards for different kinds of institutions, this individual stated, 
1 would say the same thing with regard to a church-related academic 
community as I would to a non-church related academic community. I 
don't think there are any canons of freedom of expression that are more 
absolute than absolutes; either you are completely committed to it or you 
are not committed to it, church-related or not. 
Yet, even this strong language gave way to the following small concession. His closing 
sentiment, however, was made in support of tolerance and the free market approach to 
expression. 
I guess there is some point at which the absolute guarantee of freedom of 
expression is that people may express themselves freely so long as they 
don't interfere with other people's freedom of expression; that is, keep 
other people from speaking. And so long as they do not cause or tend to 
cause physical harm to other people or prohibit ... other people's 
opportunity, then, if it's phony, if it's untrue, if it does not conform with 
181 
reality, it will die a natural death. 
Another president I 42, Religious-Freedom l, in the context of a strong statement 
in support of free expression, pointed out not only that things should be different al the 
church-related college but also that there are other values competing with free 
expression that require one to balance them. Raising the question himself he asked: 
"But does our church-related character shape our threshold [of tolerance for valueless 
expression]?" His answer: 
On a church-related campus it ought to, but you also have to keep in 
mind that while our central values, as institutions, relate to openness and 
inquiry and the pursuit of truth, ... there is a second value that is equally 
important ... and that is the education of students; and openness is not 
the only value related to that task. 
We have an educational responsibility to those students which, if 
it is harmed by perhaps what is an unfortunate or overzealous term for 
one person's right to do their thing, then I wonder about the wisdom of 
leadership in that setting. It seems there are no easy answers here, 
conceivably, on some issues, and you have to make the best judgment 
possible, and the judgement may not be perfect, but one ought to keep in 
mind those two values and not just the one. 
Picking up on this theme later, and also demonstrating a sensitivity to the 
perceptions of presidential power, he pointed out that 
not all ideas are equal and there is such a thing as nonsense. I mean, 
we're talking about the pursuit of objective truth, and ... maybe there's 
a time to just call nonsense, nonsense, and I suppose if the president does 
that it becomes quite intimidating and that might be seen as limiting 
expression. 
This president also addressed the issue of the limits often imposed on expression 
in the public sector when students' comments which reflect the "values growing out of 
their faith ... [are] responded to in a derisive way." The frequency with which he has 
heard of these incidents has led him to conclude that, in spite of the fact that 
we talk about the church-related college ... being a place where 
expression is limited, it may be that -- given the character of our society 
right now -- this may be the place where free expression is perhaps most 
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able to be practiced, at least for people of faith. 
Yet another responJent [13, Secular-Freedom) asserted both the import,1rnce of 
free expression as well as the need for some limits and the process of balancing that must 
be used to reconcile the two. He noted that "we uphold freedom of expression on the 
one hand, but on the other hand, if it violates or makes it uncomfortable, in some 
serious way, on the members of the community, then at that point we would weigh the 
issue." 
This particular president also addressed in an eloquent way an important point 
made in the literature review regarding the Lutheran tradition of open and free inquiry: 
I think we really have built in, as a Lutheran institution, a tradition of 
freedom of inquiry. I mean, I begin the discussion [with prospective 
faculty members] by talking about Luther and the fact that it was in a 
university community that he found freedom to search for the truth as he 
felt he was drawn to do, and then to express the results of his work. And 
it was Luther who really engaged the culture and church of his day in a 
kind of open debate. His attitude was really ... , 'Let the argument 
begin and let the truth prevail. Let the argument lead us to the truth 
because in this truth we find out a new thing about God.' And so I have 
a marvelous sense of that tradition of freedom of expression in a 
Lutheran-related academic community and take every opportunity to 
articulate it and celebrate it. I think it's one of the keystones for this 
institution and others like it. 
Prominent themes in the views of the next president [9, Religious-Restraint) 
included the tension and the need for balance which are inherently connected to the 
notion of a church-related academic community. Throughout his interview, he made 
comments such as the following: 
On this campus . . . we have tried to be open to people taking a 
contradictory point of view and having the chance to work that through 
and believing . . . that it is an important and integral part of the 
educational process .... 
So long as the expressions are contained within our campus community, 
I'm pretty generous in allowing people to grapple with things .... 
An academic institution has been constituted for the very reason of 
searching for the truth, so I see academic inquiry as an education, as 
distinct from indoctrination, and I see the role of the college or the 
university to provide religious instruction that is persuasive in its · 
character but does not preclude the opportunity for the members of the 
academic community to raise a question or to engage in an honest search 
for understanding. I think if that is disallowed on the campus, l am not 
sure that, in my definition, such a campus would qualify to be called a 
college or university but perhaps would be some kind of a ... Bible 
college or something like that. 
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But in light of all the support for expression, this individual felt that an 
"underlying question" is whether 
the student or a faculty member, or the president of an institution, or a 
member of the board of regents -- do those individuals have a 
responsibility over and against the church and the word of God that that 
church represents, which should place constraint upon what they might 
otherwise feel free to do? I believe the answer is "Yes" to that. I believe 
that once a student chooses to enroll in an institution like ours that does 
take a strong and very forthright confessional posture over against the 
word of God and the Lord Jesus Christ -- that student has placed himself 
or herself under certain constraints, and has done so voluntarily and 
needs to, in the practice of one's life, needs to honor such a commitment. 
That's not to say that students don't have the right to pursue issues of 
curiosity and question. I think academic pursuit -- legitimate academic 
pursuit on the one hand -- needs to be distinguished from a conscious 
deliberate attempt to inflame or to insult. Yes, that can be seen as a 
freedom of expression, but I don't think that's the same as academic 
freedom; or I would distinguish between academic freedom, on the one 
hand, and First Amendment rights or freedom of speech on the other, 
and I would place parameters on First Amendment rights when one 
voluntarily associates with a church-related college. 
In the end, he claimed that "the role of the educator" is to use one's freedom to 
teach, "and yet not be flagrant about such freedom." Moreover, "there's a certain 
balance that the representative of the gospel must take, particularly when such an 
individual serves in an academic setting, where young people are trying to grow and 
develop understanding." 
It was obvious that the next president [I 2, Secular-Restraint] had given serious 
thought to the tension that exists inherently in being a college of the church. To set the 
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tone for his interview, he made the following statement at the outset which belies his 
"secular" label: 
I know there is always potential for faith and knowledge to come into 
conflict. My position is that at that point faith has to supersede 
knowledge because I think that faith is finally the truth and knowledge is 
going to be changing, evolving, developing; and so, I encourage the 
instructors here to explore knowledge because we want them to be as 
informed as possible and whatever kind of research and so on that is 
required, so be it. But at the point at which the research does come into 
conflict with the faith that we hold as a religious community, then I 
expect them to allow faith to supersede that knowledge. 
He also saw "changing attitudes" as part of the mission of the college. He 
realized, however, that one cannot do that in a meaningful way by forcing only one 
viewpoint upon the students or without helping them to learn how to distinguish between 
good and bad ideas. Sounding somewhat restrictive, but certainly not the most 
supportive of restraint (although he was), he concluded, 
I don't think that I'm going to get anywhere trying to change attitudes if 
we just squelch discussion of the issues. And so, we have not done that. 
. . . We have to deal with them and we have to help students learn how 
to deal with them. That does not mean that I have to signal some kind 
of support for those positions by allowing advertising in the school paper. 
It is interesting to contrast the position of the previous president from a college 
on the East Coast (where expression is often thought to be more open) who openly 
supports restraint based on the religious mission of his institution, to the following 
statement of one who presides over a more secular and free school [ 4] located in the 
Midwest (usually thought to be more restrained): 
I don't really think there should be any difference between the role of 
free expression in a church-related academic community versus any other 
academic community, except that, in the church-related academic 
community, l think you do have the added element of our sense of value, 
our respect for the individual that adds a dimension to the civility of that 
relationship. So in that sense, I think we go beyond it, but I would 
certainly hope that we find as much free expression on any campus as we 
would the church-related .... [J]ust because we're church-related should 
not make us different. The only thing that makes us different is how we 
approach the total subject of education and the value judgements that are 
involved in that. So, I think there's a big difference in the educational 
environment at a church-related college and that certainly affects the 
respect and those things that enter into the freedom of expression. 
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One would think, on the basis of those remarks, that he would have had a score more 
reflective of greater support for expression, but he barely made it over the line between 
freedom and restraint. 
Joining him is another (8, Secular-Freedom] who also did not believe that much 
should be made of the fact that a college happens to be church-related, at least with 
regard to the role that free expression should play on a college or university campus. 
In his case, however, his score on the Freedom-Restraint scale reflected that attitude. 
I think that expression does have to be free there as in any other kind of 
academic community. I would not favor limiting the expression even 
though much of what is said I might disagree with [or] ... find silly or 
obnoxious. That is part of, after all, an academic enterprise. People are 
able to say what they think and have their ideas tested, and in the course 
of discussion and debate try to arrive at something more closely 
approximating the truth of the matter. So, I see no essential difference 
between a church-related college and a non-church-related college, as far 
as expression is concerned. . . . I do think that there does come a time 
when the line should be drawn, but I don't know that that decision should 
be made any differently in a church-related school as compared with a 
secular school. I do think that when speech goes to the point of inciting 
physical violence where persons or property might be seriously hurt or 
damaged, then [some] ... authority has to step in and say, "This has gone 
too far." 
It is interesting to note that while he is supportive of some restraint, it apparently is not 
because of anything that has to do with the church-related nature of the institution. 
Moreover, this position is taken even by some of the presidents of the more "religious" 
institutions. 
The president of the next institution [40, Religious-Freedom] believed that most 
people would ultimately support the restraint of something; it is just that they disagree 
as to what that should be. 
There is a constant pressure, depending upon what one perceives as being 
agreement with one's ideological positions, as to whether it should or · 
should not be permitted; and I find it to be interesting that people, both 
on the political and religious left, as well as on the political and religious 
right, have basically the same set of assumptions; namely, that some things 
ought to be banned and some things out to be included. It's just that they 
disagree on what those things are. 
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He explained, without hesitation, that certain kinds of expression can be subject 
to restraint at his institution. The particular example he cited happened to deal with 
demonstrations, but he suggested that the principle employed in this type of case is 
applied universally. 
[W)e certainly would not speak out against students if they were to stand 
out in front of my office, for whatever reason, if they were to do it 
without damaging anything and without interfering with the work-a-day-
world of the people who work in my facility. They could do that for the 
whole year if they wanted to. As soon as they ... get in the way of 
people doing their jobs or make it impossible for people to go to class or 
are disruptive of classes -- at that stage of the game we move into a 
different kind of behavioral response, and we could perhaps seek an 
injunction, we perhaps could put them before a judicial committee here 
on campus, and ultimately suspend or expel. So, we do have limitations 
on one's expression. 
He then went on to explain how he understands the nature of the tension that 
exists for colleges of the church. 
It seems to me that the struggle here is that, on one hand, when the 
church is feeling anemic, or when the university or college is feeling 
anemic, and feeling that Christianity is being buffeted on every side, and 
every wind of doctrine is being contemplated as being a possibility, when 
the church gets into a kind of siege mentality (and again I'm trying to use 
that term pejoratively), ... when the church or the institution feels under 
siege, then what tends to happen is that the draw bridges will get pulled 
up and the walls will get built higher to protect the church or the 
institutions from the infiltration from the barrage from the outside. On 
the other hand, when the institution or the church feels strong about 
itself, it tends to lower the walls and lower the draw bridges. And it 
seems to me that at this particular point in time, that -- given the 
overriding power of human secularism and rejection of the Christian faith, 
and the kind of things that people perceive in the lack of being able to 
have prayers in public functions and all other kinds of things -- that a lot 
of people see the church, and Christian (Lutheran, Calvinist, whatever) 
colleges and universities understand that there is a tendency to want to 
raise the walls higher and draw the draw bridges back up again. But in 
that very process, there is also the potential admission that the church or 
that the doctrine of the church, or that the affirming message of the 
biblical record cannot make it in a society in which it must compete for 
the affections and the sympathy and the support of people. And the only 
way the church is going to -- and the gospel is going to exist is if somehow 
or another, it has special protection. And that, in itself, is a very 
interesting admission, or very interesting fear. It's like one guy that I read 
once, when talking about his reaction to people who feel that Scripture 
has to be protected, said, "My view is that my attempting to protect 
Scripture is like my walking down the street with a lion on a leash, and 
I'm there to protect the lion;" his point being that if Scripture is so 
anemic that it cannot function for itself -- then, my gosh, what have we 
got? -- and it puts a tremendous amount of responsibility on me and I've 
arrogated to myself the role of God, etc. So, there's a real tension here 
that when one becomes overly protective of the Christian message and the 
Christian faith, [as well as] what it implies about one's faith in and one's 
perceptions about the viability and the power of the gospel and of the 
biblical message. 
So, in my own case, I constantly struggle with this, but I'm not of 
a mind, personally, if you feel it's my task to arrogate to myself a fourth 
place in the Godhead and somehow or another imply or believe that 
without me and my efforts the message will not be productive. Now, 
that's different, however, from saying that I believe very strongly that it's 
my task to share the message, reclaim the message, to witness on behalf 
of the message. But witnessing on behalf of and sharing is different from 
the mentality of protecting, if you follow what I'm saying. 
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Another (38, Secular-Freedom] who also saw the tension and was forced to 
struggle with the controversy brought an administrator's eye to the situation, as well, by 
acknowledging the need to avoid the kind of legal controversy that could result by either 
those who are offended or those whose expression is restricted. He suggested that, at his 
institution, 
What we always have to do is ... try to balance these things in terms of 
potential exposure to ... future litigation. But that doesn't mean that you 
cut and run and hide under the rug. What we would probably do, at a 
certain point, is simply say that this is offensive and take it down ... on 
the grounds that it's insulting and demeaning to a particular class of 
people. 
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Further acknowledging the perplexing nature of the matter, he continued, moving 
from a pragmatic concern about liability to a rather philosophical approach that seemed 
to seek resolution in some sort of vague relativity. 
[I]t's really a tough issue between freedom of speech and action and 
trying to insure that the speech and action is appropriate to the kind of 
community that you're trying to create or trying to sustain. One doesn't 
want to be unnecessarily restrictive because that sets up all kinds of 
problems too. Yet one doesn't want to be so unrestrictive that one creates 
the impression that ... you know, anything goes. So you're sort of in that 
very grave situation of ambiguity, and l think probably sometimes the best 
way to face some of these things is existentially; you know, life is full of 
ambiguities, and there is no ready answer to some of it, no ready way of 
dealing with it, and I sometimes wonder if we could move more in that 
direction if we would sometimes diffuse some of these rather sharp 
irreconcilable either/ors between control of speech and action and free 
speech, and freedom to act on the other side. Those things seem to be, 
you know, sort of win/lose situations at best, and somehow we've all got 
to get to a place ... [where] it really is kind of win/win where everybody 
says, "Yeah, this is the best way to go because we all come out the better 
for it;" ... and not where making a choice for one thing automatically 
means something else is going to go down the tubes, either free speech or 
the college's integrity. 
One very new to the presidency [16, Religious-Freedom] has found the move 
from the life of scholarship and critical exchanges (which he truly relished), to that of 
full-time administration at the highest level, to be somewhat frustrating. He stated, "It's 
assumed on this campus that controversial issues not only can be discussed, but must be 
discussed. But there's an uneasiness, I think, in [the church body]." In reference to the 
Lutheran tradition of open inquiry, he commented, "I often say that we should be the 
ones that are the best. We were born posting theses for debate." Nevertheless, he was 
somewhat disappointed to find that 
Students are not really into debate . . . . They want a very firm, almost 
catechetical view of life. College is tough because it challenges 
assumptions. So, I think we have to develop an atmosphere in which we 
encourage debate and permit people to say what's on their minds, and 
develop the kind of security around them for people to change their 
minds. If you're being attacked all the time, then you can't change your 
mind. But if you can just have a free exchange of ideas with friends, then 
you can walk away and say, "Gee, thanks 'cause I really learned 
something and I'm going to change my mind on that." 
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Commenting, as did several others, on the difference between church-related 
higher education and its public or secular private counterparts, he observed that 
We have more freedom of expression on this campus than a lot of public 
universities. I taught at ... Purdue ... , I taught at UC [University of 
California], I taught at Princeton, and there are certain topics in a public 
university where you have to be very careful; you have to be politically 
correct. 
This individual is also an ordained Lutheran minister and the following comment 
revealed the pastoral theology he employs in his approach to the topic under study. 
I think free expression in the church-related academic community is an 
essential. It must be there, but probably needs to be done with Christian 
love. We want to protect the right to explore ideas, but not to destroy 
weak-faced or struggling people either. And there I would say we use 
common sense in a number of ways. If I have a friend who is overweight, 
I have a right to say, "Gee, you're fat." But I wouldn't do that, even if I 
thought it was a health-threatening thing. I might try to find subtle ways 
to encourage that person to deal with the issues that cause that. I think 
on a Christian campus we must have freedom of expression. We must 
also deal with that in love. 
The next president [24, Secular-Freedom] also seemed to acknowledge the value 
of establishing a "caring community," and the need for occasional restrictions on 
expression to do that. But he also recognized that one doesn't materialize by itself. 
Ultimately, this president, like the previous respondent, saw the matter in terms of love 
for others, but he emphasized more the fact that it may simply be a matter of good 
manners when he noted that 
it's an effort to be ... a caring community where the emphasis is on 
education and caring and that we don't hurt each other ... intentionally, 
and if [it happens] unintentionally, that we learn from those experiences. 
. . . What we're really talking about is good manners; we're not talking 
about restriction of freedom of expression, but good manners .... I think 
that the colleges all have responsibilities to encourage good manners, 
respectful relationships between people; that there are ways of ... dealing 
with either youthful stupidity or youthful indiscretion, or even with 
misguided hatefully motivated behavior of various kinds, even verbal 
behavior that you can deal with in various ways. To have either laws 
prescribing or specifically protecting the right to say and do, or perhaps 
to specifically say, whatever one wants to say -- it seems to me that we 
already have the First Amendment. I mean, we have other kinds of laws 
already in place .... 
I think there [is] certainly, particularly in a college [ of] the church 
(the Lutheran Church in our case), the sense that we are each our 
brothers' and sisters' keepers, and we do care, and we do have 
responsibility to treat each other in an open, loving, caring manner. All 
those things can be communicated in many ways .... The addition of a 
speech code or similar kinds of codes which restrict freedom of 
expression, I think, should be unnecessary; ... and, not just unnecessary. 
I think they are inherently unwanted and inappropriate. 
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Having dismissed the need for specific codes or policies which regulate 
expression, this president then addressed the issue of whether the Christian character of 
the college is what should determine the civil behavior he expects to see. Ultimately, 
however, that is not to be a significant factor in how free expression is understood at his 
institution. 
I think we have, by making claims to be church-related, ... the notion 
that we somehow have, within our mission statement, the true 
understanding of the Christian faith and sense of comm unity, an 
appreciation for diversity and all of that. So the Christian openness -- all 
those things, I think -- affect the culture and the way we relate to each 
other, the way we treat each other, and how we talk to each other, and so 
on. So, I think that that does have an impact in terms of, perhaps, what 
speech codes or other codes that you might feel are necessary to have. 
But then, ... when you're talking about an academic institution, you're 
talking about an academic institution whether it's secular or whether it's 
church-related .... 
The basic principle of freedom of speech and the freedom of, or 
the responsibility to search for truth, wherever it might lead you, is one 
that is firmly entrenched at [ this college], and I did not see any conflict 
[ with us] as a church-related college and even as a Christian College. 
Affirming the label imposed by his placement in the graph, the president at the 
next college (18, Religious-Restraint], when asked how he would rate his own institution 
on a scale of 1-5, where 5 is very church-related, said that it was a "5 +, or 5 going on 
8." Because of that, he continued, 
my view ... of free expression on this campus ... would probably be 
much more narrow than what it might be in many other institutions. 
. . . I think ... the most important things which lead us toward that is 
simply starting with Scripture; what God views as acceptable and, I think, 
unacceptable. 
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He is also able to recognize, however, that one need not depend on the Christian or 
church-related nature of the place to bring behavior to a higher standard. Like the 
previous president, he saw it as a matter of manners or, as he called it, "good taste." 
I think many times as I work with students ... who may have been 
unhappy about this thing or that, I have, at times, said, "This has nothing 
to do with being a Christian. This has nothing to do with being a disciple 
of Jesus Christ." I think this is just plain a question of what is good taste 
socially, and what isn't, and so while, if people are using vulgar language, 
using racial slurs and all that, while some would like to pull out the 
Handbook of Synod or [ the Lutheran] Confessions, if they could find 
something on it in there, or Scripture -- while I don't object to it, I try to 
talk to them as a person to another person, and say, "I would object to 
this even if I were not a Christian. . . . I think that's uncouth and it's not 
showing good taste, common sense, or what have you." 
The next president [10, Religious-Restraint], however, went specifically to 
Scripture for direction, and confessed that 
one of my guiding principles ... over the years as an administrator has 
been to try to follow the example of St. Paul in the sense of saying, "If 
you know something is going to give offense to someone else, don't do it." 
And part of the issue then is trying to make that kind of determination, 
and that would be true with expression as well. If I know that something 
l'm going to say is going to offend somebody, going to upset somebody, 
hit on an area of sensitivity that is inappropriate, then I should just not 
say it even though I may have the right to say it. 
Nevertheless, he then went on to express that, as far as the institution is concerned, it is 
necessary to tolerate some offensiveness for the sake of the educational process. Citing 
a particular example, he elaborated. 
There was some language used [in the student newspaper] that some 
people thought was really quite inappropriate, but again officially, as an 
institution, we let it happen because ... we feel that pretty wide freedom 
of expression is okay. This is the place to do that in an academic 
community, and ... as anybody knows who is involved in trying to do 
morals education or values education along side of academic things, ... 
there's that fine line to walk. 
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As both his response to the survey question on the issue and the following quote reveal, 
this president seemed to draw his line between the classroom discussion and the campus 
demonstration. Incidently, he was one of only 7 among the 40 who agreed on that item 
( # 14). 
believe that any opm1on can be expressed within the context of a 
classroom where it is a structured academic setting. That's the place to 
ask questions, to form opinions, to seek out the truth -- all those laudable 
kinds of things we talk about in higher education. But when it's moved 
outside of the formalized academic structure, and you would have, like, 
a political rally, for instance, being formed -- which is really more for the 
sake of advancing an individual, or an individual's opinion outside of the 
structure -- then, I think that's inappropriate. That's disruptive to the 
educational process .... [T]here's protected speech within the structure, 
but outside it the institution has some rights too. So, while it would be 
appropriate to have a discussion about pro-choice issues, let's say, the 
right-to-life issues within the context of the classroom, whether it's a 
sociology class or a theology class or whatever. But because we are 
church-related and we have a specific stance on that issue that we try to 
stand for, it would be inappropriate for a group of students to try to hold 
a rally out in front my office advocating pro-choice. 
Clearly, he and his colleague from Institution 40 differ on the propriety of this means 
of expression. 
Commenting specifically on the nature of expression in a church-related 
academic community, he said, 
I think it is possible to be strongly church-related without being parochial. 
I'm using parochial, I guess, in a very negative connotation, as being very 
narrow-minded, almost fundamentalist in viewpoint; everything is black 
and white. We set up fences to keep the rest of the world out. ... [But] 
church-related doesn't have to be parochial. You can be a part of the 
community, but at the same time, you're willing to stand up for values 
and beliefs that you believe are important. So that for us, as a church-
related institution, you would never apologize that we are Christ-
centered; that we are willing to stand up and say that the basic precept of 
understanding and operation on this campus is driven by the fact that we 
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believe that Jesus Christ died and rose for our sins. It doesn't matter if 
you're Lutheran or not, that is what we believe, and that we believe that 
impacts every part of your life; but that's not being parochial. 
The score of Institution 36 [Secular-Freedom] on the scale of church-relatedness 
was one of those situated very close to the "secular" end. Nevertheless, its president 
demonstrated in his remarks that he finds it "reasonable" for "a college of the church" 
to take a more ''dogmatic position" when it comes to the matter of questionable 
expression: "I don't think there is anything wrong with a college having some limitations 
in light of its traditions and the church to which you are related." He stated that it is 
his "personal view," however -- suggesting, perhaps, that he does not view his institution 
primarily as "a college of the church" -- that, in general, 
freedom is to be preferred over constraint and that successful institutions 
are ones that have a character which encourages -- in the vast majority of 
cases, successfully encourages -- courtesy, respect, reasonableness; but in 
which people have the freedom to act unreasonably, uncharitably, 
discourteously. And in the process of being in that institution, they 
become imbued with a willingness to be supportive of the values of 
respect for others, appreciation for the views of others, openness to the 
concerns of others, but at the same time, they become clear and 
committed to views that fall out of the tradition of the institution. 
He also recognized, however, that one must use his or her judgement as each case arises. 
He cited one incident which involved the posting of intimidating signs on a student's 
residence hall door where 
we intervened to try to see ... whether we could find out who posted it 
and to try to help that person deal with what struck us as potentially 
dangerous feelings, although that's one area in which it's not entirely clear 
what the right position should be as to what you can say. Our feeling is 
that you can't say that; and at the same time we might lose a case in court 
if we undertook to say that you can't say that. But that's a risk we'd be 
willing to take, and where we find such a thing we would remove it and 
where we find a person who's been involved in such a thing and we would 
counsel and attempt to put substantial pressure on the person to change 
from that course of action. . . . Our view would be that that's an 
intimidating act and there's damage to the person who is intimidated, and 
that that damage is outweighed in the balance of issues and should not be 
allowed, and that [ the] damage outweighs the consideration of freedom 
of speech. It's conceivable that our action in such a case could depend 
somewhat on the specifics of the circumstance, whether the person 
involved, the person who was being attacked, as it were, was, in fact, a 
person who was being injured in that process. But in this instance, our 
sense was that there was an injury being done, that it was an injury that 
was, or if it should continue, it was an injury that would be consequential, 
and the risk of limiting freedom of expression and the consequences of 
taking that risk were outweighed by the risks of allowing the behavior to 
continue. But that's a judgement call. 
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The last president (20, Secular-Restraint] to be discussed clearly appreciated, but 
was concerned about, the tension that is inherent in an institution that purports to be 
"both ... a learning community and ... a college community of faith." On the one 
hand, while admitting that "I tend to err on the side of supporting people's rights to an 
opinion and to expressing that, so long as it doesn't result in the denigration of others," 
he still had, on the other hand, 
a great deal of difficulty establishing how far one dare go. And how, you 
know, I haven't found an instance yet in which I have been moved to say, 
"Okay, that's it; you can't go any further." But I suspect that I would if 
there were displays of, you know, copulation on stage. I expect I would 
say, "That's gone too far." ... I'm not very inclined, l think, to restrict 
the pursuit of issues that may be sensitive, may even be very offensive to 
some group. I guess what l would be concerned about is whether the 
conclusion is warranted. 
By way of conclusion to this section, a comment by one of the veteran presidents 
interviewed [13] is useful in summarizing the issue and then providing a sensible 
perspective. He could have been speaking for several of his fellow presidents when he 
observed that 
the fact that we are church-related and that we take the Confessions of 
the church seriously will always open us to a question of criticism about 
"Can you be an academic institution and be a church-related institution 
at the same time?" But l think that question is probably a good one to 
raise periodically in the life of these institutions, but I guess coming out 
of the kind of Lutheran family that we do, we have a very good position 
from which to work our way through that kind of question. 
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Sharing a similar sentiment, the president of institution 40 used the occasion to 
quote from a 1992 work by the Lutheran scholar, Jaroslav Pelikan, Sterling Professor of 
History at Yale University (who was also the keynote speaker at the LECNA meeting 
where the second survey was administered). Entitled The Idea of the University: A Re-
examination, this president felt that the following statement was appropriate to include 
in the record. Speaking of the university, Pelikan wrote, 
"What is needed is the skill and the art of holding views strongly and yet 
respecting views that are diametrically opposed. This skill is one with 
which diversity has had rich experience and involves a civility of 
discourse that is all too often overlooked in discussions of free speech 
inside and outside the university. Civility in discourse is sometimes 
treated as though it were, at best, an arbitrary convention and hypocrisy, 
at worst. But the discourse that goes on within the university may serve 
as the most impressive exhibit available to prove that civility is, in fact, 
the best means that human reason has devised over the centuries of 
warfare and aggression for coping with fundamental differences." 
In the opinion of the president who read this passage in the interview, what 
presidents of Lutheran colleges and universities should try to do is 
keep people focused upon the fact that there can be and are differences 
of opinion, and those differences of opinion need to be debated 
vigorously and strongly, but they need to be done with civility ... in such 
a way that you honor your opponent as well as honor yourself. 
From the foregoing, a number of themes emerge but the predominant one seems 
to be that it is seen to be important, at many of these institutions, to balance the value 
of free expression with other values such as Christian love, civility, good taste, and a 
sound education. To the extent that one's exercise of the rights deriving from the First 
Amendment comes into conflict with those, the interview group seems to be willing to 
entertain certain limitations. Even the six who claimed in their responses to item 3 in 
the second survey that "[T]he First Amendment's right to free expression should be 
considered an absolute right," all seemed able to think of certain situations during the 
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interviews where they could support restraint. 
Nevertheless, in their attempt to bring a balanced approach to the matter, many 
statements supportive of open inquiry and tolerance for unpopular ideas were expressed. 
At least three presidents even pointed out how the Lutheran tradition, from an historical 
perspective at least, is actually quite characteristically inclined, especially in an academic 
community, to pursue the truth by any means, one of them noting that the Lutheran 
Church was "born posting theses for debate." 
Several made comments about the problems inherent in viewing Lutheran and 
public institutions as the same when it came to expression. Item 19 in the second survey 
stated: "Lutheran colleges and universities should always follow the same standards for 
expression as public colleges and universities." When the responses to this statement 
were consulted for only those who were interviewed, it was found that 13 of the 17 
(76.5%) did not support following the same standard in the two sectors. While not all 
of them commented on that point in the interviews, two completely different reasons 
were offered for this lack of support. One was seemingly based on the fact that, as 
Christian institutions, certain things that the First Amendment might force a public 
university to tolerate would be inappropriate in a Christian community. In other words, 
non-support for a common standard was based on a desire to limit or restrict expression. 
Others, however, felt that to follow the standard of the public sector would, itself, 
impose unwanted limits on the expression at the Lutheran institution, especially in the 
area of religious discussions and particularly in various worship activities. 
Ultimately, the general sense that seemed to emerge from the interviews was that, 
as in many dimensions of life, there is a certain element of risk involved in trying to find 
the proper distinction between and perfect balance of freedom and propriety in the area 
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of campus-based expression at a college or university of the church. In response to item 
6 in the second survey, which asserted that "Just because a person has a constitutional 
right to say something does not necessarily mean it is morally right to say it," there was 
almost total agreement. Part of the act of balancing for these presidents seemed to focus 
on the effect that it would have on those negatively affected. In other words, while it is 
possible to acknowledge, on the one hand, that a certain freedom to act a certain way 
or to express a particular unpopular idea in an offensive manner does indeed exist, many 
of these respondents are willing to defer to the existence of equally valid values which 
are rooted in the Christian ethic of love and concern for other people. This is 
reminiscent of the statement of Luther himself which appears as the epigraph to this 
dissertation: "A Christian is a perfectly free lord of all, subject to none. A Christian is 
a perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all." 
Hypothesis 
The controlling hypothesis for this study, as stated in first chapter, was that the 
attitudes of the presidents of Lutheran colleges and universities concerning the nature 
and limits of free expression on their campuses would be determined to some extent by 
the degree of church-relatedness of their respective institutions. Specifically, it was 
expected that the higher the degree of church-relatedness an institution exhibited, the 
greater support there would be for limits upon and restraint of expression on the 
campus. Conversely, the more "secular" an institution, the more support or tolerance 
there would be for expression of all kinds, including that which could be considered 
questionable or offensive. The results of the convergence of the first and second phases 
of this study, as well as the comments offered by the presidents interviewed in the third 
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phase, support this hypothesis. 
It was also expected that the responses of the presidents would likely indicate that 
offensive speech was discouraged generally as something which is antithetical to the 
religious values and missions of the institutions. That is, when expression violates those 
values, there would be a greater willingness to favor restrictions on it, in spite of the fact 
that the value of free expression would also be strongly affirmed. In short, it was 
expected that religious values do, in fact, inform a Lutheran college or university 
president's attitude of what is appropriate campus-based expression. The resolution of 
this issue can be found in the results of item numbers 21 and 22 discussed above. It will 
be recalled that while the sample, as a group, did indeed acknowledge a clear distinction 
between certain kinds of expression and the religious values of their institutions, they 
were also, on the whole, quite reluctant to prohibit or punish expression to any great 
extent. It must also be remembered, however, that there was a tendency for presidents 
of the more church-related institutions to be more inclined to take a more restrictive 
posture toward this kind of expression and respond in a more punitive way. 
It might also be said, however, especially in light of the interviews, that religious 
values were not the only values put forth as that which directs the form or tone that 
campus based expression might take. It was found, even among some institutions that 
appear to be quite church-related, that courtesy, decency, and respect -- even love, all 
possible motivating factors for people regardless of their connections with a church --
could also contribute to the kind of civility desired by many in the group. Consequently, 
while for certain individuals Christian love or other religious values may have proven 
to be an adequate incentive, these standards, as they are communicated to members of 
the campus communities, were not always couched in this language. Even the president 
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who rated his college "5, going on 8" was able to say, "I would object to this even if I 
were not a Christian." Good manners or good taste is not a virtue exclusive to church-
related people. 
Therefore, in light of the findings reported in this chapter, but particularly as 
illustrated by Figures 1 and 2 above, there does seem to be considerable support for the 
general conclusion that presidents of the Lutheran colleges and universities which 
display a higher degree of church-relatedness indicate less tolerance for offensive or 
questionable expression, and that denominational affiliation is related to the church-
relatedness of the colleges and universities sponsored by each church body. 
Summary of Data Analysis 
In this chapter the results of all three phases of the study were reported and 
analyzed. The first phase consisted of a survey which was sent to the presidents of all 
45 Lutheran colleges and universities in the United States. It solicited information about 
both the institutions and the presidents. The responses were used to arrive at a 
determination of church-relatedness for each institution. For the 40 individuals whose 
self-selection established them as members of the sample, the scores on the scale of 
church-relatedness which was established ranged from 7 to 47. The label on the two 
extremes of this scale were "secular" for the low scores and "religious" for the higher 
scores. 
The second phase consisted of another survey which contained 48 closed-ended 
statements dealing with freedom of expression in both society and higher education. 
They also contained situations or hypothetical incidents to which the presidents were to 
share how they would respond if such were to occur on their campus. Their responses 
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took the form of agreement or disagreement on a five-point scale. These data were then 
used to establish a scale of tolerance or support for expression for each individual. The 
range of possible scores was 48 to 240. The range of actual scores of the respondents was 
92 to 214. The labels on the two extremes of this scale were "restraint" for the lower 
scores and "freedom" for the higher scores. 
The two scores representing institutional position and presidential attitude were 
then paired and plotted on a graph consisting of intersecting axes; the vertical axis was 
the scale of church-relatedness and the horizontal axis was the scale of tolerance. The 
resulting figure displayed the relative position of each institution in the form of a 
scattergram. Each institution (with the exception of two whose coordinates placed them 
on either axis) was also located in one of the quadrants of the graph and assigned, on the 
basis of the characteristics consistent with its tendencies on each of the scales, one of the 
following labels: "Secular-Freedom," "Secular-Restraint," "Religious-Freedom," or 
"Religious- Restraint." 
The hypothesis of the study was that those institutions which were more church-
related would tend to have presidents whose attitudes toward free expression were more 
restrictive. An examination of the graph affirmed that the points did tend to move from 
the upper-left quadrant of Secular-Freedom to the lower-right quadrant labeled 
Religious-Restraint. Indeed, if one were to draw a line connecting the most extreme 
cases of Secular Freedom and Religious Restraint, it would pass almost directly through 
the vertex of the two axes. 
The study was also interested in determining whether there was any pattern to 
the placement on the graph of the three largest Lutheran church bodies which sponsor 
institutions of higher education (ELCA, LCMS, and WELS). When lines were drawn 
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around the outermost points of each specific denomination, the resulting geometric 
shapes provided a vivid display of distinct and relatively self-contained clusters for each 
denomination. The 24 schools of the ELCA, as expected, were heavily (and almost 
exclusively) situated in the Secular-Freedom quadrant. The 3 WELS institutions, on the 
other hand, formed a rather tight triangle in the middle of the Religious-Restraint area. 
Interestingly, the 11 LCMS colleges and universities split into two camps. One, 
containing 8 institutions, was situated between the ELCA cluster and the WELS block 
and directly in the path of the flow of points from the upper-left to the lower-right of 
the graph. The three remaining LCMS institutions exhibited the relatively rare 
characteristics of a category which is not consistent which the hypothesis; namely, they 
were both religious and free. 
The third phase of the study produced descriptions of how the 17 presidents 
interviewed perceived the church-relatedness of their own institutions, as well as a long 
list of criteria accumulated from their assessment of what determines whether a college 
or university is church-related. These presidents also provided information about the 
kinds of incidents that have occurred on their campuses where freedom of expression 
had been an issue. Finally, their comments were analyzed to find statements of support 
for either extending the right to free expression or restricting it. Interestingly, almost all 
respondents made statements which exhibited support for both of these positions. The 
various reasons given for supporting restraint in a church-related academic community 
sometimes reflected the religious character or values of the institutions and at other 
times did not. These ranged from feeling a sense of obligation, as a Christian, to love 
one's neighbor, to the simple exercise of good manners as a contribution to the 
maintenance of civility. 
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When the data from the interviews were examined in the context of the survey 
data, it was found that the statements of the presidents in the interviews were very often, 
but not always, consistent with their responses in the surveys. 
In the next chapter the entire study will be summarized and its findings discussed. 
After stating the conclusions derived from the research, their significance will be assessed 
and the practical implications and possibilities for future research will be identified. 
Context 
CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary of the Study 
Because academic communities are places where open and free expression is 
essential to accomplish their objectives, church-related colleges and universities may be 
confronted with a potential conflict if certain types of expression occurring on their 
campuses are considered by some to be inconsistent with the mission and values of the 
institution. On one hand, people in academic communities need to be able to engage 
in open and free inquiry, to report what they find, and to state their opinions about 
those findings -- all for the sake of the production of knowledge that might lead to truth. 
On the other hand, there is a feeling by some that there should be a limit on what can 
be expressed in an institution of the church and restrictions imposed on the content of 
and means used for expression, especially if it has the potential to hurt -- or even merely 
offend -- another. To the extent that a college or university sees itself as a community 
of faith, forgiveness, compassion, and love, it is likely that these attributes, if viewed as 
primary values, could result in restrictions being imposed on expression. 
As the individual ultimately responsible for the climate that exists on the campus, 
the president of a church-related institution, therefore, must weigh the nature of 
questionable expression and consider imposing or recommending limits upon it if it 
violates the standards established by the institution's religious character. It is in light of 
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this tension, therefore, that this study addressed the following problem: Does the degree 
of an institution's church-relatedness influence its president's attitudes toward the nature 
and limits of free expression on the campus? 
Growing from this, it became the purpose of the study to determine I) the degree 
of church-relatedness for a sample of Lutheran colleges and universities; 2) the degree 
of support or tolerance that exists for freedom of expression on each campus according 
to its president; 3) the nature of the relationship between an institution's degree of 
church-relatedness and its degree of tolerance for free expression; and 4) the nature of 
the relationships that exist between the different Lutheran church bodies which sponsor 
these institutions. 
The presidents of these institutions were selected to serve as the sample for the 
study because presidents are often seen as the single most important individuals in an 
academic community and the ones who either actually have the power to -- or are 
perceived to be able to -- set the tone for the kind of environment that should be 
established for the communication and free exchange of ideas. Presidents not only 
determine the direction for their institutions; they also often embody them to a great 
degree. Presidents from Lutheran colleges and universities were chosen because the 
researcher believed that they could identify with both the Lutheran tradition of support 
for scholarship in the pursuit of truth, as well as the teachings of the church with regard 
to how people should treat one another. In other words, they would appreciate the 
significance of the tension that exists between the need for free expression and the 
problems that can arise when the freedom is abused. The degree to which the problem 
could be identified by the presidents as having theological overtones was something that 
was of interest to the researcher as well. 
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It was also believed that, because of the \ <11 ious denominational differences that 
exist as a result of American Lutheranism's historical divisions, the members of the 
sample would display a moderately diverse set of views on the relative importance of 
freedom and restraint in their responses to both closed-ended statements and open-
ended interview questions, as well as the extent to which this was viewed as a theological 
problem. 
Given this setting, and the expectation that the sample would produce results 
suggesting that a wide range exists among these institutions and their presidents on scales 
of both church-relatedness and support for free expression, the theory posited was that 
Lutheran colleges and universities exhibit characteristics which allow them to be placed 
into one of four categories corresponding to the quadrants produced when a scale of 
church-relatedness and a scale of support for free expression are made to intersect. The 
first scale ranges from "secular" to "religious" and the second from "freedom" to 
"restraint." Pairing an institution's scores from the two scales and plotting the 
coordinates on a graph produced a scattergram (see Figures 1 and 2) which 
demonstrated not only the relationship between church-relatedness and support for 
freedom of expression for each institution, but also the degree to which individual 
church bodies arranged themselves into clusters in the respective regions of the graph. 
These quadrants were designated as either Secular-Freedom, Secular-Restraint, 
Religious-Freedom, or Religious-Restraint. 
The theory, therefore, suggests that the presidents of more secular ( or less 
church-related) institutions are more supportive of free expression in higher education 
in general, and Lutheran higher education in particular, than those from institutions 
which are more religious (or church-related), and consequently less supportive, or more 
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likely to favor restraint, when it comes to offensive expression. This theory gives rise to 
another as well; namely, that Lutheran institutions of higher education tend to cluster 
together with the others from their own church bodies. 
Finally, the study provided an opportunity to examine the extent to which the 
principle of freedom of expression would be viewed as either a legal, moral, or 
theological issue; or at least one having legal, moral, and theological dimensions. These 
three categories were viewed as representing an ascending degree of intolerance as 
applied to offensive or controversial expression in a church-related campus setting. 
The primary question addressed in this study was as follows: To what extent does 
the degree of church-relatedness of the Lutheran colleges and universities in the sample 
determine or influence the attitudes of the presidents of these institutions with regard 
to the nature and limits of free expression on their campuses? The hypothesis was that 
the higher the degree of church-relatedness an institution exhibited, the greater support 
there would be for limits upon and restraint of expression on the campus as determined 
by the president. Conversely, the more "secular" an institution, the more support or 
tolerance there would be for expression of all kinds, including that which could be 
considered questionable or offensive. In short, it was believed that support for 
expression would be linked to how "secular" or "religious" an institution is. 
Methodology 
Procedures. Each one of the presidents of the forty-five Lutheran colleges and 
universities in the United States was contacted with an invitation to become a participant 
in this study. Forty of them elected to be included. 
The collection of data took place in three phases. The first phase consisted of 
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mailing a researcher-designed survey instrument to each of the forty-five members of the 
population. It solicited information not only about the presidents themselves but also 
about certain characteristics of their respective institutions. 
The second phase consisted of the distribution of another researcher-designed 
survey instrument. Copies of this were administered to some of the presidents in person 
at a meeting many of them attended. Those who were not at the meeting or those who 
did not complete it on that occasion were then mailed a copy along with a request to 
complete and return it. It consisted of 48 items to which the presidents could respond 
in one of the following ways: strongly agree, mildly agree, neither agree nor disagree, 
mildly disagree, or strongly disagree. Forty individuals ultimately responded to this 
instrument. Since all of them had also completed the first phase, these presidents 
constituted the sample. 
The third phase of the study, which was designed as a supplement to the first two, 
consisted of taped phone interviews with the seventeen presidents who had indicated a 
willingness to participate in this way. 
Data Analysis. Data were analyzed by calculating frequencies and percentages 
for all of the responses to the first two surveys. On the basis of 10 criteria selected from 
the first survey, a score of church-relatedness for each institution was determined. The 
presidents' responses to the second survey were also converted to points which gave rise 
to an institutional score representing its support for free expression. As stated above, 
the convergence of these scores produced a graphic illustration of not only the relative 
positions of each institution, but also the relationship of each church body to the others. 
Cross-tabulations were also performed on the variables from the first survey with each 
of the items in the second survey. 
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The analysis of the interview data focused on three main topics: 1) the presidents' 
perspectives of the church-relatedness of their institutions and the criteria they used to 
arrive at that determination; 2) the presidents' recollections of the incidents which had 
occurred recently on their campuses where the freedom of expression was an issue; and 
3) the presidents' approaches to reconciling the tension perceived between freedom of 
and restraints upon expression on their campuses. 
Major Findings 
Lutheran colleges and universities in the United States display a wide array of 
distinctive characteristics in spite of the fact that, with few exceptions, their presidents 
consider them to be authentically church-related institutions of higher education in the 
Lutheran tradition. Some were begun as liberal arts colleges and remain so today. 
Others have evolved from seminaries or teachers' colleges into more comprehensive 
institutions. Still others maintain an exclusive focus on the preparation of future 
workers for the sponsoring church body. The years of their founding range from the 
1830s to the l 970s, and their Lutheran enrollments go from less than 5% to 100%. 
The respondents themselves are a relatively homogenous group of individuals in 
terms of their personal characteristics, even if the institutions over which they preside 
vary a great deal with regard to their respective levels of church-relatedness. It was also 
found that the presidents' attitudes on the degree of support for freedom of expression 
extends from one extreme to the other. 
Finally, there appears to be a relationship between the church-relatedness of a 
Lutheran college or university and the extent to which its president supports either free 
expression or the restraint of expression. Moreover, when the relative position of each 
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institution is examined, a definite pattern can be seen with regard to the relationships 
that exist not only between the institutions within the three largest church bodies 
represented in the study (ELCA, LCMS, and WELS), but among those church bodies 
as well. 
More specifically, the colleges and universities affiliated with the ELCA, as a 
group, clearly tended to be the most secular and nearly the most free. Indeed, of the 24 
ELCA institutions in the sample, 20 (83.3%) were situated either in or on an axis 
bordering the quadrant labeled "Secular Freedom." On the other hand, the three 
colleges of the WELS were all found in the quadrant which represented "Religious 
Restraint." All but 2 of the 11 LCMS institutions (82%) were located in the two 
"religious" quadrants, but were split into Religious Freedom and Religious Restraint 
camps, with 3 and 6 institutions in each, respectively. (One LCMS institution was 
situated directly on the horizontal axis between freedom and restraint but was counted 
as being with the latter because it was closer to the other LCMS colleges in that quadrant 
than to the three in the "freedom" quadrant.) 
Discussion and Interpretation of the Findings 
What the findings seem to suggest, first of all, is that Lutheran colleges and 
universities differ significantly with regard to the degree to which they exhibit certain 
characteristics of church-relatedness. Some are very church-related and others only 
nominally so. This can be seen clearly in the range of scores produced in Phase One of 
the study. The most "secular" institution accumulated 7 points and the most "religious" 
had 47. While it was only one of 10 criteria used to determine the scores, the percentage 
of Lutheran students enrolled at a college or university became somewhat representative 
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of the nature of these extremes. The most secular college, for instance, had "less than 
two dozen" Lutheran students according to its president, while the one designated as 
most religious had a student body made up entirely of Lutherans. Similar figures were 
true for faculty percentages, as well, along with opportunities for worship and required 
religion courses. The tendency was for those scoring high on any of these areas to also 
be high on the others too. The converse tended to be true, as well. 
Furthermore, the most secular institutions were those affiliated with the ELCA, 
the largest Lutheran church body in the United States. With its 29 institutions (24 of 
which were in the sample), and a number of them being located in the East and the 
South where few Lutherans reside, the ELCA collectively seems not to appear, at least 
in comparison with the LCMS and the WELS, as being very church-related. This can 
also be explained, in part, by the fact that almost all of the ELCA institutions have 
existed primarily as liberal arts colleges for most of their histories, whereas those of the 
LCMS were intended, until relatively recently, to serve as schools for the preparation of 
professional workers for the church. Two of the three WELS colleges still have that as 
their sole purpose. 
The ELCA is also the result of a merger which took place in 1988 that joined 
three bodies which, themselves, had evolved as a result of previous mergers. 
Consequently, there has not been a tradition of centralized control over or coordination 
of its "system" of higher education. All the institutions of the LCMS, WELS, ELS, and 
CLC, on the other hand, are controlled quite closely by their parent church bodies. 
Perhaps for some of these same reasons, therefore, the ELCA institutions also 
seem to display less sensitivity to the concern about offensive or controversial expression, 
at least to the point of restricting it to any great degree, or feeling that it should be 
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restricted, for that matter. This is seen not only from the overall scores of its institutions 
on the scale of support for freedom or restraint but also on the basis of a number of 
representative items selected from the second survey and examined in the following 
pages to support the significance of the findings, particularly those which show the 
relative positions of the three largest church bodies. 
It will be recalled that the theoretical range of scores for Phase Two was 48-240 
and that the actual range for all members of the sample was 92-214. It was found that 
the denominational ranges and average scores of the three major church bodies were as 
follows: 
ELCA 
LCMS 
WELS 
128-214 
108-188 
92-118 
162.2 
139.1 
106.3 
If only the 8 institutions from the "restrained" camp of the LCMS are examined, its 
range is 108-144 and its average is only 125.9. In any event, the LCMS institutions are 
positioned squarely between those of the ELCA and the WELS which appear, in turn, 
as polar opposites on the continua employed in this study. 
Again, in support of the findings discussed above, if one reexamines the responses 
to a few selected items in the second survey, presented more graphically than they were 
in Chapter 4, it is possible to see how the presidents of the institutions of the three larger 
church bodies display consistent responses relative to each other. 
For example, when the denominational responses to items 30-32 are examined 
by church body, one sees a certain aspect of the "freedom" of the ELCA, the "restraint" 
of the WELS, and the mixed responses from the LCMS. This is illustrated in the bar 
graphs in Figure 4. The statements in items 30-32 were as follows: 
30. The student newspaper at a Lutheran college or university 
should be free to criticize the position taken by the sponsoring 
church body on a matter of public policy. 
31. The student newspaper at a Lutheran college or university 
should be free to criticize the position taken by the sponsoring 
church body on a matter relating to church practice. 
32. The student newspaper at a Lutheran college or university 
should be free to criticize the position taken by the sponsoring 
church body on a matter of biblical interpretation. 
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Figure 4.--Percentage of presidents from the ELCA, LCMS, and WELS agreeing with the 
statement in items 30-32 of the second survey. 
96% 73% 0% 96% 55% 0% 96% 55% 0% 
ELCA LCMS WELS ELCA LCMS WELS ELCA LCMS WELS 
#30 #31 #33 
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The collective responses to these statements are instructive because they pit the 
two key elements in the controversy under study against each other in classic fashion. 
The freedom allowed to a student newspaper could be considered a good indicator of 
the attitude toward freedom or restraint of expression. When the issue in question is 
related to an ecclesiastical concern, the two dimensions of free expression and church-
relatedness confront one another and the responses may reveal the priorities of the 
respondent on the major issue. Consistent with the general findings, the ELCA 
presidents strongly support free expression, the WELS presidents favor complete 
restraint, and the LCMS presidents are split. 
Three more statements, not arranged sequentially, but illustrative in the same way 
of the relative position of these three church bodies, are items 20, 25, and 28. They are 
worded as follows: 
20. Lutheran colleges and universities should place a higher 
priority on a person's feelings than on another's right to 
say something offensive to that person. 
25. Lutheran colleges and universities should not prohibit and 
punish expression which is in conflict with its values, but 
respond only with admonition, education, and information 
about why it opposes the position it finds offensive. 
28. The student newspaper at the institution you serve would 
be permitted to carry an advertisement for an abortion 
clinic. 
Figure 5 shows how the representatives of the ELCA, LCMS, and WELS responded. It 
should be noted that the percentages in items 20 and 25 are for those agreeing with the 
statements, whereas the percentages in item 28 represent those disagreeing strongly with 
the statement regarding tolerance for abortion advertisements. 
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Figure 5.--Percentage of presidents from the ELCA, LCMS, and WELS agreeing with the 
statements in items 20 and 25 and disagreeing strongly with the statement in item 28 in the 
second survey. 
17% 36% 67% 75% 45% 33% 21% 91% 100% 
ELCA LCMS WELS ELCA LCMS WELS ELCA LCMS WELS 
#20 #25 #28 
Once again, the responses on these items support the findings that the ELCA is 
consistently more pro-expression, the WELS more pro-restraint, and the LCMS some-
where in between. 
Finally, the last three items in the second survey were designed to determine the 
degree to which the presidents saw offensive expression as either a legal, moral, or 
theological problem. It will be recalled that this was one of the issues the study set out to 
explore. Items 46-48 state: 
46. Expression which could be considered offensive or 
defamatory because it contains a message intended to hurt 
its hearers through the use of language that is racist, sexist, 
or based on some other characteristic of the hearer presents 
a problem that is primarily legal or constitutional in nature. 
47. Expression which could be considered offensive or 
defamatory because it contains a message intended to hurt 
its hearers through the use of language that is racist, sexist, 
or based on some other characteristic of the hearer 
presents a problem that is primarily mornl or ethical in 
nature. 
48. Expression which could be considered offensive or 
defamatory because it contains a message intended to hurt 
its hearers through the use of language that is racist, sexist, 
or based on some other characteristic of the hearer 
presents a problem that is primarily theological or spiritual 
in nature. 
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The expectation was that the ELCA, being less church-related and more supportive of 
free expression would see this primarily as a legal issue to be controlled by court 
interpretations of constitutional language. The researcher then expected that the LCMS 
and the WELS would be more inclined to view this as a moral, and perhaps as even a 
theological matter, with the WELS being more definitive concerning the spiritual 
implications of this kind of behavior. At least in the last case, that is precisely what 
happened, with 100% of the WELS presidents agreeing on both items 47 and 48. What 
was surprising, however, was the high degree to which all three church bodies viewed the 
issue as primarily a moral one, including the 83% of the ELCA presidents, with only 
25% seeing it primarily as a legal issue. This is illustrated clearly on the next page in 
Figure 6. 
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Figure 6.--Percentage of presidents from the ELCA, LCMS, and WELS agreeing with 
statements in items 46-48 of the second survey. 
25% 36% 67% 83% 91% 100% 46% 64% 100% 
ELCA LCMS WELS ELCA LCMS WELS ELCA LCMS WELS 
#46 #47 #48 
In short, while the results were not exactly as expected in terms of the progressive 
and consistent matching of church body and primary philosophy, they nevertheless 
confirm the general finding; namely, that these institutions, when viewed in clusters of 
their sponsoring church, are arranged in a distinctive fashion from Secular Freedom to 
Religious Restraint. 
The third phase of the study produced descriptions of how the 17 individuals 
interviewed perceived the church-relatedness of their own institutions, as well as a long 
list of criteria accumulated from their assessment of what determines whether a college 
or university is church-related. In general, it was found that if one examines the 10 
items used in this study to arrive at a determination of church-relatedness and compares 
it to the 13 criteria cited most frequently by those who participated in the interviews, a 
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common thread of emphasis can be seen running through both, particularly with regard 
to the Lutheran presence on the campus and the role that religious instruction, formal 
worship, and other forms of devotional activity play in the life of the community. This 
was an encouraging finding because it also supports the validity of the means used to 
determine church-relatedness in Phase One. 
ln the interviews, the presidents also provided information about the kinds of 
incidents that have occurred on their campuses where freedom of expression had been 
an issue. What was striking about the findings here was the broad range of situations 
that have been addressed on these campuses. They included a wide variety of problems 
utilizing several different means of expression from traditional speech and press issues 
to matters relating to artistic expression and academic freedom. It is also interesting to 
note that some of the incidents would likely only arise on a church-related campus. 
Concerns such as cursing and creationism demonstrate the nature of the conflict possible 
when the values of freedom and propriety collide. 
Finally, when their comments were analyzed to find statements of support for 
either extending the right to free expression or restricting it, almost every respondent 
demonstrated support for both of these positions. The various reasons given for 
supporting restraint in a church-related academic community sometimes reflected the 
religious character or values of the institutions and at other times did not. These ranged 
from feeling a sense of obligation, as a Christian, to love one's neighbor, to the simple 
exercise of good manners as a contribution to the maintenance of civility. All who 
participated acknowledged at some point the fact that free expression is essential for an 
academic community. 
Because none of the presidents from the institutions of the WELS elected to 
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participate in the third phase of the study, one can only speculate as how these 
individuals would have replied to the interview questions. Based on their responses to 
the statements in the second survey and the positions of these three schools on the graph 
(see Figure 2) -- not only in terms of the quadrant in which they are situated but also 
their close proximity to each other -- one might expect that the WELS presidents 
probably would have stated opinions uniformly reflecting support for the restraint of 
expression found to be in conflict with the Christian values which serve as the basis of 
their institutional missions. 
In terms of findings that were expected and unexpected, it was expected that the 
ELCA presidents would tend to be more secular and also more free; that WELS leaders 
would tend to be more religious and also more restrained; and that those of the LCMS 
would tend to be somewhere between the other two. This was, to a great extent, what 
was found. Consequently, the data seem to support the hypothesis of the study that the 
church-relatedness of a Lutheran college and university is linked to the degree of 
support for freedom or restraint of expression on its campus. What was unexpected was 
how distinct the church bodies were from each other and how neatly these expected 
findings appeared graphically. It was also unexpected, however, that the LCMS would 
split into two distinct camps, one more supportive of freedom and the other relatively 
restrained. Moreover, it was also a surprise that the three LCMS institutions which did 
not follow the pattern of either the other eight from their own church body or the total 
sample in terms of the general flow of the plotted points, would be situated in the 
Religious Freedom quadrant of the graph. 
The combination of church-relatedness and support for free expression, while 
ultimately the ideal for a church-related academic community, in the opinion of the 
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researcher, was clearly outside the scope of the hypothesis. Jt was particularly 
unexpected that even three institutions of the LCMS would exhibit as much support for 
free expression as did those in the Religious- Freedom quadrant. 
Finally, the placement of Institution # 5 from the ELS was something of a 
surprise. The researcher would have predicted, on the basis of general perceptions of 
the institution, that it would have been situated in the midst of the WELS cluster. 
In the analysis of the data for this study, it became apparent that there were a 
number of variables which could have accounted for a president's general attitude or his 
response to a particular item which were difficult or even impossible to identify. While 
cross-tabulations of all the items from the first survey were performed with all those 
from the second survey, the small number in the sample made it difficult to isolate a 
large number of the variables to determine the degree to which they may have 
contributed to or helped explain the findings. When a pattern of any kind emerged, it 
was noted in the reporting of the results for Phase Two in Chapter 4. 
The variable, of course, which did provide a substantial amount of guidance was 
denominational affiliation, and that explains its extensive use in the analysis and the 
significant weight given to it in the discussion and interpretation of the findings. Apart 
from the general tendency for the hypothesis to have been supported, the relative 
positioning of the three larger Lutheran church bodies constitutes the most important 
funding in the study. 
As reported in the literature review, there has been only one other attempt 
(Penney, 1992) to examine institutional response to offensive expression. That survey 
of a small number of Midwestern colleges focused more on the existence of codes 
designed to regulate hate speech. Penney found that more than half of the institutions 
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in her sample had no codes and nearly two-thirds had no intention of adopting one. 
Two-thirds also stated that no desire for one had been expressed on the campuses in the 
study. 
The instrument used in Penney's study makes no mention of legal rights, moral 
wrongs, or theological concerns of any kind in its examination of campus-based speech 
codes. Neither is there any item in it which would reveal whether a respondent 
institution was church-related. Likewise, in the responses to the study's open-ended 
questions, nothing was written which acknowledged the moral or theological dimension 
of this topic. Finally, in the notes used for her presentation of the study, which were 
shared with the researcher, there is no reference to the denominational affiliation of any 
of the institutions in the study (Penney, 1992). Church-relatedness clearly was not a 
factor or a consideration in this study. 
Because that study was so different from this one, it is difficult to compare its 
findings to any focus of the present study except to say that the Lutheran presidents, to 
a great extent, also demonstrated in their comments a lack of support for or interest in 
establishing speech codes for their campuses. It was frequently mentioned in the 
interviews that such policies often create more problems than they resolve, and that 
there are other ways to deal with this matter such as education, encouragement and 
admonition. 
Conclusions 
In light of what was found in this study, a number of conclusions can be formed. 
First of all, it has become relatively clear that the issues of defining the nature of free 
expression and determining appropriate limits for it are seen as vital to an academic 
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community. Moreover, it appears to be particularly important for church-related 
institutions because they must constantly weigh each challenge to freedom of expression 
-- which is acknowledged as an essential value for accomplishing educational goals --
against what may be seen as equally precious values which are related to the religious 
mission and character of their particular academic communities. 
As a result of the subjective nature of the issues involved and the inherent tension 
that exists between what are often seen as equally compelling values, it can also be 
concluded that it is difficult to study the nature and limits of free expression at church-
related colleges and universities. It became very apparent during the course of the 
interviews that these college and university presidents appreciated the complexity of the 
dilemma posed in the study and expressed a certain amount of perplexity about the issue 
and the constant tension that accompanies it. But they also seemed to be willing to 
accept the fact that it can be, in a sense, a healthy tension which produces for their 
campuses a controversy which, in its resolution one way or the other, helps establish the 
intellectual and spiritual tone for those who work and study there. 
In any event, based on the responses in all three phases of the study, it is 
therefore possible to conclude that the extent to which a college or university is church-
related seems to affect presidential attitudes toward freedom of expression on their 
campuses. The more church-related an institution, the more support is exhibited for 
restraint of expression. The more secular an institution, the more likely the president 
is to support the freedom of expression. 
Finally, it can be concluded that within the general body of Lutheranism in the 
United States, there is a tendency for the three largest individual church bodies to 
display distinctive characteristics relative to each other, at least on the basis of the 
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church-relatedness of their respective colleges and universities and how the presidents 
of those institutions demonstrate support for either free expression or the restraint of 
expression on their campuses. 
Significance of the Study 
Given that the attitudes of the presidents of any sector of higher education, let 
alone Lutheran higher education, have not been studied on the matter of free expression, 
this study provides a starting point for further exploration on most aspects of this topic. 
It also contributes to the general literature on church-related higher education and, to 
a lesser extent, on presidential leadership in those kinds of institutions. 
Further, the study provides, through the responses of 89% of all Lutheran college 
and university presidents, a portrait of Lutheran higher education and demonstrates that 
within what may appear to be a relatively homogeneous mainline Protestant 
denomination, there is a significant amount of diversity, at least on the issue addressed 
in this study. 
In short, the study revealed the attitudes of a particular group of educational 
leaders on an important and current topic in American higher education. It 
demonstrated the differences that exist among Lutheran colleges and universities with 
regard to the varying degrees of church-relatedness they display. It also revealed some 
interesting tendencies with regard to the individual church bodies themselves. Finally, 
it provided some indication of the degree to which church-relatedness affects how 
Lutheran college and university presidents view the nature and limits of free expression 
on their campuses. 
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Limitations of the Study 
Research is motivated by a desire to understand better the object of study; to 
come closer to the truth of some issue. Survey research, however, can only ever hope 
to approximate or approach -- but never attain -- perfect understanding. Conscientious 
efforts may be expended to avoid the common problems which weaken the results of 
survey research such as interviewer bias and non-uniform conditions for the 
administration of the instruments, among others. Yet, even after taking all possible 
precautions, there is ultimately no way to guarantee that one's findings have not been 
affected by one or more of these problems. 
In the present study, a number of factors might be identified as weaknesses or 
limitations of the research. First of all, it could be pointed out that because the 
respondents had to identify themselves, it is possible that they were not as candid as they 
would have been had they been able to remain anonymous. It is possible that at least 
some of the five presidents who elected not to participate did so because of this aspect 
of the research design. It should also be noted that some of the respondents were 
acquainted with the researcher, which may have influenced their responses. 
Another data collection issue is the length of the second instrument. With only 
48 items, it could have been longer, which may have improved its internal reliability. 
It is also possible, however, that there is a greater likelihood for a shorter instrument to 
be completed and returned. 
Although the cost to do so would have been prohibitive, personal rather than 
telephone interviews may have improved the quality of the data collected in Phase 
Three. On more than one occasion, it became evident during the course of the 
interviews that the subject was distracted by things happening in his office while he was 
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responding to the questions. During one session, a president twice had to interrupt the 
interview, hang up, take a call from "a $10,000-a-year donor," and call the researcher 
back. 
It also may have enriched the study to have had a higher number of individuals 
participate in the interview phase. Moreover, it would have been preferable to have 
spent an entire week on each of the campus, interviewing and administering surveys to 
students, faculty members, and other administrators as well, to get a complete portrait 
of the role of free expression at each institution. This could then be supplemented by 
additional interviews with the executives responsible for the supervision of higher 
education from the headquarters of each of the national church bodies. 
Finally, one limitation was in the non-uniform way in which the data ultimately 
were collected, in spite of deliberate attempts to administer the surveys consistently. It 
will be recalled that the intent was to have all subjects provide their responses to the 
second survey at a meeting of the presidents, but only 25 did so necessitating the use of 
the mail for the balance of the sample. Consequently, conditions for their participation 
for this phase of the study were not the same for all subjects. Some did it in one sitting 
during a rather compressed time-frame; others may have provided their responses only 
after taking considerable time to reflect on each item. 
With regard to data analysis, it is likely that more sophisticated methods of 
statistical applications could have been employed not only with the determination of the 
concept of church-relatedness but also in the analysis of data through the use of 
regression to identify other variables which may have been significant in the formulation 
of the presidents' attitudes on free expression. 
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Implications for Practice 
From a practical perspective, this study is not only helpful in clarifying the role 
that certain religious values play in the life and practice of Lutheran colleges and 
universities; it also reveals the degree to which each institution's president has developed 
his position with regard to free use of or restraint for offensive expression on the 
campus. This provides an opportunity for institutions to reevaluate any existing policies 
or practices and, if seen as appropriate by individual campus communities, to establish 
new ones which address the issues identified in the study. 
The study also presents a relatively clear portrait of Lutheran higher education, 
generally, insofar as it reveals the differences which exist among institutions calling 
themselves II Lutheran," as well as differences among the various church bodies with 
which they are affiliated. Theoretically, it provides one -- and possibly the only --
empirically-based conclusion relating to the ideological and theological position of the 
church bodies represented in the study. In other words, while casual observers of 
American Lutheranism may have suspected, on the basis of the respective doctrinal 
positions and public pronouncements of the church bodies represented in this study, that 
the ELCA is more "liberal" than the LCMS and the WELS, with the latter being the 
most "conservative" of the three, the study provides empirical support for that 
conclusion. 
Such a determination may be perceived as valuable to those who desire to know 
where the institutions of a given church body stand on the issue. Certainly it could be 
seen as important for the institutions and church bodies themselves to want to know 
where they stand in the event that their self-perception is different from what was found. 
It could also provoke further research by those who wish to either confirm these findings 
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or explore other issues in a similar manner. 
This research could also aid in keeping alive a discussion that has been revisited 
periodically over the years, both by the Lutheran college and university presidents 
through LECNA, and the Association of Lutheran College Faculties (a group which 
meets annually to discuss issues of mutual concern to its members); namely, what, if 
anything, is distinctive about Lutheran higher education, and how can each institution 
better facilitate the processes of teaching, learning, research, and service from that 
distinct perspective? 
As these questions are addressed, presidents and faculty members alike would be 
well advised to give some attention to the role of expression on their campuses, since the 
tension identified in the study seems genuine and has been acknowledged by several of 
the subjects as an important issue to be exploring. Representative of a number of 
remarks made during the interviews was the following: 
I think it's a very intriguing issue, and the response of my colleagues 
when I told them about this study was, "What an interesting idea." It's 
a very key kind of issue. I think with the whole political correctness 
debate, it's pretty timely. I would be one who would be interested in 
knowing more, partly because I would like to learn. I think it is such a 
fundamental issue to the academy that it seems to me as a president I 
need to ... know what other presidents think about these key issues; and 
I might be able to learn something. . . . It's been fascinating. 
While this individual may have found the experience fascinating and the issue 
intriguing, the topic itself is one that is still capable of provoking bitter tension and 
acrimonious debate. That the tension persists on these and other campuses is evidenced 
by the incidents reported both by the presidents in the study and the national media. 
That the presidents often feel caught between the competing values of freedom and 
propriety as they work to resolve the conflict on their campuses can be seen in their 
comments reported extensively in Chapter 4. 
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Institutions should be led to see the potential negative consequences for an 
academic community which consistently attempts to reconcile conflict between open 
inquiry and challenges to either religious teachings or someone's feelings by resolving 
it through the proscription of expression. On the other hand, those who study and teach 
in church-related colleges and universities must accept the inconsistency in deliberately 
attempting to harm another or in subverting the most basic teachings of the sponsoring 
church in intellectually dishonest ways. 
Finally, Lutheran educators must understand that if they want to maintain a 
recognizable and effective relationship with the church body which sponsors -- and 
perhaps to some degree supports -- them, additional dialogue should be encouraged 
between the leaders of the higher education institutions of the churches and the churches 
themselves. In short, Lutheran college and university presidents should take the 
initiative in opening more effective channels of communication with the leaders and laity 
of their respective church bodies. By employing the tools of research, critical analysis, 
and continuous dialogue, institutional leaders can help educate church members about 
the role higher education can play in the fulfillment of the church's greater mission, 
whatever they may define that to be. In the process, church leaders may also begin to 
see those who teach and learn at its colleges and universities as less of a threat to the 
truth and more as partners in the ongoing pursuit of it through means which 
acknowledge the value of both faith and reason. 
Implications for Further Research 
A number of options present themselves for follow-up or duplicate studies to the 
research reported here. For example, similar studies could be conducted with presidents 
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of 1) public, 2) private, non-church-related, and 3) non-Lutheran church-related 
institutions. It would be particularly interesting to duplicate the study with another 
specific group of institutions with a distinct affiliational identity, such as all Jesuit, or all 
Roman Catholic, Baptist, or other denominational colleges. It might also be interesting 
to focus specifically on any differences which may be due to the geographical region of 
the institutions in the study. Finally, the study could also be replicated within the 
Lutheran sector, but with a different group of respondents, such as chief academic 
officers, chief student affairs officers, faculty, or students. Future research could also be 
conducted on faculty expression and academic freedom using any number of respondent 
groups, either as individuals or in comparison with each other. 
Finally, interesting findings might also be provided if lay members of the church 
bodies were surveyed about their perceptions and expectations with regard to the degree 
to which free expression should be supported on the campuses affiliated with their 
church. Would those not directly involved with higher education hold a view more 
supportive of restraint than college presidents? And would there be any difference 
between the attitudes of members who were and were not college educated; or were and 
were not educated at a Lutheran college or university? Research with these foci might 
contribute to the broader body of literature which is concerned with the significance of 
receiving an education at a particular kind of institution. 
Conclusion 
It appears to be certain that as long as academic communities are populated by 
individuals whose primary purpose is to explore different ideas and engage in 
communication about them, there will be no end of controversy and debate over what 
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constitutes appropriate expression. It would be well, therefore, if institutions which 
consider themselves places of dialogue and learning would occasionally reconsider the 
role that expression should play in the course of its daily activities. Through the means 
of expression itself it might then arrive at some determination regarding the relative 
importance both freedom and restraint -- and, in the case of church-related institutions 
of higher education, truth and love -- are to be given in the academic enterprise. 
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APPENDIX 2 
COVER LETTER ACCOMPANYING FIRST INSTRUMENT 
January 18, 1993 
Dear President : 
Freedom of expression in academic communities has received much attention over the 
last few years. News stories and opinion pieces in both the popular press and The 
Chronicle of Hi~her Education provide accounts of specific incidents and commentary 
on the important principles connected with this controversial issue. Perhaps you saw the 
September/October (1992) Journal of Hi1:her Education which was devoted entirely to 
"Racial Harassment on Campus." Some early efforts at research on this timely topic 
have taken place but more, from both the public and the private sector, is needed. 
I am writing to request your invaluable assistance in a study I am conducting on the 
attitudes of the presidents of Lutheran colleges and universities regarding the nature and 
limits of free expression on their campuses. f am also interested in learning how the 
mission and values of Lutheran institutions of higher education guide their presidents 
in their responses to questions and problems that arise in this area. As president of a 
Lutheran higher education institution, your views will provide valuable insights on this 
topic. As president, you officially represent your institution's perspective on freedom 
of expression at your campus. 
Since the presidents of all the Lutheran colleges and universities in the United States 
have been included in the sample, it is crucial to the study that each one participate. 
Your willingness to cooperate at each stage, therefore, will be greatly appreciated. 
Data collection for this study is being done in three phases. The first is this mailing with 
its request to you to provide certain information about your institution and yourself. 
The second will be a survey of presidential attitudes to be administered at the LECNA 
meeting in February. The distribution of the survey and time for its completion have 
been approved by the executive committee of LECNA, and Don Stoike, the executive 
director, has indicated that a certain amount of enthusiasm about the study has been 
expressed. Those not attending the LECNA meeting will be mailed a copy of the survey 
and requested to complete it shortly after the meeting is held. The final phase will 
involve personal interviews conducted at a later time with a smaller number of the 
presidents. Your willingness to participate in the interview stage will be requested in the 
survey administered at the LECNA meeting. Again, a 100 percent response rate for the 
first two stages is being hoped for and is possible with your help. 
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For this first part, then, I am asking that you do three things: 
1. Please complete and ceturn the attached survey which includes 25 items. 
Numbers 1-15 consist of inquiries which will provide information about your 
institution. Numbers 16-25 seek information about you. 
2. Please send me a copy of your institution's Mission Statement or whatever most 
closely approximates such a document. 
3. Please send me a copy of any written code or policy which may specifically 
address the issue of expression on your campus, including anything that limits, 
restricts, or prohibits expression of any kind for any reason. For the purposes 
of this study, expression refers to any written, spoken, or symbolic 
communication from one person to another person or group of people. 
Please return the above items in the enclosed envelope. Under no circumstances will 
you be identified by name or institution in the analysis and reporting of this study. If 
you have any questions please call me at 708-209-3007 (office, with phone mail) or 708-
344-2259 (home). 
I look forward to receiving your early reply and to seeing you at the LECN A meeting 
in February. 
Sincerely, 
H. Robert Hayes 
Vice President and Dean of Students 
Associate Professor of Political Science 
APPENDIX 3 
FIRST SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
Please provide the requested information about the college or university you serve and 
return it, along with a copy of the institution's Mission Statement, in the enclosed 
envelope. Thank you. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
What was the institution's total undergraduate enrollment (headcount) for fall, 
1992? 
What percentage of the undergraduate students is Lutheran? 
How many full-time faculty (including those assigned to administrative duties) 
are there? 
What percentage of the full-time faculty members is Lutheran? 
How many theology or religion courses are required for graduation as part of the 
institution's general education requirement for undergraduate students? __ _ 
How often in a typical week are worship services or formal group devotions 
conducted on the campus (not including convocations or assemblies)? 
per week 
How often is Holy Communion celebrated on the campus? 
___ per month 
___ per week 
Does each academic year begin with an event which could be considered a 
worship service? 
Yes No 
Does each academic year conclude with a baccalaureate or closing worship 
service? 
Yes No 
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10. Do faculty meetings typically begin with a prayer or some other form of 
devotional activity? 
Always Usually Seldom Never 
11. ls the president required to be a member of the sponsoring church? 
Yes __ _ No __ _ NIA (for independent) __ _ 
12. Is the president required to be a member of the sponsoring church's clergy? 
Yes __ _ No __ _ NIA (for independent) __ _ 
13. Is there any individual or group in the structure of the institution's sponsoring 
church body, besides your local board of regents or trustees, which has a legal 
right to exercise control over institutional policy? 
Yes __ _ No __ _ NI A (for independent) __ _ 
14. Does the institution have a written policy or code that specifically limits, restricts, 
or prohibits expression of any kind for any reason? If so, please return a copy 
of it aloni with this survey. 
Yes ___ No __ _ 
15. Indicate denominational affiliation of the institution today and in 1985. 
1993 1985 
American Lutheran Church NIA 
Church of Lutheran Confession 
Evan. Lutheran Synod 
Evan. Lutheran Church in America 
Lutheran-Independent 
Lutheran Church in America 
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod 
Wisconsin Evan. Lutheran Synod 
NIA 
NIA 
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PERSONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Please check the appropriate space 
or provide the requested information for the following items. 
16. Age: 30-34 __ 
35-39 __ 
40-44 __ 
45-49 __ 
50-54 __ _ 
55-59 __ 
60-64 __ _ 
65-69 __ 
70-74 ---
75-79 __ 
80-84 __ 
17. Racial/ethnic background: Please identify the racial or ethnic category which best 
describes you. (If you feel it is more descriptive, you may check as many as are 
appropriate.) 
African 
Danish 
English 
Finnish 
German 
Irish 
Norwegian 
Slovak 
Swedish 
Other(s) (please specify) ______________ _ 
18. Of what denomination or faith are you a member? 
Church of Lutheran Confession 
Evan. Lutheran Church in America 
Evan. Lutheran Synod 
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod 
Wisconsin Evan. Lutheran Synod 
Other (please specify) 
19. Are you an ordained member of the clergy in any religious denomination? 
Yes ___ No __ _ 
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20. If you are ordained, please indicate rn which denomination you hold clergy 
membership. 
Church of Lutheran Confession 
Evan. Lutheran Church in America 
Evan. Lutheran Synod 
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod 
Wisconsin Evan. Lutheran Synod 
Other (please specify) 
21. Please list your academic degrees, the institutions from which each was received, 
and the major area of study for each program. If you wish, you may also include 
institutions attended for work which did not result in or lead to a degree. 
Institution 
22. How long have you been at your current institution in any capacity? 
23. How long have you been the president at your current institution? 
24. How long have you been an administrator in higher education? 
25. How long have you served in Lutheran higher education? __ _ 
Please sign and date here. 
(Name) (Date) 
Your institution. ___________________________ _ 
Check here if you would like a copy of the results of this study. __ _ 
THANK YOU 
APPENDIX 4 
FOLLOW-UP LETTER TO THOSE NOT RESPONDING TO FIRST SURVEY 
January 25, 1993 
Dear President : 
Last week a questionnaire which represents the first phase of a study I am conducting 
on the attitudes of all the Lutheran college and university presidents on the issue of free 
expression was mailed to you. As I indicated in my cover letter, every president has 
been included in the survey and the hope is for a 100 percent response. 
A number of surveys have already been returned. As of today, however, yours is not 
among them. If you have, in fact, already sent me your completed three-page, twenty-
five-item instrument called "Survey of Lutheran College and University Presidents," 
please accept my sincere thanks. If you have not, please do so today. Due to the 
nature of the study, the response of each president is crucial. 
If for some reason you did not receive the questionnaire, or it has been misplaced, I 
have enclosed another copy along with the original letter. Again, your participation is 
important and greatly appreciated. 
As the letter indicates, the second phase of the study will be administered on February 
8, at the LECNA meeting in Florida. If you do not attend that meeting l will be sending 
you a copy of that questionnaire in the mail as well. By all means, please complete this 
survey and the next one even if you do not attend the meeting. 
I look forward to hearing from you soon and, hopefully, seeing you in another week or 
so. 
Sincerely, 
H. Robert Hayes 
Vice President and Dean of Students 
Associate Professor of Political Science 
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APPENDIX 5 
SECOND SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
This survey is designed to obtain your responses to statements concerning the nature and 
limits of free expression in society at large, in Lutheran higher education in general, and 
also on your particular campus, especially as it relates to the rights of students. 
It is important that you answer each item in terms of your official position as president 
of your institution instead of as a private citizen. This is not to suggest that the 
responses would necessarily be different from one role to the other; only to emphasize 
that this is a survey of the attitudes of Lutheran college and university presidents. 
Therefore, please respond on behalf of your institution and not on the basis of your 
personal opinion. 
To study responses in relation to institutional characteristics, I need to know the identity 
of each respondent. Consequently, I ask that you write your name and the name of your 
institution at the end of this survey instrument. Please be assured that under no 
circumstances will you be identified by name or institution in the analysis or reporting 
of this study. 
Spaces have also been provided at the end for you to indicate whether you would be 
willing to participate in the interview phase of this study and whether you would like to 
receive a copy of the results of this survey. 
Thank you for your participation. 
DIRECTIONS: Please respond to each statement by selecting one of the following five 
choices and putting the number corresponding to your response in the space next to 
each item. NOTE WELL: For purposes of this survey, the term expression refers to any 
written, spoken, or symbolic communication from one person to another person or 
group. 
1. strongly agree 
2. mildly agree 
3. neither agree nor disagree 
4. mildly disagree 
5. strongly disagree 
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[NOTE: The numbers in the spaces were not included on the instrument as administered 
but represent the responses considered to be the ones most supportive of free expression 
and used to calculate the score of support for freedom or restraint of expression.] 
1 -----'1"--_ 
2_~5"--_ 
3 -----'1"--_ 
4_~5"--_ 
5 _~1"--_ 
6 _~5"--_ 
7_~1~_ 
8_~5 __ 
9 _~5"--_ 
10_~1 __ 
11_~1 __ 
12_~1~_ 
13_~5 __ 
Freedom of expression is one of the most important rights in a 
democratic society. 
There are some issues which should not be discussed in any setting. 
The First Amendment's right to free expression should be considered an 
absolute right; that is, no law should be passed which abridges this 
freedom. 
Some expression may be so offensive as to lack any social or educational 
value. 
If, in a given situation, the right to free expression finds itself in direct 
conflict with another constitutional right (such as the right to be free from 
discriminatory treatment), free expression should be given preference. 
Just because a person has a constitutional right to say something does not 
necessarily mean it is morally right to say it. 
The Constitution protects some expression that is inconsistent with certain 
Christian values and beliefs. 
A person who can demonstrate that genuine offense was caused by the 
expression of another should be able to succeed in a civil suit against that 
individual. 
A person who can demonstrate that genuine offense was caused by the 
expression of another should be able to find recourse in the criminal laws 
of the state. 
Freedom of expression is one of the most valuable commodities than can 
exist on any college or university campus. 
The discussion of unpopular ideas is an essential aspect of a liberal 
education. 
The discussion of ideas which may be offensive to certain individuals or 
groups is occasionally necessary to accomplish the goals of a liberal 
education. 
It is appropriate to put limits on expression because of the time, place, or 
manner in which it occurs. 
14 __ 5 __ 
15 ------"-1 __ 
16 __ _ 
17 __ 5 __ 
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Some topics are appropriate to discuss in a classroom setting but not 
outside the class. 
Students should be able to say anything they want when they are in their 
residence hall rooms. 
Students and professors sf-tould be held to the same standard regarding 
free expression when acting as members of the campus community. 
Outside speakers should have greater freedom while on the campus 
making a presentation th&n is typically allowed students or professors 
addressing the same issue in a class. 
18 1 The institution you serve Would take the same action against a student for 
----
19 _-----"-1 __ 
20 __ 5 __ 
21 __ 5 __ 
22_-=5 __ 
23 _--=5 __ 
24_-=5 __ 
25 -----"-I __ 
26 __ 5 __ 
27_~1 __ 
inappropriate off-campus expression as it would if the expression had 
occurred on the campus. 
Lutheran colleges and Universities should always follow the same 
standards for expression a~ public colleges and universities. 
Lutheran colleges and universities should place a higher priority on a 
person's feelings than on allother's right to say something offensive to that 
person. 
Some expression could be considered to be m clear conflict with the 
religious values of the institution you serve. 
Expression which is considered to be in clear conflict with the religious 
values of the institution you serve would be prohibited and punished. 
Lutheran colleges and universities should establish and enforce limits on 
expression which is found to be offensive by certain identifiable groups 
on the campus. 
Lutheran colleges and universities should establish policies which make 
punishable the uttering of tacial epithets. 
Lutheran colleges and UtJ.iversities should not prohibit and punish 
expression which is in CO£lflict with its values, but respond only with 
admonition, education, and information about why it opposes the position 
it finds offensive. 
Public colleges and univetsities should establish policies which make 
punishable the uttering of tacial epithets. 
The student newspaper at a public college or university should have a 
right to carry an advertisefllent for an abortion clinic. 
28 _ _.....1 __ 
29_~1~_ 
30_~1~_ 
31 _~l~_ 
32 _ _.....1 __ 
33_~5~_ 
34 _---=5 __ 
35_~1~-
36 _ _.....1 __ 
3 7 -------"--1 __ 
38 _ _.....1 __ 
39_~1~_ 
40_~1~_ 
244 
The student newspaper at the institution you serve would be permitted to 
carry an advertisement for an abortion clinic. 
The student newspaper at the institution you serve is free to criticize your 
administrative decisions. 
The student newspaper at a Lutheran college or university should be free 
to criticize the position taken by the sponsoring church body on a matter 
of public policy. 
The student newspaper at a Lutheran college or university should be free 
to criticize the position taken by the sponsoring church body on a matter 
relating to church practice. 
The student newspaper at a Lutheran college or university should be free 
to criticize the position taken by the sponsoring church body on a matter 
of biblical interpretation. 
You would restrict the distribution of an unofficial (or "underground") 
student newspaper on your campus regardless of whether any of its 
content was offensive. 
You would restrict the distribution of an unofficial (or "underground") 
student newspaper on your campus only if its content was offensive. 
Students at a public college or university should be free to display a 
Confederate flag on the door of their residence hall room. 
Students at a public college or university should be free to wear clothing 
on the campus which clearly communicates that a specified racial or 
ethnic group is intellectually inferior. 
Students at a public college or university should be free to wear clothing 
on the campus which clearly communicates that a specified racial or 
ethnic group should be exterminated. 
Students at the institution you serve would be free to display a 
Confederate flag on the door of their residence hall room. 
Students at the institution you serve would be free to wear clothing on the 
campus which clearly communicates that a specified racial or ethnic 
group is intellectually inferior. 
Students at the institution you serve would be free to wear clothing on the 
campus which clearly communicates that a specified racial or ethnic 
group should be exterminated. 
41 _ _____,_1 --
42_----=-.1 __ 
43 -----'1'-----
44 _--=5 __ 
45_~5~_ 
46 -----''---
47 _--=5 __ 
48_~5~_ 
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College and university campuses should be the most tolerant places when 
it comes to expression and the free exchange of ideas, whatever their 
value. 
Expression which might not be tolerated in society at large should be 
allowed on a public college or university campus because of the academic 
interest in seeking the truth by any means. 
Expression which might not be tolerated in society at large should be 
allowed on a Lutheran college or university campus because of the 
academic interest in seeking the truth by any means. 
Expression on public college and university campuses should adhere to 
a higher standard of decency than is required in society at large because 
more is expected of those who are supposed to be engaged in legitimate 
intellectual pursuits. 
Expression on Lutheran public college and university campuses should 
adhere to a higher standard of decency than is required in society at large 
because more is expected of those who are supposed to be engaged 111 
legitimate intellectual pursuits. 
Expression which could be considered offensive or defamatory because 
it contains a message intended to hurt its hearers through the use of 
language that is racist, sexist, or based on some other characteristic of the 
hearer presents a problem that is primarily legal or constitutional in 
nature. 
Expression which could be considered offensive or defamatory because 
it contains a message intended to hurt its hearers through the use of 
language that is racist, sexist, or based on some other characteristic of the 
hearer presents a problem that is primarily moral or ethical in nature. 
Expression which could be considered offensive or defamatory because 
it contains a message intended to hurt its hearers through the use of 
language that is racist, sexist, or based on some other characteristic of the 
hearer presents a problem that is primarily theological or spiritual in 
nature. 
Your name ____________ Your institution ___________ _ 
Please check here if you would be willing to participate in the interview phase 
of this study. 
Please check here if you would like to receive a copy of the results of this survey. 
THANK YOU 
APPENDIX 6 
LETTER SENT WITH SECOND SURVEY TO THOSE 
NOT IN ATTENDANCE AT LECNA MEETING 
February I 0, 1993 
Dear President ___ _ 
As part of a study I am doing on the attitudes of Lutheran college and university 
presidents regarding free expression on their campuses, I am attempting to get responses 
on two different survey instruments from all 45 of the individuals who lead Lutheran 
institutions of higher education in the United States. 
As you may recall, the first was mailed in the middle of January. I would like to take 
this opportunity to thank you for completing your copy and returning it to me. The 
second was administered at the LECNA meeting February 8-9, in Florida, which you did 
not attend. Therefore, I am enclosing a copy of that and would request that you 
complete and return it right away so your responses can be analyzed along with those 
of your fellow presidents. 
Because of the nature and size of the population being studied, it is very important that 
the highest possible number of responses be included in the study. Your participation 
now can assure that of happening. 
Please return your form in the enclosed envelope. Again, under no circumstances will 
you be identified by name or institution in the analysis of this study. If you have any 
questions please call me at 708-209-3007 (office, with phone mail) or 708-344-2259 
(home). 
I look forward to receiving your early reply, and l thank you for your participation. 
Sincerely, 
H. Robert Hayes 
Vice President and Dean of Students 
Associate Professor of Political Science 
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APPENDIX 7 
LETTER SENT WITH SECOND SURVEY TO THOSE WHO ATTENDED 
LECNA MEETING BUT DID NOT COMPLETE SECOND SURVEY 
February 12, 1993 
Dear President : 
It had been my hope that the setting at Marco Island for the LECNA meeting would 
have provided the most conducive environment for the greatest possible return of my 
survey of Lutheran college and university presidents. As one who also receives many 
requests to fill out these kinds of instruments, I thought that avoiding the mail, your busy 
office, and even busier schedule, and going directly to you and your fellow respondents 
would not only be more convenient but would also provide relatively uniform conditions 
for the administration of the survey. 
For some reason, this did not prove to be true in your case; for even though you were 
kind enough to take the time to complete and return the first instrument which I mailed 
in January, I did not receive the second one handed out last Monday prior to the 
LECNA business meeting. Possibly you had stepped out and did not get one. Perhaps 
you just did not feel like doing it at the time. I also recognize that you may simply 
object to the study, or the instrument, or, as a matter of principle, are unwilling to 
participate. 
I would like respectfully to request that you reconsider and complete the enclosed copy 
and return it to me at your earliest convenience in the envelope provided. It should 
only take about 15-20 minutes. 
A number of your colleagues expressed genuine interest in the project, and I do believe 
that it is attempting to address an extremely important issue in higher education --
especially church-related higher education -- which has obvious implications for our 
institutions and is certainly in keeping with the spirit of both the Lina Meyer lecture and 
Dr. Pelikan 's keynote speech. 
Please take the time to become part of this project. Again, except for the fact that I will 
be aware of your responses, you will not be identified by name or institution in the 
analysis or reporting of this study. If you have any questions or wish to discuss some 
aspect of the study with me, please do not hesitate to call me at 708-209-3007 (office) or 
708-344-2259 (home). 
Sincerely, 
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APPENDIX 8 
LETTER TO THOSE INDICATING A WILLINGNESS 
TO PARTICIPATE IN INTERVIEW PHASE 
March 30, 1993 
Dear President : 
Thank you for taking the time to complete my survey on the attitudes of Lutheran 
college and university presidents concerning free expression on their campuses. I am 
also grateful for your willingness to participate in the interview phase of this study. 
I recognize that you are very busy, and I would like to try to make this experience as 
convenient for you as possible. Therefore, I ask that you pick the date and the time 
when you could spend approximately one hour in a phone interview about freedom of 
expression in church-related institutions of higher education. 
Please indicate on the enclosed sheet three different times, in order of preference, 
sometime between April 5 and May 29, 1993, when I could call you and conduct the 
interview. Feel free to select any time of the day or evening. It is almost assured that 
your first or second choice will be honored. I will mail or fax you a confirmation of 
your date and time along with a copy of the interview questions. 
With your permission I would like to tape record the interview. At no time will the tape 
ever be heard by anyone other than myself and the individual who may transcribe the 
interview. Furthermore, neither you nor your institution will be identified by name in 
the reporting of anything included in the tape. If you do not wish to have the interview 
tape recorded, please so indicate on the enclosed sheet. 
Once again, thank you for your participation. I look forward to receiving your reply 
within the next few days. 
Sincerely, 
Bob Hayes 
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APPENDIX 9 
INTERVIEW APPOINTMENT FORM 
Survey of Lutheran College and University Presidents 
Phase Three 
Interview Appointment Form 
for 
PRESIDENT 
COLLEGE 
Please indicate in the spaces below your first, second, and third choices for your phone 
interview of approximately one hour sometime during April or May and return to me 
in the enclosed envelope. 
Choice 
example 
1st choice 
2nd choice 
3rd choice 
Phone number to be called: 
Month 
April 
Day 
15 
Time/Zone 
3 p.m. E.S.T. 
Please indicate below your willingness to allow me to tape record our conversation. 
____ Check here if you will permit your remarks to be recorded. 
____ Check here if you will not permit your remarks to be recorded. 
Please sign here ______________________ _ 
Return in the enclosed envelope. Thank you. 
Bob Hayes 
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APPENDIX 10 
INTERVIEW CONFIRMATION LETTER 
April 5, 1993 
Dear President : 
Thank you for your prompt response to my request to schedule your phone interview. 
I will call you on 
TUESDAY, APRIL 13, 1993, AT 11:30 A.M., C.D.T. 
The interview should last approximately one hour, give or take five to ten minutes. 
Attached is a copy of the questions we will be discussing. It is my understanding that 
I have your permission to tape record our conversation. 
I appreciate your willingness to do this, and I look forward to speaking with you next 
week. 
Sincerely, 
Bob Hayes 
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APPENDIX 11 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
l. Can you recall anything happening on your campus within the last five years 
which could be considered, in any sense, an "issue" or an "incident" related to 
anyone's freedom of expression? For example, this could include, but not be 
limited to, a racial, ethnic, or gender-related matter. If so, would you please 
identify 
a. the actors involved, 
b. the nature of any controversy present, 
c. the facts in the case, and 
d. how it was resolved. 
2. Are you aware of any current concerns that any members of your campus 
community have with regard to their own right to freedom of expression? If so, 
please elaborate. 
3. Taking a slightly different approach to the matter, are you aware of any concerns 
that anyone on your campus may have regarding the way someone else's exercise 
of freedom of expression is affecting him or her? Please elaborate. 
4. Please identify what criteria you would use to determine the degree of church-
relatedness of your institution. On a scale of 1-5, where 1 represents an 
institution which is not church-related at all and 5 represents an institution which 
is very church-related, rate your institution. Please relate the criteria you 
identified to the rating you gave for your institution. 
5. How do you view the role of free expression in a church-related academic 
community? 
6. What perspectives help inform your approach, or what are the values that most 
influence your attitudes, with regard to the role of free expression at your 
institution? Which are most important and which are least important in your 
mind? 
7. Do you favor a written institutional policy of any sort which would establish 
limits on what can or should be prohibited in terms of any kind of expressive 
activity on your campus? Please elaborate. 
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8. Please describe the approach that is taken by the administration on your campus 
with regard to the students' exercise of free expression, including the role of the 
student newspaper. 
9. Are you aware of any occasion where your Board of Trustees or Regents has 
addressed the issue of freedom of expression on your campus? If so, please 
elaborate. 
APPENDIX 12 
FOLLOW-UP LETTER TO THOSE NOT SCHEDULING INTERVIEWS 
April 26, 1993 
Dear President : 
A few months ago, when you completed my survey on the attitudes of Lutheran college 
and university presidents concerning free expression on their campuses, you indicated 
a willingness to participate in the interview phase of the study. On March 30, I sent you 
a letter and a form to fill out and return to me which allowed you to select the time 
when you would like the interview to take place. As of today, I have not yet received 
your reply. 
If you have sent your form back but have not received a confirmation and list of 
questions from me, please contact me at (708) 209-3007 as soon possible. If you have 
decided that you would rather not participate after all, it would also be helpful for me 
to know that. If you could send back the "Interview Appointment Form" or call me 
with your decision, it would be greatly appreciated. 
Naturally, it is my hope that you still are willing but simply have not been able to 
respond. The interviews which have already been conducted have ranged from about 
30 minutes to an 1 hour and 15 minutes, but the typical call lasts less than three-quarters 
of an hour. Those who have participated so far seem to have found it to be interesting, 
and at least worth the time invested in the exercise. For me, it has been quite rewarding. 
Please consider remaining in the interview group and return the enclosed form as soon 
as possible. If you want to participate but cannot find a time in April or May, it would 
be possible to extend the time for interviews into the first two weeks of June, if 
necessary. If you choose to remain in the study I will mail or fax you a confirmation of 
your date and time along with a copy of the interview questions. Regardless of what you 
decide, I hope to hear from you soon. 
Best wishes as you conclude your current academic year. 
Sincerely, 
Bob llayes 
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APPENDIX 13 
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO FIRST SURVEY 
[Based on data collected from 43 respondents) 
1. What was the institution's total undergraduate enrollment (headcount) for fall, 
1992? 
f % 
500 or less 6 14 
501-1000 11 26 
1001-1500 10 23 
1501-2000 5 12 
2001-2500 6 14 
2501-3000 4 9 
Over 3000 1 2 
2. What percent of the undergraduate students are Lutheran? 
f % 
Under 10% 3 7 
10-19% 6 14 
20-29% 4 9 
30-39% 8 19 
40-49% 5 12 
50-59% 8 19 
60-69% 3 7 
70-79% 1 2 
80-89% 1 2 
90-99% 1 2 
100% 3 7 
3. How many full-time faculty (including those assigned to administrative duties) 
are there? 
f % 
50 or less 12 28 
51-100 15 35 
101-150 6 14 
151-200 5 12 
201-250 1 2 
251-300 3 7 
no response 1 2 
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4. What percent of the fuJl-time faculty members are Lutheran? (40 responses; 3 
spaces left blank] 
f % 
"Don't know" 4 9 
Under 10% 1 2 
10-19% 3 7 
20-29% 3 7 
30-39% 5 12 
40-49% 2 5 
50-59% 5 12 
60-69% 2 5 
70-79% 1 2 
80-89% 1 2 
90-99% 6 14 
100% 7 16 
no response 3 7 
5. How many theology or religion courses are required for graduation as part of the 
institution's general education requirement for undergraduate students? 
no. of courses f % 
0 2 5 
1 6 14 
2 15 35 
3 8 19 
4 7 16 
5 0 0 
6 2 5 
7 0 0 
8 1 2 
no response 2 5 
6. How often in a typical week are worship services or formal group devotions 
conducted on the campus (not including convocations or assemblies)? 
no of services f % 
1 3 7 
2 7* 16 
2.5 1 2 
3 3 7 
4 5** 12 
5 8 19 
6 5 12 
7 3 7 
8 1 2 
6-8 1 2 
8-9 l 2 
9 2 5 
11 
12 
15 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
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* l"2 Lutherai.; there are also Catholic and Jewish services."] 
** ["4, plus 3 Catholic masses per week; 1 Sabbath per week in Jewish Center.] 
7. How often is Holy Communion celebrated on the campus? lTotals more than 
43 due to multiple responses.] 
per week 
no. of times f 
1 18 
1.5 1 
2 3 
1-2 1 
5 1 
per month 
f 
1 7 
2 1 
4 2 
6 2 
8 1 
[includes "l + every other Sunday"] 
per semester 
f 
1 1 
2 1 
per year 
f 
0 7* 
2 1 
[* 2 responses which 
never have it on campus 
explain that students 
take it in local 
congregations.] 
8. Does each academic year begin with an event which could be considered a 
worship service? 
f % 
Yes 36 84 
No 7 1~ 
* [One of these is a "convocation with an invocation.") 
9. Does each academic year conclude with a baccalaureate or closing worship 
service? 
f % 
Yes 42 98 
No 1 2 
10. Do faculty meetings typically begin with a prayer or some other form of 
devotional activity? 
f % 
Always 37 86 
Usually 3 7 
Seldom 
Never 
1 
2 
2 
5 
11. Is the president required to be a member of the sponsoring church? 
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Yes 
No 
f 
9 
34 
lJ{, 
21 
79 [2 added: but does have to be Lutheran] 
12. Is the president required to be a member of the sponsoring church's clergy? 
Yes 
No 
f 
4 
39 
% 
9 
91 
13. ls there any individual or group in the structure of the institution's sponsoring 
church body, besides your local board of regents or trustees, which has a legal 
right to exercise control over institutional policy? 
Yes 
No 
f 
16 
27 
% 
37 
63 
14. Does the institution have a written policy or code that specifically limits, restricts, 
or prohibits expression of any kind for any reason? [42 responses, one left blank] 
f 
Yes 19 
No 23 
no response 1 
% 
44 
54 
2 
[One "no" added: "Unless the expression constitutes sexual harassment or creates 
a hostile working environment. Another "no" stated: "However, there are 
expectations outlined in the Faculty Handbook which are relevant. . . . I sense 
they are fairly typical of expectations for faculty with, perhaps, the exception of 
expression related to our mission in a church-related college.] 
15a. Indicate denominational affiliation of the institution in L 993. 
Church of Lutheran Confession 
Evan. Lutheran Synod 
Evan. Lutheran Church in America 
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod 
Lutheran-Independent 
Wisconsin Evan. Lutheran Synod 
f 
1 
1 
27 
11 
0 
3 
[ One ELCA college left blank for '93; two did not participate.] 
% 
2 
2 
63 
26 
0 
7 
15b. Indicate denominational affiliation of the institution in 1985. 
American Lutheran Church 
Church of Lutheran Confession 
Evan. Lutheran Synod 
Joint ALC/LCA 
Lutheran-Independent 
Lutheran Church in America 
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod 
Wisconsin Evan. Lutheran Synod 
PERSONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
f % 
16. Age: 45-49 11 26 
50-54 10 23 
55-59 10 23 
60-64 7 16 
65-69 4 9 
70-74 0 0 
75-79 1 2 
f 
9 
1 
1 
2 
0 
15 
11 
3 
% 
21 
2 
2 
5 
0 
35 
26 
7 
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17. Racial/ethnic background: Please identify the racial or ethnic category which best 
describes you. (If you feel it is more descriptive, you may check as many as are 
appropriate.) 
f % 
African 1 2 
Danish 0 0 
English 3 7 
Finnish 1 2 
German 20 46 
Irish 2 5 
Norwegian 2 5 
Slovak 0 0 
Swedish 2 5 
Norwegian/Swedish 2 5 
English/Norwegian 1 2 
German/Norwegian/Swedish 1 2 
Danish/German 1 2 
Danish/Norwegian 1 2 
English/German 1 2 
Danish/Swedish 1 2 
English/German/Irish 1 2 
German/Irish/Norwegian/Scottish/Swiss/Polish 1 2 
Unknown (adopted) 1 2 
18. Of what denomination or faith are you a member? 
f 
Church of Lutheran Confession 
Evan. Lutheran Church in America 24 
Evan. Lutheran Synod 
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod l l 
Wisconsin Evan. Lutheran Synod 3 
Other: Presbyterian 1 
no response 2 
* [one ELCA respondent noted: "not formal member"] 
% 
2 
56" 
2 
26 
7 
2 
5 
19. Are you an ordained member of the clergy in any religious denomination? 
f % 
Yes 17 39.5 
No 26 60.5 
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20. If you are ordained, please indicate in which denomination you hold clergy 
membership. N = 17. 
Church of Lutheran Confession 
Evan. Lutheran Church in America 
Evan. Lutheran Synod 
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod 
Wisconsin Evan. Lutheran Synod 
21. Education. 
Under2raduate de2rees, institutions, and majors 
AA Bethany Lutheran College (MN) 
Concordia College (St. Paul) 
Concordia College (Selma) 
St. John's College (KS) 
St. Paul's College (MO) 
Suorni College 
BA Augustana (IL) 
Augustana (IL) 
Augustana (IL) 
Baylor University 
Bethany College (KS) 
Brown University 
Concordia (Moorhead) 
Concordia (Moorhead) 
Concordia (Moorhead) 
Concordia Senior College (IN) 
Concordia Seminary (St. Louis) 
Concordia Seminary (St. Louis) 
f 
1 
7 
0 
7 
2 
Pre-Seminary 
German 
History 
Philosophy 
History. English 
History 
European History 
Economics 
Speech, Economics 
Philosophy 
% 
6 
41 
0 
41 
12 
Biblical Languages, Humanities 
BS 
Concordia Teachers College (IL) 
Franklin and Marshall College 
Gettysburg College 
Gustavus Adolphus College 
Dana College 
Lenoir-Rhyne College 
Luther College 
Miami University (Ohio) 
Northwestern College (MN) 
Northwestern College (MN) 
Northwestern College (MN) 
Northwestern University 
Occidental College 
St. Olaf College 
University of Tennessee-Chattanooga 
Wartburg College 
Wheaton College 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
Yale University 
Capital University 
Concordia Teachers College (NE) 
Concordia Teachers College (NE) 
Concordia Teachers College (NE) 
Concordia Teachers College (NE) 
Dr. Martin Luther College 
Drexel University 
Mankato State University 
Muhlenberg College 
BSEd Concordia Teachers College (IL) 
Concordia Teachers College (NE) 
BMus Cosmopolitan School of Music 
Graduate degrees, institutions, and majors 
MA Ball State University 
Brown University 
University of Chicago 
Eastern Michigan University 
Emory University 
Harvard University 
University of Illinois 
Indiana University-Bloomington 
University of Iowa 
Marquette University 
Michigan State University 
Education, Church Music 
Biology 
Mathematics 
English 
History 
Economics 
Political Science 
Liberal Arts, Languages 
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Religion, Languages, and History 
Pre-theology 
Mathematics 
Philosophy, Psychology 
English 
Math, Psychology 
History 
Psychology 
Philosophy 
Interdisciplinary 
Chemistry 
Biology 
English 
Secondary Music Education 
Elementary Education 
Elementary Education 
Mathematics 
Biology, Education 
Education 
Elementary Education 
Theory 
American Literature 
American Economic History 
History of Christianity 
Education 
History 
Philosophy 
History 
Zoology-Genetics 
Political Science 
Educational Administration 
Rhetoric and Public Address 
University of Northern Colorado 
Northwestern University 
University of Oregon 
University of Pennsylvania 
Presbyterian School of Christian Ed. 
Rutgers University 
Wake Forest University 
University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
Yale University 
Yale University 
MEd Concordia Teachers College (NE) 
University of Missouri 
Ohio State University 
MMus Cleveland Institute of Music 
MMusEd Wayne State University 
MSEd Moorhead State University (MN) 
MS Ohio University 
Purdue University 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
STM Concordia Seminary (St. Louis) 
Concordia Seminary (St. Louis) 
Lutheran Theological Seminary (PA) 
Th M Princeton Theological Seminary 
ABD Marquette University 
CAS Harvard University 
EdD Harvard University 
Marquette University 
University of Nebraska 
Pepperdine University 
PhD Brown University 
University of Chicago 
University of Colorado 
University of Denver 
Indiana University-Bloomington 
University of Michigan 
Ecology 
Rhetoric, Public Address 
Mathematics 
American Studies 
Mathematics 
Biology 
English Literature 
Medieval English 
History (Church History) 
Church History 
Elementary Education 
Counseling 
Educational Administration 
Composition 
Music Education 
Educational Administration 
Chemistry 
Speech, Philosophy 
Curriculum and Instruction 
Education 
New Testament 
Church History 
New Testament Theology 
Educational Administration 
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Higher Ed. Admin., Social Policy 
Education 
Education 
Educational Administration 
Administration 
American Civilization 
American Religious History 
Philosophy 
Religion 
Zoology-Genetics 
Education 
University of Michigan 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
University of Nebraska 
Northwestern University 
Northwestern University 
Ohio University 
Oklahoma University 
University of Oregon 
University of Pennsylvania 
University of Pennsylvania 
University of Pittsburgh 
Princeton University 
Princeton Theological Seminary 
Purdue University 
University of Southern California 
SUNY Buffalo 
University of Texas 
Union Seminary (NYC) 
Wayne State University 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
Yale University 
Yale University 
Yale University 
SMD Union Theological Seminary 
ThD Lutheran School of Theology 
Divinity degrees, institutions, and majors 
BD Concordia Seminary (St. Louis) 
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Communication Theory and Research 
Educational Administration 
Physiology 
History/Church History 
Rhetoric, Public Address 
Chemistry 
Zoology, Parasitology 
Mathematics 
Religious Thought 
American Studies 
Mathematics 
Mathematics 
New Testament 
Speech, Philosophy 
Educational Psychology 
Social Psychology 
Higher Education Administration 
Reformation Studies 
Education 
Curriculum and Instruction 
History 
History (Church History) 
Church History 
Sacred Music 
New Testament 
Concordia Theological Seminary (IL) Theology 
Garrett Theological Seminary 
Luther Seminary (St. Paul) 
Luther Theological Seminary Theology 
Lutheran Theology Seminary Philadelphia 
STB Harvard Divinity School 
CRM Wisconsin Lutheran Seminary 
CTh Luther Seminary (St. Paul) 
Colloquy Concordia Seminary (St. Louis) 
MDiv Augustana Seminary (IL) 
Concordia Seminary (St. Louis) 
Concordia Seminary (St. Louis) 
Theology 
Theology 
Theology 
New Testament 
Concordia Theological Seminary (IL) 
Lutheran School of Theology (IL) 
Lutheran School of Theology (IL) 
Wisconsin Lutheran Seminary 
Wisconsin Lutheran Seminary 
Lutheran Theol. Southern Seminary 
Professional degrees, institutions, and majors 
JD Ohio State University 
MBA Drexel 
Wake Forest University 
Additional or Post-doctoral work 
Carnegie-Mellon University 
Charles University (Prague, Czechoslovakia) 
Columbia University 
Eastman School of Music 
Harvard University 
Harvard University Inst. for Ed. Management 
University of Michigan 
University of Minnesota 
University of Minnesota 
National War College 
New York Theological Seminary 
Philipps Universitat (Marburg, Germany) 
University of Puerto Rico 
University of Texas 
Union Theological Seminary (Strassbourg) 
United States Coast Guard Academy 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
Theology 
Theology 
Theology 
Church History 
Law 
College Management 
History 
Administration 
History, Music 
International Relations 
Bible 
History 
Spanish (Spoken) 
Education 
Marine Engineering 
Social Work 
22. How long have you been at your current institution in any capacity? 
f % 
0-5 years 17 39 
6-10 8 19 
11-15 6 14 
16-20 4 9 
21-25 2 5 
26-30 4 9 
31-35 2 5 
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23. How long have you been the president at your current institution? 
f % 
0-5 years 20 46 
6-10 9 21 
11-15 9 21 
16-20 5 12 
24. How long have you been an administrator in higher education? 
0-5 years 
6-10 
11-15 
16-20 
21-25 
26-30 
31-35 
f 
0 
6 
10 
9 
8 
8 
2 
% 
0 
14 
23 
21 
19 
19 
5 
25. How long have you served in Lutheran higher education? 
0-5 years 
6-10 
11-15 
16-20 
21-25 
26-30 
31-35 
36-40 
41-45 
f 
7 
5 
2 
5 
5 
10 
6 
2 
1 
% 
16 
12 
5 
12 
12 
23 
14 
5 
2 
264 
APPENDIX 14 
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO SECOND SURVEY 
[Based on data collected from 40 respondents] 
1. Freedom of expression is one of the most important rights in a democratic 
society. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
36 
4 
0 
0 
0 
% 
90 
10 
0 
0 
0 
2. There are some issues which should not be discussed in any setting. 
3. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
4 
4 
1 
10 
21 
% 
10 
10 
2.5 
25 
52.5 
[Comment: One respondent underlined the words "issues" and "discussed" in 
this item.] 
The First Amendment's right to free expression should be considered an absolute 
right; that is, no law should be passed which abridges this freedom. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f % 
9 22.5 
7 17.5 
6 15 
5 12.5 
13 32.5 
[Comment: One respondent added, "e.g., 'fire' in a theater." Another stated, 
"yelling fire in a crowded theater, et al."] 
4. Some expression may be so offensive as to lack any social or educational value. 
f % 
strongly agree 28 70 
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5. 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
9 
1 
0 
2 
22.5 
2.5 
0 
5 
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If, in a given situation, the right to free expression finds itself in direct conflict 
with another constitutional right (such as the right to be free from discriminatory 
treatment), free expression should be given preference. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
2 
5 
15 
11 
7 
% 
5 
12.5 
37.5 
27.5 
17.5 
[Comment: One respondent underlined "discriminatory treatment" in the item 
and stated that "this is not a constitutionally protected right."] 
6. Just because a person has a constitutional right to say something does not 
necessarily mean it is morally right to say it. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
35 
4 
0 
0 
1 
% 
87.5 
10 
0 
0 
2.5 
7. The Constitution protects some expression that ts inconsistent with certain 
Christian values and beliefs. 
8. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
"?" 
f 
25 
7 
4 
2 
1 
1 
% 
62.5 
17.5 
10 
5 
2.5 
2.5 
[Comment: One respondent wrote, "It appears so" above "The Constitution" in 
this item.] 
A person who can demonstrate that genuine offense was caused by the expression 
of another should be able to succeed in a civil suit against that individual. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f % 
4 10 
11 27.5 
10 25 
6 15 
9 22.5 
9. 
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!Comment: One respondent who answered "strongly disagree" to this item circled 
the word "offense" and added item "8.5" to which he answered "strongly agree": 
"A person who can demonstrate that genuine injury was caused, etc., etc." 
Another underlined "genuine offense" in items 8 and 9 and wrote a question 
mark above the phrase.] 
A person who can demonstrate that genuine offense was caused by the expression 
of another should be able to find recourse in the criminal laws of the state. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f % 
4 10 
10 25 
11 27.5 
6 15 
9 22.5 
[Comment: In the margin next to items 8 and 9, one respondent wrote 
"libel/slander."] 
10. Freedom of expression is one of the most valuable commodities that can exist on 
any college or university campus. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
27 
11 
1 
1 
0 
% 
67.5 
27.5 
2.5 
2.5 
0 
[Comment: One respondent wrote, "I'm not sure it can always take place on a 
Christian campus." Another underlined the word "commodities" in the item.] 
11. The discussion of unpopular ideas is an essential aspect of a liberal education. 
12. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
31 
7 
2 
0 
0 
% 
77.5 
17.5 
5 
0 
0 
[Comment: One respondent, who answered "mildly disagree" to this item, wrote, 
"The discussion of ideas, including those which may be 'unpopular' with some. 
It is the focus growing out of your phrasing which diminishes my 
'enthusiasm.'"] 
The discussion of ideas which may be offensive to certain individuals or groups 
is occasionally necessary to accomplish the goals of a liberal education. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
f % 
25 62.5 
11 27.5 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
2 
2 
0 
5 
5 
0 
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13. It is appropriate to put limits on expression because of the time, place, or manner 
in which it occurs. 
14. 
15. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
16 
20 
1 
1 
2 
% 
40 
50 
2.5 
2.5 
5 
Some topics are appropriate to discuss in a classroom setting but not outside the 
class. 
f % 
strongly agree 2 5 
mildly agree 5 12.5 
neither agree nor disagree 7 17.5 
mildly disagree 12 30 
strongly disagree 14 35 
Students should be able to say anything they want when they are in their 
residence hall rooms. 
f % 
strongly agree 6 15 
mildly agree 6 15 
neither agree nor disagree 6 15 
mildly disagree 14 35 
strongly disagree 7 17.5 
"?" 1 2.5 
[Comment: After answering "?" for this item, the respondent wrote, "There are 
reasonable limits set in law -- yelling 'fire,' e.g." Another asked, "Who else is 
there?" A third stated, "Students do; they have no inherent (or constitutionally 
protected) right to do so."] 
16. Students and professors should be held to the same standard regarding free 
expression when acting as members of the campus community. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f % 
19 
11 
3 
6 
1 
47.5 
27.5 
7.5 
15 
2.5 
[Comment: After underlining "same standard" in this item, the respondent wrote, 
"'same' as each other? As other citizens under the Constitution?"] 
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17. Outside speakers should have greater freedom while on the campus making a 
presentation than is typically allowed students or professors addressing the same 
issue in a class. 
f <}~) 
strongly agree 1 2.5 
mildly agree 6 15 
neither agree nor disagree 6 15 
mildly disagree 14 35 
strongly disagree 13 32.5 
18. The institution you serve would take the same action against a student for 
inappropriate off-campus expression as it would if the expression had occurred 
on the campus. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
"?" 
f 
2 
4 
5 
18 
10 
1 
% 
5 
10 
12.5 
45 
25 
2.5 
19. Lutheran colleges and universities should always follow the same standards for 
expression as public colleges and universities. 
20. 
f % 
strongly agree 2 5 
mildly agree 4 10 
neither agree nor disagree 2 5 
mildly disagree 15 37.5 
strongly disagree 17 42.5 
[Comment: After answering "strongly disagree," one respondent added, "but my 
answer is because at most public universities, prayer, for example, is forbidden. 
Lutheran colleges should not have that standard!" Another, also answering 
strongly disagree, stated, "Not so in liturgical settings; the question is not 
precise."] 
Lutheran colleges and universities should place a higher priority on a person's 
feelings than on another's right to say something offensive to that person. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f % 
4 10 
7 17.5 
12 30 
9 22.5 
8 20 
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21. Some expression could be considered to be in clear conflict with the religious 
values of the institution you serve. 
22. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
27 
10 
2 
1 
0 
% 
67.5 
25 
5 
2.5 
0 
Expression which is considered to be in clear conflict with the religious values 
of the institution you serve would be prohibited and punished. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
2 
5 
6 
12 
15 
5 
12.5 
15 
30 
37.5 
[Comment: One respondent wrote "Hate language that constitutes a threat to 
safety" under this item. Another underlined the word "religious" and added 
"narrowly defined." A third inserted the words "by faculty" after the word 
"Expression" in this item.] 
23. Lutheran colleges and universities should establish and enforce limits on 
expression which is found to be offensive by certain identifiable groups on the 
campus. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
3 
12 
7 
10 
8 
% 
7.5 
30 
17.5 
25 
20 
[Comment: One respondent underlined the words "by certain identifiable groups 
on" in this item, then added a "?" and the words "vs. by the academic 
community?"] 
24. Lutheran colleges and universities should establish policies which make 
punishable the uttering of racial epithets. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
5 
19 
5 
4 
7 
% 
12.5 
47.5 
12.5 
10 
17.5 
[Comment: After circling the word "punishable" in this item, one respondent 
added, "l can't respond until I learn what you mean by this." Another wrote, "I 
25. 
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don't feel l should advocate for the whole."] 
Lutheran colleges and universities should not prohibit and punish expression 
which is in conflict with its values, but respond only with admonition, education, 
and information about why it opposes the position it finds offensive. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f % 
10 25 
16 40 
4 10 
7 
3 
17.5 
7.5 
[Comment: One respondent circled the words "conflict with its values" and 
"offensive," connected them with a line and added, "2 different issues! (could 
be)." Another circled the word "only" and added, "in all cases?" A third wrote 
the word "initially" at the end of this item.] 
26. Public colleges and universities should establish policies which make punishable 
the uttering of racial epithets. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
4 
14 
10 
2 
10 
% 
10 
35 
25 
5 
25 
27. The student newspaper at a public college or university should have a right to 
carry an advertisement for an abortion clinic. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
11 
15 
7 
3 
4 
% 
27.5 
37.5 
17.5 
7.5 
10 
28. The student newspaper at the institution you serve would be permitted to carry 
an advertisement for an abortion clinic. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
7 
5 
3 
5 
20 
% 
17.5 
12.5 
7.5 
12.5 
50 
[Comment: One respondent added, "Note: Policy established by the Board does 
not allow abortion ads. I would tend to allow them." He answered this item 
"strongly agree." One respondent answered "yes," which was counted as 
"strongly agree."] 
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29. The student newspaper at the institution you serve is free to criticize your 
administrative decisions. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
33 
3 
1 
2 
1 
% 
82.5 
7.5 
2.5 
5 
2.5 
[Comment: One respondent answered "yes," which was counted as "strongly 
agree."] 
30. The student newspaper at a Lutheran college or university should be free to 
criticize the position taken by the sponsoring church body on a matter of public 
policy. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
28 
4 
2 
5 
1 
% 
70 
10 
5 
12.5 
2.5 
31. The student newspaper at a Lutheran college or university should be free to 
criticize the position taken by the sponsoring church body on a matter relating 
to church practice. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
26 
3 
4 
7 
0 
% 
65 
7.5 
10 
17.5 
0 
32. The student newspaper at a Lutheran college or university should be free to 
criticize the position taken by the sponsoring church body on a matter of biblical 
interpretation. 
33. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
24 
5 
2 
2 
7 
% 
60 
12.5 
5 
5 
17.5 
You would restrict the distribution of an unofficial (or "underground") student 
newspaper on your campus regardless of whether any of its content was offensive. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
f % 
5 12.5 
3 7.5 
3 7.5 
34. 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
15 
14 
37.5 
35 
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[Comment: One respondent answered "no," which was counted as "strongly 
disagree."] 
You would restrict the distribution of an unofficial (or "underground") student 
newspaper on your campus only if its content was offensive. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
"depends" 
f 
3 
14 
2 
7 
13 
1 
% 
7.5 
35 
5 
17.5 
32.5 
2.5 
[Comment: One respondent wrote the word "extremely" over "unofficial (or 
'underground') student newspaper" and made reference to a "1992 action". 
Another drew a bracket around both items 33 and 34, answered "strongly 
disagree" to both and added, "Another question that is imprecise. The issue is 
not 'official' vs. 'unofficial' ( or underground), but whether those who edit and 
write the 'unofficial' paper identify themselves or not. If not, then it is to be 
regarded as not protected by the canons of academic freedom." Another 
answered "no," which was counted as "strongly disagree."] 
35. Students at a public college or university should be free to display a Confederate 
flag on the door of their residence hall room. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
14 
10 
11 
3 
2 
% 
35 
25 
27.5 
7.5 
5 
[Comment: One respondent circled "free" in items 35-40 and added, "with no 
reaction or response?"] 
36. Students at a public college or university should be free to wear clothing on the 
campus which clearly communicates that a specified racial or ethnic group is 
intellectually inferior. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
"?" 
f 
7 
2 
7 
10 
13 
I 
% 
17.5 
5 
17.5 
25 
32.5 
2.5 
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[Comment: One respondent underlined the words "be free to wear" in this item. 
Another answered "no," which was counted as "strongly disagree."] 
37. Students at a public college or university should be free to wear clothing on the 
campus which clearly communicates that a specified racial or ethnic group 
should be exterminated. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
4 
3 
3 
4 
26 
% 
10 
7.5 
7.5 
10 
65 
[Comment: One respondent answered "no," which was counted as "strongly 
disagree."] 
38. Students at the institution you serve would be free to display a Confederate flag 
on the door of their residence hall room. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
15 
10 
8 
5 
2 
% 
37.5 
25 
20 
12.5 
5 
[Comment: Respondent underlined "be free" in this item, and wrote, "free, yes, 
but counseled not to do so."] 
39. Students at the institution you serve would be free to wear clothing on the 
campus which clearly communicates that a specified racial or ethnic group is 
intellectually inferior. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
5 
2 
4 
13 
16 
% 
12.5 
5 
10 
32.5 
40 
[Comment: One respondent answered "no," which was counted as "strongly 
disagree."] 
40. Students at the institution you serve would be free to wear clothing on the 
campus which clearly communicates that a specified racial or ethnic group 
should be exterminated. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
f 
2 
2 
2 
% 
5 
5 
5 
41. 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
4 
30 
10 
75 
275 
lComment: One respondent answered "no," which was counted as "strongly 
disagree."] 
College and university campuses should be the most tolerant places when it 
comes to expression and the free exchange of ideas, whatever their value. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f % 
14 35 
15 37.5 
5 12.5 
4 10 
2 5 
[ Comment: One respondent underlined the words "free exchange of ideas" in this 
item. Another answered this item "strongly disagree" and added, 
"Mathematicians should not 'tolerate' a statement that 2 + 2 = 5."] 
42. Expression which might not be tolerated in society at large should be allowed on 
a public college or university campus because of the academic interest in seeking 
the truth by any means. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
11 
11 
5 
5 
8 
% 
27.5 
27.5 
12.5 
12.5 
20 
l Comment: One respondent stated, "imprecise: so long as it is not disruptive." 
Another added, "depends on forum."] 
43. Expression which might not be tolerated in society at large should be allowed on 
a Lutheran college or university campus because of the academic interest in 
seeking the truth by any means. 
44. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
10 
9 
5 
5 
11 
% 
25 
22.5 
12.5 
12.5 
27.5 
Expression on public college and university campuses should adhere to a higher 
standard of decency than is required in society at large because more is expected 
of those who are supposed to be engaged in legitimate intellectual pursuits. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
f % 
9 22.5 
14 35 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
5 
5 
7 
12.5 
12.5 
17.5 
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[Comment: One respondent underlined "adhere to a higher standard of decency" 
with a question mark above it. Another circled the word "should." Another 
underlined the word "decency."] 
45. Expression on Lutheran college and university campuses should adhere to a 
higher standard of decency than is required in society at large because more is 
expected of those who are supposed to be engaged in legitimate intellectual 
pursuits. 
46. 
47. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
revised question 
f 
15 
12 
7 
2 
3 
1 
% 
37.5 
30 
17.5 
5 
7.5 
2.5 
[Comment: One respondent drew a line through the words "legitimate 
intellectual pursuits" and replaced them with "religious and spiritual pursuits," 
answering "strongly agree" for the revised question. Another underlined the 
word "decency." A third underlined the words "because more is expected of 
those who are supposed to be engaged in legitimate intellectual pursuits," and 
noted that this is the "wrong reason."] 
Expression which could be considered offensive or defamatory because it 
contains a message intended to hurt its hearers through the use of language that 
is racist, sexist, or based on some other characteristic of the hearer presents a 
problem that is primarily legal or constitutional in nature. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
f 
4 
8 
6 
14 
8 
% 
10 
20 
15 
35 
20 
Expression which could be considered offensive or defamatory because it 
contains a message intended to hurt its hearers through the use of language that 
is racist, sexist, or based on some other characteristic of the hearer presents a 
problem that is primarily moral or ethical in nature. 
f % 
strongly agree 16 40 
mildly agree 20 50 
neither agree nor disagree 2 5 
mildly disagree O 0 
strongly disagree 2 5 
48. 
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[Comment: One respondent who answered "strongly agree" to items 46 and 47 
drew a bracket around them and wrote "both." After item 48, which he left 
blank, he wrote, "No idea what this means."] 
Expression which could be considered offensive or defamatory because it 
contains a message intended to hurt its hearers through the use of language that 
is racist, sexist, or based on some other characteristic of the hearer presents a 
problem that is primarily theological or spiritual in nature. 
strongly agree 
mildly agree 
neither agree nor disagree 
mildly disagree 
strongly disagree 
"?" 
f 
12 
10 
8 
5 
4 
1 
% 
30 
25 
20 
12.5 
10 
2.5 
[Comment: For #s 46-48, one respondent (answering "neither agree nor 
disagree" for all three, added that it is "both constitutional and moral ... and 
spiritual." Another, answering "strongly agree" for all three, wrote, "My 
responses to questions 46, 47 and 48 are contradictory in that not all three can 
be primary at the same time; therefore I have removed the word primary from 
each of the three sentences in selecting my responses."] 
APPENDIX 15 
LETTER SENT WITH SURVEY RESULTS TO THOSE REQUESTING TIIEM 
April 23, 1993 
Dear President : 
Last winter you were kind enough to complete two different questionnaires for my study 
of Lutheran college and university presidents. At that time you indicated that you would 
like to receive a copy of the results. 
Enclosed are the raw tabulations of the responses and a compilation of the information 
provided by you and the other respondents, including all comments which were written 
on the completed instruments. 
Please accept my thanks once more your participation. Best wishes as you conclude the 
current academic year. 
Sincerely, 
Bob Hayes 
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